CHAPTER 2.

PIONEERING INFORMAL LOGIC AND ARGUMENTATION STUDIES

ANTHONY J. BLAIR

Abstract: This paper traces, in a first-person account, my journey from an assistant professor teaching ethics and political philosophy, through (together with Ralph Johnson) teaching “applied logic”, authoring *Logical Self-Defense*, organizing the first-ever symposium on informal logic, editing the proceedings, publishing and editing the *Informal Logic Newsletter* and later the journal *Informal Logic*, organizing later Windsor conferences, revising *Logical Self-Defense;* then meeting van Eemeren and Grootendorst, serving on the board of ISSA, and more – during the emergence of informal logic and argumentation theory as scholarly fields.

PREFACE

The following is an account of my participation in some of the signal developments in the infrastructure supporting the emergence of informal logic and argumentation theory in the last quarter of the 20th century.

1. BEGINNINGS

On September 1st 1967, two months after Canada's centennial celebrations, I began a 39-year appointment in the University of Windsor philosophy department in Windsor, Ontario, Canada. I was hired out of a doctoral program at the nearby University of Michigan, to teach principally philosophical ethics and political theory (which I did teach, among several other things, throughout).

Shortly before the start of the 1972-73 academic year, I was asked to help out with a new course, which my colleague Ralph Johnson had created the previous year that had proven so popular the enrolment had doubled—from 20 to 40, as I recollect—causing the opening of a second section (those were the days!). Johnson, who had been hired to teach modern formal logic among other things, called the course "Applied Logic". Its objective was to improve students' ability to analyze and evaluate the arguments about public affairs to be found in the media of the day, especially in newspapers and magazines. The textbook Johnson had selected for the course was Howard Kahane's *Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric, The Use of Reason in Everyday Life*, which had just been published in 1971. My exposure to logic had been a two-semester symbolic logic course as an undergraduate at McGill University over a decade earlier and a one-semester formal logic course as a graduate student at Michigan. I didn't have tenure at Windsor at the time, so I agreed, but I insisted that I needed Johnson to tutor me. We taught our two sections in sync, covering the same material each class, using the same assignments, tests and final exams in both sections. Most important, we discussed the material and its reception together before and after classes, and shared in the collection of examples to use in assignments, tests and exams. By the second year, while we continued to teach our two classes as two identical sections of a single course, I was at home with the material and we team-taught as equals.

2. THE ORIGINS OF *LOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE* (1973-1976)

The "Applied Logic" course continued to prove popular, although there was a heavy workload of written assignments (with a correspondingly heavy marking load), and the standards were rigorous. It was hard to get an A. In those days courses in most Canadian universities were eight months long, a full academic year. By the end of April, students and teachers in "Applied Logic" were exhausted. But the improvement in the students' analytic and critical skills over the year certainly seemed to be striking. Johnson and I were enthusiastic about the subject matter, and the students themselves recommended the course to their friends as challenging but worthwhile, so we ended up getting a growing enrollment population of serious students prepared to work.

Kahane's approach was to use the informal fallacies as analytic and critical tools. His chapters were peppered with examples of arguments, mainly about political and social issues of the day, which he analyzed and then assessed, modeling the kind of analysis and evaluation the students were expected to apply to the exercise examples at the end of each chapter. Spotting the logical blunders was not always easy, but it was satisfying, and left the critic feeling smugly superior.

Several features of Kahane's book were attractive. (1) According to Kahane, a person who is persuaded by a fallacious argument commits a fallacy no less than does a person who is guilty of making a fallacious argument. So the pressure is on the student both to recognize fallacies and to avoid arguing fallaciously. (2) Kahane made the fallacies student-friendly rather than esoteric by replacing intimidating Latin labels (with the exception of ad hominem) with descriptive English labels. (3) He introduced "new" fallacies that occurred in the arguments of the day, and dropped several from Aristotle's classic list that turned up rarely, if ever, in contemporary discourse. (4) Among the "new" fallacies were problems with an argument's premises; not all fallacies were inferential. (5) The text is thick with examples of short arguments that people of the day made in print, which he used both in explaining each fallacy and in the chapter end exercises. (6) There was a chapter on extended arguments—those in which the author develops and defends several lines of reasoning in support of the conclusion. (7) Kahane included chapters on advertising tricks and on problems with the presentation of the news in the mass media of the day.

Johnson and I liked these features, and they seemed to contribute to the book's success in engaging students. However, before long we began to hand out revisions of portions of the text to our classes. For one thing, excellent though Kahane's examples were, they were almost entirely drawn from the American media and targeted at an audience of U.S. students. We often had to spend time providing backgrounds for examples from the textbook that were necessary if our students were to understand them, explaining such things as how the U.S. republican system of government differed from the Canadian parliamentary system. My undergraduate political science course in comparative governments paid off. We had to hunt for Canadian examples. We spent many an hour in the evening and on weekends pouring through the *Windsor Star*, the *Toronto Globe and Mail*, and *Maclean's* magazine hunting for a nice example of a straw man argument or a case of ambiguity or any of the other twenty or so fallacies that Kahane discussed.

For another thing, we began, usually on the basis of examples that didn't quite fit Kahane's description, to see the need for distinctions that Kahane overlooked or had chosen not to draw. For instance, we found examples of ambiguity some of which traded on a word's being vague—having different meanings that bleed into one another—and others that traded on an equivocation, where there is an actual switch between one clear meaning to another from one premise to the next or from the premises to the conclusion. Or again, dealing with causal arguments we found a distinction Kahane did not emphasize needing to be made between arguments based on causal claims and arguments aimed at establishing causal claims. While we liked the category of what might be termed "premissary" fallacies, we didn't like the need to attribute bad motives to the fallacious arguers that Kahane seemed sometimes to suppose. We also wanted to make clearer and more explicit the fact that while certain patterns of argument could harbor fallacies, arguments exhibiting those patterns were not necessarily fallacious.

Where Kahane would offer a loose description of a fallacy, we found it helpful for our students to provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for each fallacy. This list also helped our students make their case that a particular fallacy had been committed by producing an argument for each condition being met. Kahane enjoined his readers to give their reasons for their fallacy charges, but he did not lay out a set of steps to be followed in order to do so adequately. We found that our students, once familiarized with a particular fallacy, could fairly easily recognize an instance of it, but they had a devil of a time constructing a case that would serve to establish, before a demanding, impartial judge, that the fallacy had been committed. Having the conditions of each fallacy in hand and in mind offered them a way to organize the steps in their case and to provide the detail needed. It also helped us as instructors to be able to pinpoint precisely where a student's case for a charge of fallacy was incomplete, problematic, or mistaken.

We did not appreciate at the time that our defining conditions for each fallacy were describing argument schemes, along with critical questions that would establish their fallacious use if answered affirmatively.

We liked the fact that Kahane went after sources of information, including the news media, and after advertising. But some then-recent books, such as Carl Wrighter's *I Can Sell You Any-*

thing (1972), and Edward Jay Epstein's *News From Nowhere* (1973), plus the inside information we received from Johnson's brother Bud, who worked in advertising, and from my then brother-in-law Don McNeil, who was the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's chief TV news correspondent in Washington, led us to want to revise Kahane's stories about advertising as arguing and media news reports as sources of information as well as to apply the material to Canadian news media and advertising.

Finally, we were dissatisfied with Kahane's classification of the fallacies. He divided them into two groups: arguments that are fallacious even if valid, and those that are fallacious because invalid. Even so, his stipulative definition of validity was to our liking, for it did not rely on a distinction between deductive and inductive arguments, a distinction that is notoriously difficult to apply in practice: "A valid argument is an argument whose premises, if true, alone provide good, or sufficient, grounds for accepting its conclusion" (Kahane 1971, 3).

In the winter of 1976, we received in the mail, as did, it seems, every philosophy department in the U.S.A. and Canada, a form letter from Michael Scriven, a well known philosopher of science at Berkeley, advertising a new textbook he had written and was publishing himself, since his regular publisher, McGraw-Hill (New York), did not think there was a market for it. He said it was "for teaching reasoning skills of an elementary kind, using almost no formalism or technical vocabulary". It was designed to help students develop systematic analyses that "will handle the typical messy and often emotional arguments and prose of politics, propaganda, ethics and practical economics. The basic assumption is that doing this is difficult, important and teachable—and … better taught by a direct approach than via formal logic." This message coincided with our own motivation, and so we ordered copies of the book, called *Reasoning*.

Although Scriven argued against teaching reasoning by teaching fallacies, whereas we aimed in part at doing exactly that, we were influenced by other features of Scriven's book. For instance, we agreed with the direct approach vs. via teaching formal logic, and we shared his view that diagrams can help portray the logical structure of arguments.

After three years of teaching the course together, Johnson and I had, in our class handouts, what amounted to most of the manuscript of a textbook of our own to replace Kahane. However, it took the McGraw-Hill Ryerson textbook salesman, Herb Hilderly, to point this out to us and to urge us to submit a manuscript to his company. (M-HR was the Canadian branch of the American publisher, McGraw-Hill.) We called it *Logical Self-Defense*; our students called it LSD. Several features of Kahane's text found their way into LSD.

3. DIFFICULTIES IN PUBLISHING *LOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE* (1976)

We sent off a manuscript (ms.) of over 500 pages to Toronto. In due course we received a letter from McGaw-Hill Ryerson regretting that the two referees who had reviewed the manuscript both recommended against its publication. The two referees' letters were enclosed. One's principal complaint was that we had not covered enough fallacies. We later learned this critic's name, and he was the author of a textbook that distinguished 92 fallacies! The other attacked the quality of the material. His letter, we noticed, was the original copy, with the author's name only covered by White-Out. I held the letter up to a light, and there, showing through the White-Out, was the author's name, clear as can be.

I was immediately suspicious of the appropriateness of this reviewer, for I knew him. He had been my discussion-group leader in my first philosophy course when I was a junior undergraduate at McGill, and I also knew him from faculty seminars I attended as a senior. He had then shown no great interest in logic, and had a traditional education at Oxford. It seemed to us that he was from the start antagonistic to the non-traditional introduction-to-logic course that *Logical Self-Defense* represented. Moreover, it seemed evident that he had dismissed the book after reading the first few chapters, and had not read it through, for despite his contemptuously-expressed criticisms of the early chapters, he had nothing at all to say about the bulk of the book.

I was furious. After a conversation with Johnson in which we discussed lines of response, I sat down and typed up a long, heated letter to McGraw-Hill Ryerson, arguing that the reviewers represented a traditional approach whereas the ms. could only get a fair, and from M-HR's point of view, a marketing-relevant appraisal from reviewers who could entertain the possibility of such a departure from old-fashioned approaches. Without mentioning that I knew his identity, I took up and argued aggressively against the strongly critical reviewer's objections, point-by-point. I accused him of laziness and of failing to read the entire ms. and invited M-HR to show our response to him. I also included point-by–point rejoinders to the criticisms of the fallacy-favoring referee's report. Johnson read the letter and suggested toning down some of the outrage, which I did, and it went out over both our signatures.

To our surprise, M-HR agreed to send the ms. out to new referees, ones who might be more open to our approach. We later learned that it went to Michael Gilbert at York, and Terence Penelhum at Calgary. Penelhum didn't have time to do the review and suggested his former student, Trudy Govier, then at Trent, who took it on. Both Gilbert and Govier liked the concept and the contents, both recommended publication, and both said the ms. was far too long. One suggested cutting it in half; the other noted that we should leave the instructor something to say in class! M-HR agreed to consider publishing a much-shorter ms. We set to work, cutting the fat from our prose and slashing inessential material. I think we finally submitted a c. 300-page (double-spaced) ms. and M-HR offered us a contract. The first edition was 236 pages long.

4. *LOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE* (1977)

Logical Self-Defense went through three Canadian editions (1977, 1983, 1993). Seeking riches in the American market, in 1993 we asked McGraw-Hill of New York if it would publish the third Canadian edition but with the examples and their discussion replaced with American examples. When we submitted the manuscript, McGraw-Hill insisted on sending it out for review before agreeing to publish it. The reviewers made several good suggestions, so that in revising the manuscript to respond to them, we produced an improvement over the third Canadian edition. The U.S. edition came out in 1994, and to my mind it is the definitive version of *Logical Self-Defense*. It was our impression that McGraw-Hill failed to market the book aggressively, but for whatever reason it did not sell well in the United States and in due course McGraw-Hill remaindered the book and returned the copyright to us. In 2006, through a friendship I had with Robert Trapp, an American debate coach and communication studies scholar who did some work for IDEA (the International Debate Education Association), IDEA Press (New York) published a reprint of the 1994 U.S. edition in 2006, which is still in print.

This is not the place to describe the book in detail or to track the changes made from edition to edition. I will, instead, list what seem to me to be some of its important features in general.

a. The introduction of “Acceptability”, “Relevance” and “Sufficiency” as criteria of logically good arguments and violations of them, respectively, serving as a way of classifying fallacies. These criteria were picked up and used, often without attribution, by several other textbook writers. Some have even taken them to be the earmarks of informal logic. However, (a) Hansen has suggested they are not original, being already distinguished by Chaim Perelman; (b) Siegel has pointed out that sufficiency presupposes relevance, and so inferred that relevance cannot be a separate criterion, and (c) Tindale has shown that there are problems with our handling of all three criteria within the text.

b. Boxed fallacy conditions. These grew more detailed from edition to edition. One condition or set of conditions identified the type of argument, and another condition or set of conditions identified the circumstances in which an occurrence of such a type of argument would be fallacious. We thus held that it is not a particular type of argument that is fallacious, but rather particular uses of it. We thereby were adopting a sort of argument scheme theory, and Walton's view that it is not particular argument schemes that are fallacious, but instead particular misuses of them. Our conditions under which an argument of a given type would be fallacious were an independent version of Hasting's "critical questions". The boxed conditions also served as a checklist for our students, whom we required to make a case for their charge whenever they alleged that a fallacy had been committed. We had discovered that a skill in recognizing the occurrence of fallacies does not correlate with an ability to argue cogently in support of that allegation.

c. Argument analysis. The importance of an analysis of an argument under assessment that lays bare its inferential structure, and the need for a careful, context-sensitive, functional and charitable reading of texts in order to produce a fair and accurate structural analysis.

d. Argument mapping. The introduction of tree diagrams and a numbering convention, both of which convey the illative relations of the argument(s) in a text, including meta- and meta-/meta- arguments. Some students read maps better, others read text better.

e. Complex extended arguments. The expansion of the analytic apparatus to apply to extended arguments: arguments that include many lines of support and much meta-argumentation. Thus we applied what was learned using snippets of arguments to longer, more fully developed arguments.

f. Distinction between persuasion and argument in advertising. A chapter on the “logic” of advertising that explains how the laws governing advertising are rules that permit counter-intuitive invitations to draw inferences. We also argued that advertising often, or even usually, does not use arguments to persuade, although it often uses arguments to mask more effective motivational devices. Too often communication theorists continue to treat advertising as a fertile source of examples of attempts at persuasion by arguing, to our mind missing the masking function of arguments in advertising.

g. Influence of material conditions on information via the news media. We offered advice for watching TV news and reading newspaper news reports. We assumed that these were major sources of information, regarded as reliable, that funded our students’ belief formation. Our approach was not so much to warn students to watch for bias or provincialism as to know how news reports originate, get assigned and written, and must deal with unavoidable distorting properties of the respective media.

h. Use of arguments to support judgments as an aid to learning. The requirement to support a critical analysis of an argument or item of information using arguments was an important learning tool.

i. Fallacies as not-always-fatal flaws. Our emphasis on the fact that fallacies as we conceived them are often corrigible mistakes, so that receiving a charge of fallacy does not necessarily put one in fear of having to abandon a line of argument. Arguments can often be repaired in the wake of successful fallacy charges.

5. THE WINDSOR SYMPOSIUM ON INFORMAL LOGIC

Johnson and I completed *Logical Self-Defense* in 1976, probably in the early fall, for it appeared in 1977. We held the “Symposium on Informal Logic” on 26-28 June 1978, a year and a half later. So it must have been at some point in the late fall of 1976 that we decided to hold a conference on informal logic. What caused us to do so? My memory of the specifics is feeble, so I had best quote from the preface to the proceedings, which was written in 1979, a good deal nearer the event:

> The basic premise behind the calling of the Symposium was a simple one: the time was ripe. Interest in informal logic was growing rapidly. Courses in informal logic or critical reasoning were springing up at an astonishing rate across North America, and work on informal logic in the journals was increasing markedly. At the same time there was little if any contact between philosophers working and teaching in the field. In fact, what was remarkable about the proliferation of informal logic courses and writing was that it appeared to exhibit a sort of unconnected spontaneous generation. Another feature of these developments was a paucity of broadly-focused theory. (The theoretical work in the journals was largely directed in a scattered way at various informal fallacies.) Hence it appeared that the Symposium would serve to highlight the present status of informal logic and provide nurture for its further development. (Blair and Johnson 1980, vii).

We sent flyers advertising the conference to philosophy departments in universities in Canada and in the surrounding states in the U.S. Midwest. The speakers on the program were all invited, for we had no way to issue a call for papers. In fact there was no dedicated source of literature on informal logic. Johnson and I presumed to give the introductory paper, which was a review and analysis of what literature there was. We invited: the two Canadian scholars who had been co-authoring a series of papers analyzing informal fallacies, John Woods and Douglas Walton; the two prominent American textbook authors, Howard Kahane and Michael Scriven; a Canada-based author of a book on fallacies, Alex Michalos, and from neighbouring University of Western Ontario, philosopher Robert Binkley. Finally, we invited the Wittgenstinian professor from York University, Peter Minkus, on the assumption of a Wittgensteinian influence on the emergence of informal logic. There were eight presentations over two and a half days. A ninth paper, by Thomas Tomko and Robert Ennis (who had attended the conference) was added to the Proceedings at Michael Scriven's suggestion.

In addition to more than a dozen colleagues and students from the University of Windsor, some 40-50 university faculty members mainly from surrounding provinces and states registered for the conference. In addition to the invited speakers, among the attendees who previously or later (or both) published in the field were: John Barker, Robert Ennis, David Gallup, Trudy Govier, Nicholas Griffin, David Hitchcock, John McPeck, Stephen Norris, Deborah Orr, Robert Pinto, William Rapaport, Thomas Tomko, and Sheldon Wein.

Part of the folklore of that first informal logic conference involved Professor Minkus, a stereotypically idiosyncratic and impractical professor. A hypochondriac who suffered from various real and exaggerated or imagined ailments, he arrived bearing a large bag of ointments and a shovel handle with which to apply them to his back. The student assistant who took him to his room in a university residence showed him how he could lock the door from the inside by pushing in the button in the handle, and how to open the window by sliding half the window from one side across the other. Left alone, Minkus checked the door.

Finding the button in the doorknob pressed in, he inferred that the door was locked, and then seeing nowhere to insert his door key to unlock it, he concluded that he was locked in his room. He rushed to the window to open it and call for help, but he happened to rush to the side of the window that was fixed and did not slide. In full panic, he grabbed his shovel handle, smashed the window and yelled to a passersby below that he was trapped in his room. Someone called the fire department and Professor Minkus was extricated. Our Dean of Arts, Eugene Malley, kindly picked up the bill for repairs to the window.

6. THE *INFORMAL LOGIC NEWSLETTER*

When the conference ended, several voices called for a meeting to decide what would come next. There was a consensus that the Windsor symposium should be followed up so that the enthusiasm the meeting had generated would not be allowed to dissipate. The participants gathered for a planning session. The sentiment was that we should keep in touch and there was mention of some sort of newsletter. It occurred to me that we were well-positioned to put out a newsletter and Johnson agreed, so we offered to do so. Waving a note in the air, Scriven declared, “Here’s five dollars for my subscription.” Others offered funds too. In the event we were able to pay for postage and other costs for $4 a year to individuals, $8 to libraries and other institutions, for four issues (that is $15 and $30 in 2017 dollars).

We were able to put together a 10-page first issue of the *Informal Logic Newsletter* the following month, July 1978. We typed it ourselves or, with the support of the Head, got help with the typing from the Windsor philosophy department secretaries. I took charge of the design, and Johnson was content to accept my aesthetic judgment. We pasted up the master copy ourselves, and had copies run off by the University print shop.

The *Newsletter* grew steadily in size. After the second issue, we reduced the print font size from 12-point to 10-point and lay out the text in two columns (thus increasing our capacity from c. 500 words/page to c. 1,300 words/page). The first two issues were 10 and 14 sides long (5 and 7 sheets); the third jumped to 16 page sides with the two-column, 10-point font format—a roughly three-fold increase in content. By its fifth and final year, the longest issue of the *Newsletter* ran to 36 pages, a capacity of over 45,000 words—90 times the amount in the first issue.

The contents of the Newsletter started out being focused on teaching and aids to instructors. They included textbook lists, reports of textbook contents, some critical reviews of textbooks, course descriptions, puzzles for analysis, scores of examples of passages containing fallacies gleaned from newspapers, magazines and books, announcements and reports of conferences, and sample test questions. However a small note by Trudy Govier in Volume One mentioning Carl Wellman's contention in Challenge and Response that there can be arguments that are neither deductive nor inductive, provoked a short article in response by Perry Weddle. Weddle's c. 4,500-word "Inductive, Deductive," and John Woods's "What Type of Argument is Ad Verecundiam?", published in Vol. 2, No. 1, were the first scholarly articles to appear in the *Newsletter*.

Over time the percentage of space devoted to articles increased, from 30% in Vol. 2, No. 1 (1978), to 60% (75% if you count a couple of critical reviews) in Vol. 5, No. 2 (1983).

7. INFORMAL LOGIC, THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM (1980)

My recollection of how we came to decide to publish the proceedings of the Windsor symposium is hazy. I infer that it must have been with the encouragement of Michael Scriven, for when we were unable to find a willing publisher, he undertook to publish it using Edgepress, the company he had formed to publish his textbook, *Reasoning*, when McGraw-Hill had turned it down.

Using his own money, Scriven printed 1,000 copies. It has long since been out of print.

None of the papers in the proceedings stands out today, however Johnson and I appended to our introductory chapter, "The recent development of informal logic," a list of 13 "problems and issues in informal logic" that seems to have had an influence on the direction of subsequent research. Here is the list without the glosses that were attached to the items: (1) The theory of logical criticism, (2) The theory of argument, (3) The theory of fallacy, (4) The fallacy approach vs. the critical thinking approach [sc. in teaching], (5) The viability of the inductive/deductive dichotomy, (6) The ethics of argumentation and logical criticism [the principle of charity], (7) The problem of assumptions and missing premises, (8) The problem of context, (9) Methods of extracting arguments from context, (10) Methods of displaying arguments, (11) The problem of pedagogy, (12) The nature, division and scope of informal logic, (13) The relationship of informal logic to other inquiries.

8. THE SECOND EDITION OF *LOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE*(1983)

Meanwhile, by 1982 Johnson and I were revising *Logical Self-Defense* in the light of our experience in using it as the text for our "Applied Logic" course for five years, and taking into account criticisms and suggestions by our students and by instructors and students in other universities in which the text had been used. Besides updating the examples, the principal changes in the second edition of LSD were tightening the boxed conditions for commission of each fallacy, and the introduction of a new chapter on how to construct arguments. This chapter reflected growth in our understanding of the nature of argument, based on our reading of the developing literature and our own discussions. It introduced the idea that (advocacy) argumentation is dialectical, in that it presupposes addressing a dissenting voice and entertaining and responding to critical arguments. It made a distinction between using arguments to inquire and using them to advocate, and borrowed heavily from Jack Meiland's *College Thinking* in proposing a method for using arguments to decide what position on a controversial issue seems justified and then constructing an argued case for that position using the findings of the inquiry. Thus we were understanding argument as dialectical well in advance of our exposure to van Eemeren and Grootendorst's pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, published in 1984, which we did not read until 1985.

9. THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INFORMAL LOGIC (1983)

By 1981-82 we were hearing murmurings from colleagues that it was time to hold another conference and in the May 1982 Informal Logic Newsletter we announced the Second International Symposium on Informal Logic (SISIL) for 22 June 1983. There were 84 registrants. Among those who were not at the first conference and who were either prominent philosophers or later published in the field (or both), were Stephen and Evelyn Barker, Seale Doss, Maurice Finocchiaro, Robert Fogelin, James Freeman, James Gough, Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka, John Hoaglund, Baylor Johnson, Fred Johnson, Charles Kielkopf, Jack Meiland, John Nolt, Richard Paul, Thomas Schwartz, Christopher Tindale, Perry Weddle, Mark Weinstein, Joseph Wenzel, Arnold Wilson and George Yoos. Repeat customers included Robert Ennis, Trudy Govier, David Hitchcock, John McPeck, Stephen Norris, Robert Pinto and Michael Scriven.

The proceedings of SISlL were not published, but many of the papers present at the conference were published as articles in *Informal Logic* (see below).

10. AILACT (1983)

SISIL saw two significant outcomes. One was the creation of the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT), with the purpose of promoting these fields and organizing sessions at the American Philosophical Association (APA) and the Canadian Philosophical Association (CPA). AILACT continues to this day, regularly organizing sessions at the Eastern, Central and Pacific annual APA conferences. The CPA initiative did not catch on. Informal logic and critical thinking papers were included in CPA programs and meetings of the Ontario Philosophical Association, but attracted negligible new audiences.

11. *INFORMAL LOGIC* (THE JOURNAL, 1984)

The other outcome of SISIL was the encouragement due to the attendees' support for Blair and Johnson's intention to transform the *Informal Logic Newsletter* into a blind-peer-reviewed academic journal, to appear three times a year. The last issue of ILN, Vol. V, No. 2, came out in July 1983; the first issue of the journal, *Informal Logic* (numbered Vol. 6, No. 1),[1] published and edited by Blair and Johnson, came out in January 1984. The founding editorial board included, Robert Binkley (Western Ontario), Robert Ennis (Illinois), Trudy Govier (independent scholar), Merrill Hintikka (Florida State), David Hitchcock (McMaster), Howard Kahane (Maryland), Richard Paul (Sonoma State), Robert Pinto (Windsor), Nicholas Rescher (Pittsburg), Michael Scriven (Western Australia), Dougas Walton (Winnipeg), John Woods (Victoria) and George Yoos (St. Cloud State). Chaïm Perelman was invited but declined, saying that the journal was too pedagogical and not sufficiently theoretical for his participation.

1. The conceit was that the five volumes of the *Newsletter* should be included in the numbering system of the journal. This has led to some confusion over the years. I now think we would have been better advised to consider the newsletter and the journal separate enterprises.

In 2000, Blair & Johnson invited their colleague in the Windsor philosophy department, Hans V. Hansen, and Christopher W. Tindale, to join as co-editors. In 2017, *Informal Logic* is in volume 37, available only on-line and open-access, and with Johnson's and Hansen's retirements as co-editors in 2016, is edited by Blair and Tindale. *Informal Logic* is unusual in that it is published by individuals—Blair, Johnson, Hansen and Tindale.

12. MEETING VAN EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST AND THE INTRODUCTION TO PRAGMA-DIALECTICS (1984/85)

In December 1984, I took advantage of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association meetings in New York City to take my family there for a few days during the Christmas Holidays while I attended the AILACT sessions at the APA. Also attending from Canada, among others, was David Hitchcock of McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, who was a member of the AILACT executive. During the conference David and I were approached by two tall strangers with distinctive Dutch accents (and flawless English), who introduced themselves as Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, and asked if they could make a presentation during the AILACT session. David pointed out that the agenda had been arranged in advance and was full. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst asked if they might meet with the two of us after the session and we agreed. We retired to a nearby pub and began a conversation that lasted, over several rounds of draft beer, well into the night, the gist of which was to exchange information. We told them about informal logic and they told us about their new theory, which they called "Pragma-Dialectics" and the newly published monograph in which they presented it, *Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions* (1984) (copies of which they either gave us then or sent us soon afterwards), and the program they had set up at the University of Amsterdam. It was the beginning of life-long friendships.

13. THE FORMATION OF ISSA AND THE FIRST AMSTERDAM CONFERENCE (1985/86)

Soon after our meeting in New York, van Eemeren and Grootendorst asked me if I would serve on the board of a new society they were forming, which they had christened the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA), and which was going to sponsor an international argumentation conference in Amsterdam the following spring, in June 1986. My role would be to do my best to publicize the conference among philosophers in Canada and the United States and encourage their participation, and to help with the vetting of abstracts and the editing of the planned proceedings. I learned that they had asked Charles Arthur Willard of the University of Louisville to play the same role among those focusing on argumentation in the speech communication scholarly community in the United States. Thus the four of us became the "Board" of ISSA. Later, when they decided to hold an ISSA conference every four years, van Eemeeren and Grootendorst instituted an annual prize for lifetime achievement in argumentation studies, three of the four winners to be keynote speakers at the next conference, they consulted Willard and me about who should receive an ISSA Prize. I served on the ISSA "Board" through six ISSA conferences, until my retirement from the University of Windsor payroll in 2006 (due to a then-extant government policy of compulsory retirement at age 65).

This invitation had an impact on my scholarly career and on my life as a whole. It exposed me to the Amsterdam theory, to the world-wide argumentation scholarship that was exhibited at ISSA conferences, and to scores of acquaintanceships from Europe and North America, many of which turned into friendships. And because I was associated with informal logic, my profile at ISSA helped to publicize our journal and our conferences in Canada. Also it resulted in invitations to be a visiting scholar in Amsterdam for two and three month periods, deepening my

Dutch friendships and my fondness for Amsterdam, Leiden, Groningen and The Netherlands in general.

Following our retirements as professors, and our stepping down from the ISSA board, the new board bestowed ISSA prizes on van Eemeren (2011), me (2012) and Willard (2013). (Grootendorst had died from cancer in 2000.)

14. *ARGUMENTATION* (THE JOURNAL, 1987)

At the first ISSA conference in 1986 plans were already afoot to launch a new journal, to be called *Argumentation* and published by Reidel (which became Kluwer in 1988, and Springer in 2005). Its managing structure reflected the need at the time to signal wider participation than just The Netherlands. The Editor-in-chief was Swiss (Jean-Blaise Grize, Neuchâtel); the editors Dutch (Frans H. van Eemeren) and Belgian (Michel Meyer, Bruxelles); the managing editors Dutch (Rob Grootendorst) and French (Christian Plantin, Lyons); the editorial board was French (Jean-Claude Anscombre, Paris), Swiss (Marie Jeanne Borel, Lausanne) and Belgian (Marc Dominicy, Bruxelles). I was invited to join what was called the advisory board, along with fellow Canadians John Woods and Douglas Walton; Americans Sally Jackson (Oklahoma), Perry Weddle (UC Sacramento), Joseph Wenzel (Illinois), and Charles Willard;. (Louisville) and, among others, such luminaries as Umberto Eco (Bologna), Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt) and Olivier Reboul (Strasburg). Within five years *Argumentation* had become established. When Meyer resigned, Kluwer supported its continuation under van Eemeren's leadership, as Springer does today. I was well acquainted with the Dutch and the North Americans. Of the others I met Michel Meyer, Marc Dominicy, Jean-Claude Anscombre and Marie Jeanne Borel. I later got to know and hit it off with Christian Plantin, whose work I particularly admired.

Johnson and I were invited to submit an article for the first issue of *Argumentation*. As was our custom, one of us would write the first draft of a joint article or chapter, then the other would write in constructive changes, the initial drafter would then make further changes, creating a third draft, and so on, back and forth, until we were both satisfied with the latest draft. I wrote the initial draft of "Argumentation as dialectical" and Johnson's changes were minimal. It became one of our most-cited papers. In it we laid out how our understanding of the dialectical character of argumentation provides a basis for identifying the arguments in written texts, and for evaluating the adequacy of premises and of the premise-conclusion link in arguments. It held that arguments are motivated by doubt or question, and aim to serve an epistemic function: to provide reasonable grounds for beliefs.

15. SCHOLARLY ACTIVITY (1980'S)

By the late 1980s, informal logic was becoming entrenched as field of scholarship. *Informal Logic* and *Argumentation* were able to fill their pages from a steady and growing stream of respectable articles. Conferences were being organized elsewhere than Windsor and Amsterdam—I recall one at George Mason University in Washington, D.C.; several were put on by John Hoagland at Christopher Newport College (now University) in Newport News, VA, beginning in 1985; Alec Fisher organized one at the University of East Anglia in Norwich, England in 1988; and there were others.

16. THE ALTA CONFERENCES

Joseph Wenzel, a scholar of argumentation and rhetoric in the field of Speech Communication at the University of Illinois, had come to SISIL in 1983. Wenzel, like Willard, later, made me aware of a large community of scholarship in argumentation and debate located in speech communication departments in American universities. It had its own journal, the *Journal of the American*

Forensic Association (JAFA), and in conjunction with the Speech Communication Association in the U.S., it held a biennial summer conference at the winter skiing resort of Alta, Utah, near Salt Lake City. At Wenzel's urging, I attended the 1985 Alta conference and so became acquainted with a parallel universe (to informal logic) of argument theory. Like informal logic, but a little earlier, members of this community were moving away from classical logic—in their case, Aristotelian class logic—and they had early on discovered both Toulmin and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, who turned them away from formal logic in general as an adequate theory of argument and argumentation. I became aware of a large body of work by Wenzel (a senior figure), Wayne Brockriede, Douglas Ehninger, Daniel O'Keefe, Barbara O'Keefe, Sally Jackson, Scott Jacobs, Charles Willard, Thomas Goodnight, David Zarefsky, Michael Leff, Dale Hample, Robert Trapp, Ray McKerrow, Carole Blair, Bill Balthrop, Bill Benoit, Pamela Benoit, Karen Tracy, Robert Craig, Jerry Hauser and many others. And I got to meet most of these people, to count most of them as congenial acquaintances, and to consider several of them as friends.

17. LOOKING BACK

The account so far has been a chronology of one person's passage along a scholarly pathway that many others travelled, if not along the identical route, then at least across similar territory and perhaps in a somewhat different order. Is there a story here? As Hansen (2017), following White (1980), has written, "A chronology puts events in temporal order. A narrative builds on a chronology by selecting events from the chronology and giving them an interpretation, a meaning" (p. 7). Is there anything that can turn this chronology into a narrative? Is there a story line in these travels? I think perhaps there is one.

I suggest that this chronology reports one view from inside what, from the outside, can be described as the story of the development of a field *of international scholarship*. In the mid-1970s both Scriven in the U.S.A. and Johnson and Blair in Canada had trouble finding textbook reviewers among their colleagues who would recommend informal logic manuscripts to publishers. A decade later dozens of new informal logic textbooks were competing for adoption. The first Windsor Symposium gathered (mostly) philosophers in 1978; the first SCA/AFA biannual Summer Conference at Alta, Utah gathered speech, rhetoric and communication scholars in 1979. A decade later the world of argumentation scholarship had been transformed. In 1988 the *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, in one reflection of the new state of affairs, changed its name to *Argumentation and Advocacy*. In the prominent speech communication scholar Charles Arthur Willard's 1983 monograph, *Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge*, there is no reference to informal logic or pragma-dialectics; but in Willard's 1989 monograph, *A Theory of Argumentation*, Blair and Johnson and informal logic, and van Eemeren and Grootendorst and pragma-dalectics are all to be found in the index. By the time of the Third International Symposium on Informal Logic, at Windsor, and the sixth Speech Communication Association/American Forensic Association Summer Conference at Alta, Utah, both held in 1989, and the second ISSA conference in Amsterdam in 1990, an international community of scholarship had been formed. People like me attended all three conferences.

I end this chronology at the point that we are able to understand it as one person's perspective—one participant-observer's perspective—on the birth of a field of scholarship, argumentation studies. In looking back, we can see collections of overlapping subject matters and the competing or coexisting theories developed to try to make sense of or even to understand those subject matters. There is no field without ideas and the ideas were proliferating. It is equally true, however, that without journals and publishers to provide venues to publicize and communicate those theories to a wide and varied audience, who absorb and then respond, led to embrace, or reject, or modify what is thus communicated, and without conferences to bring people literally together, to listen to one another and converse—without the infrastructure—it would be hard for a field to develop. There are no ideas without channels of communication. There was a happy mix of simultaneous and interacting intellectual and infrastructural developments.

Is there any basis in any of this for what might be dubbed "the Canadian hypothesis"? Is there some role that is distinctively Canadian or, citizenship aside, a result of factors from Canada that played a role in the emergence of this field? Johnson and I did get support from our university as well as from a small conference fund from the federal government administered by a national research-funding council, but I assume that other countries had similar funding available. Given the entrepreneurial promotion of the pragma-dialectical theory by the Dutch and the readiness for change in the American speech communication community, it seems likely that argumentation would have developed as a field without participation of Canadian pioneers such as Woods and Walton, Govier, Hitchcock, Gilbert, and Johnson[2] *and Blair. Canadians got on board partly because of the Windsor conferences, and because the Informal Logic journal cornered the philosophy side of the market as the journal of record for philosophically-oriented theorizing early on. Perhaps I am too close to see it, but I must confess to an inability to recognize anything distinctively Canadian about our contributions.*

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2. Johnson is an American citizen, as is Pinto, but both spent their working lives at the University of Windsor in Canada.

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