Reasonable Responses

The Thought of Trudy Govier

Edited by Catherine E. Hundleby

Windsor Studies in Argumentation

4

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Windsor Studies in Argumentation Vol. 4

Edited by Catherine E. Hundleby
University of Windsor

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Acknowledgements

As a social epistemologist I tend to think that all knowledge involves support from others but that holds especially true of this festschrift. The very inspiration for the volume comes from Ralph Johnson and Tony Blair, as an accompaniment to their issue of *Informal Logic* (33(2)), which celebrates Trudy Govier's scholarship in argumentation theory. More generally at the University of Windsor, both *Informal Logic* and the Centre for Research in Reasoning Argumentation and Rhetoric provided administrative and editorial support. At Windsor's Leddy Library, Dave Johnston and Peter Zimmerman were generous with technical assistance, and Dave helped us design the cover based on an image from the British Library.

Several more people helped get the project off the ground right at the beginning. My first challenge was to gain a picture of the range of Govier's work. Many people are well-acquainted with one or the other branches of her scholarship. For me it was argumentation theory, and I was excited to learn more about her social philosophy but also knew that my best resources were my friends in feminist ethics who find those discussions extremely important. Kate Norlock and Alice MacLachlan helped me identify contributors who could do some justice to Trudy's academic range and broad social influence, as did Kent Peacock at the University of Lethbridge. Charissa Varma provided advice about biographical research, Sandra DeVries was a most enthusiastic editorial assistant, and Dean Goorden advised on publishing formats.

The progress of the volume was delayed by my health problems and I am grateful to all the contributors and to Windsor Studies in Argumentation for their kind patience. I owe special thanks to my mother Margaret Hundleby and Moira Kloster who really helped me get back on track with their emotional and intellectual support

that extended so far as providing editorial advice on the papers. They helped me bring this valuable project back to life.

Introduction: Reasonable Responses

CATHERINE E. HUNDLEBY

Most people first encounter Trudy Govier's work and many people *only* encounter it through her textbooks, especially *A Practical Study of Argument* (hereafter PSA), published in many editions. For me it was *God, The Devil, and the Perfect Pizza* (hereafter GDPP), then PSA, and later *Socrates' Children: Thinking and Knowing in the Western Tradition* (Socrates). My friend Pierre recommended GDPP to me for my first time teaching introductory philosophy. He claimed its only drawback was that Govier makes the issues so clear that there remains little an instructor can add. That clarity pervades her work and so does the concern for interpersonal relationships, manifest in the dialogue format she occasionally employs, as in GDPP, and invokes in the title *Socrates Children*. In fact, she tells me that GDPP was based on her discussions about philosophy with her daughter, and is intended to be appropriate for people as young as fourteen or fifteen years old. Few philosophy books have been directed toward younger adolescents, and GDPP may be the only such one written by a professional scholar. That makes it emblematic of the broad and heartfelt concern Govier's work expresses with people's responsibilities toward each other, ranging across ages and beyond academic disciplines. She describes herself on her webpage as a passionate advocate of "reasonable responses" indicating how she directs her analysis of reasoning toward other people and interactions among people.

While a festschrift for a philosopher might typically speak of "the philosophy" of the celebrated theorist, in Govier's case the definite article – "the" – would erase how her work falls into two quite distinct

areas, argumentation theory and social philosophy. To speak of "philosophies" in the plural also seems inaccurate. Even the pluralism in her argumentation theory remains under the umbrella of a uniform standard: the tripartite analysis of acceptable premises, relevant premises, and adequate grounds for the conclusion – captured by the acronym ARG. And broad connections emerge in this volume. So the mass noun "thought" addresses the range of her philosophical work and highlights its importance beyond the discipline of philosophy, such as for post-secondary education and social work practice.

After this introduction, you will find a concerted attempt to provide a comprehensive list of her publications. The publication list includes a key, in bold, to help identify the works as they are cited in this volume.

A Practical Study of Argument, first published in 1985, situates Govier among a distinct segment of informal logicians who take responsibility for making theoretical advances available to the next generation of students by presenting their work in textbook format. That book, like its predecessor by Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair (1977), and like recent books by Christopher Tindale (2007) and by Maureen Linker (2014), places pedagogy at the centre of theoretical advancement. That practical social responsibility connects Govier's progress in argumentation theory with her separate work on trust and injustice. More theoretical treatment of her work on argumentation and the philosophical significance of her logical work can be found in the sister collection to this volume, edited by Johnson and Blair and published by the journal *Informal Logic* (2013, volume 33, number 2).

Govier's argumentation theory tends to be more contained within the discipline of philosophy than her social philosophy that reflects a more catholic approach. Yet argumentation may also be considered a field within social philosophy, which includes an array of

philosophical subjects that began to be considered as interconnected in the early 1980s. Thus the emergence of social philosophy appears right on the heels of the informal logic movement and its role in the twentieth century rise of argumentation theory as a distinct academic field.

Both argumentation theory and social philosophy count as "applied" or "social" relative to work that went before them, that tended to treat individual reasoners and political actors as radically autonomous. Govier helped philosophers account for the ways that reasoning and actions operate in a world robustly constituted by interpersonal relationships. Individual people's actions affect others, and responses to others demand care, in the sense of attention to both reason and emotions.

When I interviewed Trudy Govier in 2013 in Windsor, Ontario after the 10th conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, she explained that her interest in trust arose from her practical political experience in the disarmament and peace movement in Calgary from 1982. She saw trust as central to the Cold War environment: typically taking the form in Canada of distrust of the USSR and trust in strategic experts. Moreover, as a spokesperson to the media and in pubic debates, she observed the difficulties people have interacting with those they don't trust.

Marius Vermaak at Rhodes University first invited Govier to South Africa to work on argumentation in 1997, at the time that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) held its hearings. Govier's freedom from the constraints of a full-time academic position allowed her to immerse herself in the public operations of the TRC and consider it in light of new forms of social philosophy. How the TRC addressed horrific processes through a discourse revolving around ethical concepts fascinated her. So Vermaak introduced her to Wilhelm Verwoerd who at the time was an academic philosopher but heavily involved in the TRC and who later helped to write its report. Verwoerd and Govier began working together on a number of related

philosophical problems and continued that work until 2004, a collaboration that gave rise to six co-authored articles.

This collection approximately follows the path of Govier's research publication, moving from argumentation theory to social philosophy. However, as we proceed from the one to the other two things happen: the two fields engage in a little dialectic, as in the papers by Moira Kloster, Laura Elizabeth Pinto, and Alice MacLachlan; and in the very middle, Linda Radzik provides an abstract meta-ethical defense of the sensibility of social philosophy.

Konishi begins our collection with "Where Practical Activity Meets Theoretical Excitement: A Rhetorical History of Trudy Govier's Contribution to the Informal Logic Movement." His historical account describes Govier's contributions to the growth of informal logic, and her place among informal logicians who were dissatisfied with the effectiveness of formal deductive logic for teaching argumentation and reasoning to postsecondary students. Although Ralph Johnson (2013) has noted her distinctive demand for a theoretical account of argument, Govier's research was also – like that of many informal logicians – motivated by responsibility to students, not just those in her own classes but in the larger community whom her text would benefit.

Early in her career, Govier found employment teaching an introductory reasoning course, as many junior philosophers do. Yet her interest in the field began earlier, sparked when she provided a publisher's review for Johnson and Blair's ground-breaking textbook *Logical Self-Defense* (1977). Together, these experiences drew her to the *First International Symposium on Informal Logic* at the University of Windsor in 1978, which galvanized her interest. "Because Govier was so influenced by [Michael] Scriven's speech criticizing formal logic, she became an active participant in theoretical discussions by contributing to Johnson and Blair's *Informal Logic*

Newsletter that started soon after the *Symposium*," Konishi describes.

Govier built on innovations made by other informal logicians and also on prior philosophy, developing Carl Wellman's (1978) notion of conductive argument and attended to analogical reasoning. These provide alternatives to induction and deduction as models for analyzing and evaluating arguments, giving to her account a pluralism not found in other accounts of argumentation at the time. In this way, her work presages the pluralist view of argumentation schemes developed by Doug Walton (1996; 2013), who also studied philosophy at Waterloo.

Kloster, in "The Practical Teaching of Argument," draws our attention to the impact of PSA on post-secondary teaching, its explicit and implicit goals including the avoidance of error and respect for each other as reasoners. Hindsight reveals these goals to be trickier than a committed educator might hope, but the passage of time may also have made the need to reason across social differences even more urgent. Every instructor tailors the assigned textbook to their own tastes, talents, and values, as well as perceived student needs. Govier too adapted her argumentation textbook in each edition to controversies of its time, each time starting the edition of the book by setting the stage for reasoned consideration with an example of an argument favouring an unpopular view.

Govier's general approach to reasoning aimed to transcend academic disciplines and serve students beyond the academy. The pluralism in her view of argumentation did not entail abandoning general standards but articulating how such standards might be applied to different forms of inference. She adopted the tripartite analysis of argumentation from Johnson and Blair, which she formulated as "acceptability", "relevance," and "ground." The A-R-G formulation provides a mnemonic for argument too. (Having been a teaching assistant in a

class that used PSA, I ran into former students on the city bus who waved and chimed "A!R!G!... A!R!G!")

Govier's innovations extended beyond the types of argument she recognizes to the roles she considers argument to play. Like most textbooks in critical thinking, PSA stresses independent thinking; but increasingly as the editions progress reasoning becomes viewed as a cooperative practice, shared among reasoners, Kloster's analysis reveals. That aspect becomes fully expressed in Govier's argumentation monographs, *Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation* (1987; hereafter PAEE) and *The Philosophy of Argument* (1999; hereafter POA). Govier views respect as intrinsic to the act of arguing:

> To offer an argument for a claim is to show sensitivity to the thinking of other people and a respect for the minds and intellectual autonomy of those addressed in the actual or potential audience. (POA 50)

The philosophical attention to respect and disagreement that distinguish her monographs on argumentation gains a life of its own in Govier's social philosophy. Her deeper discussion of relationships between people concerns moral values rather than the epistemological values that guide her theory and pedagogy of argumentation. Yet, Laura Pinto's paper "Erosion of Trust in Education: Accountability and Teacher Professionalism" suggests that Govier's analysis of trust bears significantly on current issues in education.

Pinto criticizes current education policy practices in Canada, the USA, and the UK driven by the short term priorities that election cycles encourage. Techniques for producing immediate and measurable results obstruct trust in teachers whereas long-term policies could foster it, for instance by improving professional standards and providing autonomy to address students' specific needs. People's need for professionals and experts makes us

vulnerable, we learn from Govier. Pinto adds that we have a heightened vulnerability to teachers because they act morally and legally in place of parents. Students' and parents' vulnerability to teachers can be best addressed through a personal trust that allows students to take risks that maximize children's learning and general flourishing. Trust does not build quickly and the political demands for measurable results prioritize "accountability" and control over trust, typically through narrow measures such as test scores.

Such accountability may give the public confidence, Pinto recognizes, but that confidence lies in institutions and in people only insofar as they operate in formal roles and follow regulations. Although we can be confident in strangers, we cannot trust them. And confidence does not substitute for the personal quality of trust.

Further, Pinto argues, accountability and the audit culture it fosters actively interfere with the development of trust. Surveillance makes teachers fearful. It encourages inauthentic compliance and attempts to "game" the system. It even gives rise to a personal "blame culture" antithetic to trust. Certainly teachers may make mistakes, but publicly shaming them – as has become commonplace – undermines their ability to perform their jobs and achieve the necessary trust.

Trust, vulnerability, forgiveness, and reconciliation may have received more attention from Govier than from any philosopher before her, and is represented in the following monographs: *Social Trust and Human Communities* (1997); *Dilemmas of Trust* (1998); *A Delicate Balance: What Philosophy Can Tell Us about Terrorism* (2004); *Taking Wrongs Seriously: Acknowledgement, Reconciliation, and the Politics of Sustainable Peace* (2006); and *Forgiveness and Revenge* (2011).

She sparked a conversation that continues among others, in an approach to philosophy now described as "the

relational view." On this view, relationships among people are intrinsic to how we view each other's limitations, desires, and vulnerabilities and the value of relationships provides justification for moral responses to wrongdoing. As Radzik summarizes in "Relationships and Respect for Persons:" "blame, punishment, forgiveness, and atonement are valuable responses to wrongdoing because they repair relations."

The relational view need not draw its value from providing an alternative to traditional moral theories, Radzik explains, and so it cannot be criticized as superfluous to available accounts such as Kantian ethics. George Sher has objected in that way and also to the ambiguity and what he sees as the implausibility of the relational view. If relational claims are intended to be factual or empirical they depend on false generalizations, Sher argues. Radzik acknowledges that existing formulations may be vulnerable to Sher's criticism but she constructs a version that un-packs the tensions between the descriptive and normative dimensions of such claims as "wrongdoing damages relationships" and she shows the ambiguity to be fruitful. Are we in relationships with strangers? Ought we to be? Her answer indicates a little bit of both.

Radzik argues that modest versions of the empirical claims suffice, noting Govier's view that a wrong creates a powerful form of relationship. While that relationship may be more ideal than real, addressing it provides helpful guidance for real world actors. Relational thinking offers a "valuable interpretation of an ethic of respect for persons." Relational wrongdoing operates as "an obstacle to us living together on the terms of respect and goodwill that form our moral ideal," says Radzik. Figuring out how to respond to wrongdoing puts ethics into action. It requires, on Govier's view, recognizing that the people we engage are persons who act for reasons, have preferences, and feel emotions. They are not just objects of our experience but "participants," in the

language of P.F. Strawson. That participant stance accounts for other people's psychology and provides the descriptive dimension of the relational view. We become aware not just of the other person but also of that person's awareness of us.

Thus, people are in fact – empirically – justified in viewing themselves in terms of such relationships, and in adjusting their attitudes accordingly. Radzik stresses that "when we express our normative ideals in terms of achieving appropriate relationships with other people, rather than, say, forming our own maxims correctly, we may be primed to attend to social conditions that enable higher quality relationships."

Relational thinking helps moral reasoners interpret the significance of moral theories such as Kant's, applying them to their actual relationships and considering the extent to which their relationships with others are ideal. While it may be that many people can shrug off wrongdoing, as Sher suggests, Radzik interprets that response as indicating a poor relational state. Theorizing the situation terms of relationality helps us account for real world circumstances: "moral agents are imperfectly rational, emotionally complicated, deeply social, epistemically limited, and intensely vulnerable."

Radzik notes Govier's concern with massive wrongdoing in global politics, starting with her work on South Africa and covering many different national and international wrongs. The nature of real world wrongdoing and our responses to them occupies this collection's remaining three papers. Although Alice MacLachlan's "'Hello, My Name is Inigo Montoya:' Revenge as Moral Address" takes as its central example from the fictional film *The Princess Bride*, MacLachlan shares Govier's concern with the psychological facts about real world wrongs.

MacLachlan builds on Govier's recognition that the desire for revenge is complex, involving "agency, wrong, responsibility, and rightful suffering." Govier

resists the view of some philosophers that the emotional appeal of revenge indicates that revenge itself has a socially constructive function. She maintains that revenge intrinsically violates the Kantian demand of respect for other persons. For Govier, revenge is an especially egregious form of disrespect because it both violates consent and does harm.

MacLachlan argues that the very purpose of revenge may be to express a complex understanding, the revenger's sense of injustice. If we take the mindset of the revenger instead of the harm as the foundation of revenge, then the harm operates as a type of communication. That is why an act of revenge not recognized as retaliation does not succeed, does not satisfy, MacLachlan explains: the message must be received. A change in understanding distinguishes revenge from mere retaliation. Both may be "transformational harms," but revenge intends to restore the balance specifically by communicating the revenger's agency and moral indignation. The revenger wants credit that a retaliator may not.

So it might seem that revenge can be virtuous, expressing respect for the humanity of the revenged whose understanding needs correction, but MacLachlan does not accept that account. That revenger's worldview involves a simplistic logic and "forceful finality" and it treats the revenger as exceptional. "It is intended to end, rather than continue moral conversation."

Alistair Little and Wilhelm Verwoerd in "Private and Public: Practitioner Reflections on Forgiveness and Reconciliation" also recognize that a "messy mixture of fear, violence from the enemy, and political manipulation" stokes hatred and the desire for revenge. In the longer view, they stress that the distinction between victims and perpetrators can be very unclear. Govier worked with Verwoerd on conceptualizing responsibility, apology, forgiveness, reconciliation, and trust in the context of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. That work and their friendship provided resources for Verwoerd

in developing with Little the model of Journey Through Conflict in Northern Ireland.

Little and Verwoerd's practitioner realities defy the narrowness and freightedness of the concepts of "reconciliation" and "forgiveness," but demand instead a growth in understanding, a subtle change, moving beyond the demonization of the enemy and an exclusive focus on one's own suffering. Recognizing the humanity of others helps people recover their own humanity, Little and Verwoerd observe. Attention to the suffering of others provides the start of something that they are pressed to call "reconciliation." Steps toward understanding each other's humanity can be served by public forgiveness, and the public space can be made personal, but only with great care and delicacy.

Little and Verwoerd explain the controversial nature of victimhood. Between the extremes of innocent victims and combatants, it's hard to say if the perpetrators were "simply the men who were engaged in paramilitary organizations, or those who went to prison." Beyond that, Little asks:

> What about those who supplied information, washed or burnt clothes after an act of violence, gave financial aid or collected money, or doctors who treated paramilitaries so that they wouldn't have to go to hospital? What about the governments, what about the institutions such as the churches, who in different ways directly and indirectly contributed to sectarianism and violent conflict?

The ambiguity of wrongdoing haunts a community in the aftermath. People can disagree about the value of forgiveness. It can tear apart families and haunt individuals.

Little and Verwoerd suggest that accepting that one cannot ask for forgiveness entails denying oneself inner peace and that constitutes a certain justice. It refuses to

treat oneself as exceptional in the way that MacLachlan observes revengers do. It seriously and earnestly engages the complex humanity of others.

A broader consideration of attitudes toward wrongdoers provides the final contributed paper. Norlock's "Giving Up, Expecting Hope, and Moral Transformation" reconsiders Govier's views on respect and hope for others in light of a moral epistemology in which knowledge does not entail belief.

Norlock agrees with Govier's view that when we recognize a wrongdoing, we must assume that the wrongdoer was capable of doing otherwise and has responsibility for the act. "We do not forgive deeds, we forgive people who have committed deeds." (FR, 109) In granting wrongdoers responsibility we must also grant them the possibility of change, Govier suggests, and Norlock concurs. Even in the worst cases, they agree that we should grant "conditional unforgivability:" "the view that current conditions hold which, if removed, would permit forgiveness" (FR, 102). The conditions may include the person's reveling in harm they've caused, but if we respect their agency we must acknowledge the possibility for change.

However, Norlock's exploration of conditional unforgivability challenges Govier's view that we ought not to consider any individual person beyond reform or transformation. People may recognize transformation to be in principle possible for all people, Norlock argues, and yet we may find the evidence regarding some particular evildoer sufficient to count that person as an exception. What emerges is a form of "relational hopelessness" in which the victim considers it unlikely that the particular wrongdoer will reform, and may reasonably dissociate and deny that wrongdoer sympathy.

Norlock suggests that "Govier's arguments for moral transformation amount to arguments for the metaphysics of personhood itself." Similarly philosophically rich views of individual agency underpin Govier's

work in argumentation, and mark her scholar-ship as foundational to recent developments in both the disciplinary pedagogy of philosophy and the subdiscipline of social philosophy.

This collection exhibits a range of Govier's work and highlights possible areas of connection among her disparate projects in argumentation and ethics. That other scholars see connections not intended by Govier marks the originality of her work. She has forged new philosophical terrain by asking new questions and providing answers that are careful but also enlightening and provocative. At the end of this collection you will find Trudy Govier's response to the contributed papers.

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Short-forms used for citation in this collection are indicated in **bold**.

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1. Where Practical Activity Meets Theoretical Excitement: A Rhetorical History of Trudy Govier's Contribution to the Informal Logic Movement

TAKUZO KONISHI

Summary: Within the informal logic movement in the 20th century, Trudy Govier can be seen as a prime example of a 'pedagogy-led' informal logician whose interest in teaching of a practical reasoning course prompts her inquiry into theoretical issues in informal logic. Drawing on an oral history interview with Govier and close examination of both published and unpublished materials on informal logic from the period of 1977-1985, this chapter focuses on her gradual evolution into a powerful voice in the informal logic movement, whose interest in teaching and research inform each other and develop in tandem.

1. Introduction

Besides being a theorist and philosopher of informal logic and argumentation, Trudy Govier has been a solid contributor to education in informal logic, critical thinking, and argumentation regularly throughout her independent intellectual career.[1] First teaching a course in practical reasoning[2] at Trent University, she subsequently started to

[1] Although Govier taught at Trent University and Lethbridge University, she was an independent intellectual between 1982 and 2004 when she made great contributions to informal logic, critical thinking, and argumentation. While I attempt to maintain the thesis that Govier is a pedagogy-led informal logician as I (2009) previously did, we must not dismiss the fact that her contribution to theory and practice of informal logic is based on her independent scholarship outside of academic institutions. I thank Govier for calling my attention to these facts through the editor of this volume.

[2] To the best of Govier's recollection when I interviewed her (2007), the title of the course was Practical Reasoning. Given Kenneth Burke's

publish short but solid articles in *Informal Logic Newsletter* to answer Michael Scriven's (1980) call for a challenge to formal logic. She (Wellman, MDIA, Who says) discussed the distinction between deduction and induction and introduced ideas of conductive argument and *a priori* analogy, as well as defended the significance of fallacies. In *Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation* (PAAE), she elaborated her pluralistic theory of argument based on deductive validity, inductive strength, as well as conductive and analogical cogency. She (1999) later elaborated some of her ideas in *The Philosophy of Argument* and critically examined new ideas in informal logic, such as Ralph H. Johnson's concept of a dialectical obligation. As the editor of *Selected Issues in Logic and Communication* (SILC), she collaborated with other scholars in the field to advance our understanding of the theory and practice of informal logic, critical thinking, and argumentation. In the realm of teaching, her main informal logic contribution is *A Practical Study of Argument* published in 1985. It has sold well enough to see the release of its seventh edition, an accomplishment comparable to that of Howard Kahane's (1971) *Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric*.

As part of a collective effort to highlight Govier's achievements in the fields of informal logic, critical thinking, and argumentation, as well as social and political philosophy, this chapter focuses on her contribution to the pedagogy of logic and argumentation. As a chronicle of Govier the educator and writer in the field of informal

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position that language is a reflection, deflection, and selection of realities, the naming of a course has significance for informal logicians and argumentation scholars in philosophy departments; it must be distinct from traditional logic courses, but must also fall within the discipline of philosophy. Through my oral history project with several informal logicians since 2007, I have learned that the course was either called Practical Reasoning as she recalls, Applied Logic, Reasoning, or Informal Logic, but not Rhetoric, Logical Communication, or Pragmatics, which would imply ties with rhetoric and communication studies, and linguistics.

logic, it follows her attraction to the teaching of a practical reasoning course, the writing of *A Practical Study of Argument*, and her research into informal logic. A close examination of her work combined with my oral history interview, conducted in 2007, reveals how she has rhetorically distinguished her work from others' work, positioning herself as a pedagogy-led informal logician with a pluralist view that acknowledges a good argument can go beyond deductive and inductive.[3] In the next section, a short historical sketch traces the development of pedagogy-led informal logicians in the early years of informal logic movement. Section 3 describes how Govier was introduced to and became engaged in the teaching of an introductory logic course, eventually becoming one of the most powerful and constructive voices in the field. Section 4 examines how Govier the teacher and theorist of informal logic approached the writing of *A Practical Study of Argument*. The last section of this chapter will attempt to situate Govier in the history of informal logic, critical thinking and argumentation.

2. A short chronicle of informal logic textbooks and pedagogy-led informal logicians

Although a historical narrative of informal logic 'from pedagogy to theory' has some truth as an account for development of informal logic in the twentieth century, and although Govier approached informal logic through this 'pedagogy-led' route, my historical research on informal logic and argumentation have revealed that some philosophers started inquiries into informal logic because of other interests (Konishi 2009). John Woods and Douglas Walton were more interested in making use of dialog logic and clarifying fallacies in their collaborative

[3] Interview with Trudy Govier by Takuzo Konishi at University of Windsor, June 8, 2007.

work as a reply to Charles L. Hamblin's (1970) challenge on the standard treatment of fallacies, so in this respect they were 'theory-led' informal logicians. Robert Pinto was not so interested in pedagogical practice of informal logic. However, he was fascinated with informal logicians' research on non-deductive inference at the *First International Symposium on Informal Logic*, and started to publish in the field. His approach to informal logic is more informed by applied epistemology than dissatisfaction with logic education, so this third group is called 'applied-epistemology-led' informal logic.[4]

As leaders of informal logic movement, Johnson and J. Anthony Blair (1980, 1985, 1994, 1997, 2000) have made several attempts to emphasize the pedagogy-led route to informal logic. They (1980) observed a new trend in logic textbooks that emerged in the 1970s, that they call a "New Wave" approach (12).[5] Several characteristics are ascribed to it – among them working with natural arguments, innovative ways of treating fallacies, and a consideration of what Johnson and Blair define as extended arguments (13-17). Since there were far fewer outlets in which to publish theoretical ideas on natural language argumentation than there are now, much of innovation in argumentation theory evolved in these textbooks. Those innovative ideas include serious interest

[4] Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to delineate historical developments in theory-led informal logic and applied epistemology-led informal logic, these historical routes demand a more careful analysis and examination of pedagogy-led informal logic over the years.

[5] Johnson and Blair (1980) surveyed fifty-four textbooks published after the World War II, and divided them into two generations. The first generation is further divided into "global" approach to which Irvin M. Copi's *Introduction to Logic* belongs, and "critical thinking" approach to which Monroe C. Beardsley's (1950) *Practical Logic* belongs. These two approaches assume that sentential and predicate logic can analyze and evaluate natural argument. The second generation is also called "New Wave" approach, and Kahane was a key figure in this group. (11-13)

in informal fallacies and Kahane's (1971) fallacy approach, Stephen N. Thomas's (1973) discussion of logic and natural language, Scriven's (1976) seven-step analysis of natural language argument, and Johnson and Blair's (1977) triad criteria of relevance, sufficiency and acceptability (the RSA criteria). These notions have influenced the theory and practice of producing, analyzing, interpreting, evaluating, and criticizing natural language argumentation.

The above textbooks inspired young philosophers in the 1970s and helped them become influential informal logicians. Johnson started to teach an Applied Logic course at the University of Windsor, using Kahane's textbook in 1970-1971. Blair started to teach another section of the course in the subsequent academic year. In 1977 they published the first edition of *Logical Self-Defense*, crystallizing identity conditions for each fallacy type, drawing on Thomas for better analysis and interpretation of argumentative texts, and "Canadianizing" the content to better meet their students' needs.[6] The triad criteria of relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability that Johnson and Blair offered to organize fallacy types were widely accepted and adopted by textbook writers, and scholars in the field also investigated theoretical issues involved in the triad criteria.

Johnson and Blair are not atypical figures among pedagogy-led informal logicians. David Hitchcock also started out by teaching a course in introductory course in reasoning at McMaster University using Scriven's *Reasoning*, and ended up publishing his own textbook, *Critical Thinking: A Guide to Evaluating Information* in 1983, as well as making significant contributions to the research on inference, enthymeme, and warrant.

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[6] Johnson used the word to "Canadianize" in an oral history interview with the author in the 2007 interview. Johnson and Blair's (1997) *Logical Self-Defense* also refers to the notion of Canadianizing Kahane's textbook (xiii-xvi).

Likewise, Govier (PSA) acknowledges the influence of Scriven, Johnson and Blair, and Thomas as well as John Wisdom's *Virginia Lectures* and Carl Wellman's treatment of conductive argument in publishing *A Practical Study of Argument* (x). In short, these scholars can be called 'pedagogy-led' informal logicians in that they were initially attracted to improving logic education, then later started to publish textbooks and scholarly ideas in professional newsletters and journals. Although I am not committed to the idea that informal logic developed solely out of pedagogical practice, this short sketch endorses a view that pedagogy is an important route to the development of informal logic.

The following sections in this chapter will examine the development of Govier's thoughts on informal logic more closely and make the case that she is a clear instantiation of a pedagogy-led informal logician.

3. Trudy Govier meets informal logic

Writing her dissertation on transcendental argument at the University of Waterloo, Govier had interest in argumentation, although she recalls the topic as being more focused on epistemology and Kant's philosophy than on logic or argumentation. She tells me, in an interview from 2007 that she did not take any graduate courses in logic, but taught it to herself. As a faculty member at Trent University, she taught courses in early modern philosophy, contemporary moral problems, epistemology, metaphysics, and formal logic. In addition, she created and taught a year-long course in practical reasoning. In this two-semester course, she covered a lot of material on practical reasoning and critical thinking, using Johnson and Blair's (1977) *Logical Self-Defense*, Ronald Giere's (1979) *Understanding Scientific Reasoning*, and Darrell Huff's (1954) *How To Lie With Statistics*. She continued teaching the course until moving to Calgary in the summer of 1982,

and eventually published *A Practical Study of Argument* in 1985, based partly on her teaching experience.

Although Govier the teacher of informal logic was in the making through teaching the practical reasoning course at Trent University, her first encounter with informal logic predated her teaching, she told me. It came from an unexpected source when she was on leave in Calgary in 1976 and taking care of her daughter, then only a few months old.

> In Calgary was a man called Terence Penelhum who's a very eminent Canadian philosopher and had actually been a former professor of mine. And Terence Penelhum was sent this book to review and he was very busy. And so, he decided he wanted to find someone else to review this book. So he asked me to review it. And when I got this book, I mean, I had no credentials in formal logic or in informal logic–just Penelhum got this book, he thought I was a reliable person, so he gave this book to me. So I then got it to review.

Looking back on the review process, Govier remembers her positive impression of the manuscript of *Logical Self-Defense* and its influence on her teaching:

> I was fascinated with it, of course, because I was– at the time I was teaching a junior formal logic course at the University of Calgary and I was just fascinated with this material because it was so much more interesting and so much more practical. So I was–I was very interested right away.

In support of the publication, she offered some constructive advice for shortening the manuscript and organizing the material in a way that would introduce key ideas earlier in the textbook rather than later.[7] Thanks to

[7] Reviewer's Comments on *Applied Logic* by Trudy Govier. Unpublished material

her and Michael Gilbert's positive reviews, the manuscript, which was written by Johnson and Blair, hit the market in 1977. This is how she helped to bring *Logical Self-Defense* into existence.[8]

Having come back from her leave, Govier created and taught the practical reasoning course at Trent using books by Kahane, Giere, Johnson and Blair, and Huff, and the course was, in her judgment, successful. Govier the teacher of informal logic was in the making, partly as a result of reviewing the manuscript of *Logical Self-Defense* and the stimulation that came from that review.

As Govier's interest in informal logic grew stronger through teaching, she heard about a scholarly symposium to be held in Windsor:

> The first one I came to, I can't remember how I heard about it, but I came here from another city in Ontario–from Peterborough–where I was living. And I remember hearing about it. Somehow I heard about it and I saw the names and I thought: "Oh, those are those two people who wrote that book that I had reviewed." And so, I came down here – actually I drove down with one of my colleagues–a very nice person, and we had a really great trip to that first meeting, which I believe was in 1978.

She attended the Symposium not only to see Johnson and Blair but also to learn more about the field overall, she recalls. There she attended a talk that affected her research career:

[8] Johnson and Blair (1975) were not satisfied with the first reviewers' responses and asked for a second round. However, neither of the two exactly remembers who they recommended as second-round reviewers. When I interviewed Johnson and Blair, they only recognized that Penelhum would have been a good choice. For a detailed analysis of the review process see Konishi 2011.

> I remember a speech by Michael Scriven (1980). That's the thing that I remember the most….He came to this thing and he was quite a well-known person. I mean, he had written a lot on philosophy of science and philosophy of history and I had used his articles in other courses–not closely related to this [informal logic]–more philosophy of science and so on. So, I knew the name and, I mean, he gave a very fiery sort of speech, in which he really claimed that there was a cheat with formal logic, because it simply couldn't handle all of these kinds of arguments and it couldn't really, couldn't usefully describe them and couldn't usefully be used to teach people to handle them. I was very influenced by that speech. I thought there was a whole research agenda here, because if people have this kind of logic, it doesn't handle these kinds of arguments. Then the question arises: "Well what does handle these kinds of arguments?" And it just seemed to me to be a whole new territory. So I was very influenced by that and that's the thing that I remember the most of it. I also remember meeting Tony and Ralph and – just – I only knew them from their book, so I just – they were really very nice people, you know. Very friendly, gracious, charming, so I remember that. And then, I don't even know. I don't remember much from the other talks. It's mainly Scriven.

Because Govier was so influenced by Scriven's speech criticizing formal logic, she became an active participant in theoretical discussions by contributing to Johnson and Blair's *Informal Logic Newsletter* that started soon after the *Symposium*. One of her main contributions to the construction of theory was on types of argument and standards for argument evaluation. Responding to Perry Weddle's (1979) article on the distinction between deduction and induction, she (Wellman) called readers' attention to Wellman's *Challenge and Response* and

examined critically key ideas in the book that are relevant to the issue on the deduction-induction distinction. In her article, she introduced Wellman's unique conception of induction –confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis "by establishing the truth or falsity of its implications" (11). Based on this conception of induction she discussed whether or not the deductive and inductive categories would exhaust all argument types. She also extended his conception of conductive argument regarding moral issues to broader domains in real life, explored "an umbrella notion of validity which applies to arguments of all types" (13) and discussed problems of 'missing' premises based on Wellman's discussion of the conductive-deductive distinction (14). In the next issue of the *Newsletter* she discussed induction and deduction further, taking a subtle, nuanced position on this particular issue. While she was reluctant to scrap the distinction between deductive and inductive arguments, she could "see a reason for moving to more than two categories" of argument without a strong commitment to conductive arguments (MDIA, 8). Although she later modified her position somewhat (Assessing), considering Hitchcock's (1979) suggestion that deduction and induction are standards of argument evaluation rather than types of arguments, she maintained that deduction and induction do not exhaust all standards for argument evaluation. Throughout the discussion, she developed a pluralistic view of good argument and defended a thesis that an argument can be a good one even if it is neither deductive nor inductive, as shown in conductive arguments and analogical arguments. Given the devel-opment of research on conductive argument and *a priori* analogy in later years, her contribution to further classes of argument and further standards of argument evaluation has been highly significant.

In addition to defending a pluralistic view of good argument, Govier (Who says) also engaged in discussion about fallacies and attempted to create space for fallacy

within the theory of argumentation. She responded to conceptions of fallacy developed in a textbook by Lambert and Ulrich (1980) and a journal article by Finocchiaro (1981), from a pluralist as well as an empiricist point of view. Conceiving of a fallacy as "a mistake in reasoning, a mistake which occurs with some frequency in real arguments and which is quite characteristically deceptive" (Who says, 2), she argued that charge of fallacy "involves issues of interpretation, classification, of logic, and (tacitly) of empirical frequency and psychological tendency to deceive" (3). Since fallacy is a mistake in reasoning, it "may be necessary to invoke a standard of good reasoning" (3). With this line of thinking she attempted to connect a pluralist view of good arguments and fallacious arguments and incorporate the latter into the former, thereby providing a more comprehensive framework within which to understand good and fallacious arguments.

Addressing Lambert and Ulrich's (1980) position that a mistake in reasoning is due to formal invalidity, Govier (Who says) criticized their strong commitment to formal validity since, in their framework, neither inductive arguments nor arguments from analogy can be good (3). In their view, discussing informal fallacy is beside the point because fallacious arguments are limited to formal invalidity. However, this position can end in absurd consequences, because two arguments with the same form (A, B, therefore not-C) can be both deductively invalid and valid, as shown in the following two examples:

> 1. Mr. Jenner claims that evidence E is strong evidence that Mr. Nixon is guilty of obstruction of justice.
> 2. Mr. Jenner was a member of a commission that recommended the legalization of prostitution.
> Therefore, 3. E is not strong evidence that Mr. Nixon is guilty. (Lambert and Ulrich 1980, quoted in Who says, 3)

The first example is an instance of *ad hominem* fallacy, and, in Lambert and Ulrich's view, is fallacious because the form of the argument is not deductively valid. In contrast, the following example employs the same A, B, therefore, not-C form, and because it is deductively valid, it is not possible for the conclusion to be false if both premises are true.

> 1. My table is brown.
> 2. Everything which is brown is not green.
> So, 3. It is not the case that my table is green. (Who says, 3)

The formal deductivist framework of Lambert and Ulrich does not seem to analyze sufficiently the intricacies of *ad hominem* fallacy, deduction, or formal validity.[9] If we adopted a pluralistic theory of argument, their framework would be less promising, "for then even if we were to show somehow that an argument was deductively invalid on all feasible formal representation, it might nevertheless be based on good non-deductive reasoning." (4) Based on the analysis of these examples and other cases of *ad hominem*, Govier concluded that Lambert and Ulrich failed to make a good case against informal fallacies.

As well as criticizing Lambert and Ulrich's deductivist framework for dealing with informal fallacies, Govier (Who says) discussed Finocchiaro's position (5).

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[9] In examining Lambert and Ulrich's position, Govier seems to address formalism and deductivism simultaneously, without distinguishing between them. It is possible to construct formal systems for inductive logic and conductive argument as well as deductive logic, and Govier seems to argue against applying either a formal systems or deductivism to arguments across the board. The conflation of the two seems to be due partly to the lack of clear understanding among informal logicians of the word 'formal' among informal logicians at the time. E. M. Barth and C. W. Krabbe's (1982) clearly distinguished three different senses of 'formal' in *From Axiom to Dialogue* and Johnson and Blair (1994) later adopted their view in their "Informal Logic: Past and Present."

While Finocchiaro and she both endorsed a pluralistic view of good argument, Govier criticized him as a poor empiricist because, when he claimed in his review of textbook accounts that there are actually no common errors in reasoning, he failed to review two good sources: Kahane; and Johnson and Blair. In addition, Finocchiaro's examination of fallacies such as affirming the consequent or *post hoc ergo propter hoc* was not based on actual cases, which weakens his partially empirical thesis that fallacies do not exist. Based on her criticism of Lambert and Ulrich and of Finocchiaro, Govier (Who says) concludes with the hope that she has shown that: "the elimination of fallacies is premature, and that the reduction of informal fallacies to formal ones would not obviously be an accomplishment, philosophically speaking" (9).

Throughout her participation in theoretical discussions held in the *Informal Logic Newsletter*, Govier tried to maintain a balance between theory and practice, aprioristic and empirical attitudes, and the abstract generality of theorizing and the intricacies involved in pedagogy. The complex, intricate, subtle, and delicate theoretical whole she attempted to construct through this discussion has helped to advance our understanding of the limits of formal systems, the binarism of deduction and induction, the existence of further classes of argument and further standards of argument evaluation, and the relationship between good arguments and fallacious arguments.

We have observed Trudy Govier's development as a teacher and philosopher of informal logic and argumentation over the years: from a reviewer of the manuscript of *Logical Self-Defense* and teacher of a practical reasoning course to a young philosopher interested in informal logic to central contributor to theoretical discussion surrounding informal logic. The path she took in the late 1970s and early 1980s clearly shows that she was a prime and representative pedagogy-led informal logician who attempted to link pedagogical

practices and the construction of theories of informal logic. Recalling satisfying aspects of the early years of the informal logic movement, she mentions the fusion of practice and theory that characterizes pedagogy-led informal logic:

> The first one (1978 Symposium), I think it was just getting this whole research agenda from Michael Scriven's speech, and, you know, sensing that there could be this really practical activity that you could do that would also have a lot of theoretical excitement to it–and that was very exciting for me. And then, some of the other ones, it was more just the support of having colleagues who were interested in my work and were doing the same thing.

Govier's excitement was such that she made another attempt to bridge practice and theory of informal logic in publishing *A Practical Study of Argument* after she left her academic position at Trent. In the next section I will examine one of the best selling textbooks in the field of informal logic, critical thinking, and argumentation.

4. The making of *A Practical Study of Argument*

To understand the pedagogical and theoretical significance of *A Practical Study of Argument* to the informal logic movement, it is prudent to situate this textbook in the socio-historical, rhetorical situation of the mid-1980s. By the time it was published in 1985, the informal logic movement had advanced to such an extent that many "New Wave" textbooks were available on the market, and ideas on the pedagogy and theory of informal logic were being exchanged in the *Informal Logic Newsletter*. The field became professional after Johnson and Blair held the *Second International Symposium on Informal Logic* (SISIL) in 1983, when they decided to transform the

Newsletter into the journal *Informal Logic* and the participants agreed to establish the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT) as a sponsoring organization to disseminate theoretical ideas about informal logic and critical thinking at professional conferences. Johnson and Blair (1985) also published an overview article in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, thereby reaching an audience outside the small circles of informal logicians and making their voices heard in one of the key journals in the field of philosophy. Applied-epistemology-led informal logicians and critical thinking scholars, represented by Robert Ennis and Robert C. Pinto, had joined the movement by the mid-1980s. As the movement advanced the cause of adequate understanding and appreciation of informal logic, some dissenting voices came from outside the circle. These dissenters are represented by Lambert and Ulrich (1980) as well as by Gerald Massey (1981), all of whom attempted to defend deductivism and questioned the fallacy approach in evaluating argument.

In the rhetorical situation of the mid-1980s, Govier had to answer the demands of at least three audiences in publishing *A Practical Study of Argument*. First, it needed to be rooted well enough in traditional logical theory to appeal to philosophy instructors who wanted to teach deductive and inductive logic in introductory courses. Second, it had to accommodate the needs of informal logicians and critical thinking instructors hoping to teach logic, reasoning, or critical thinking courses in more practical ways than Copi-type logic textbooks allowed.[10] Finally, she had to appeal to the publishing market in North America so that her textbook would sell well in both Canada and the United States. These diverse, even

[10] Copi's (1953) *Introduction to Logic* is the best known among the textbooks taking the "global approach," as has been labeled by Johnson and Blair (1980). In their view, it assumes that deduction and induction are "central and essential to the logical appraisal of *all* argumentation, for *all* purposes" (12).

conflicting, audiences constituted rhetorical obstacles, and she attempted to deal with them from a pluralist view of good argument she had developed over the years. Two main strategies she employed were to modify the RSA/ARG criteria to accommodate both formal and informal logic and to use examples drawing on a wider North American context, both from Canada and the United States.

4.1 The balance between formalism and informalism in the ARG criteria

Govier points out the significance of the balance between the formal and informal approaches to argument in the preface of the textbook:

> Like most texts, this one developed from teaching experience and from reflecting on the complaints that I and others had about existing books. I have tried to combine some elementary formal logic with an informal approach to natural argument. This is because I believe that there are *some* natural arguments that do exemplify logically valid forms, and for these, the understanding of basic formal patterns is very useful. I also believe that the basic concept of deductive entailment is extremely important for the correct interpretation of arguments–whether or not those arguments are themselves deductive. The text is basically one in informal logic, but unlike some texts in the area, it allows formal logic to contribute *part* of the answer to the question of why *some* arguments are good ones. In taking this stance, I hope to satisfy those who, like myself, believe that formal logic must have some role in the analysis and evaluation of natural arguments even though its role is not as exhaustive as some formalist philosophers appear to believe. (PSA, ix)

Her reliance on formal logic for evaluating whether some arguments are good distinguishes Govier from people like Kahane or Johnson and Blair, who commit fully to informal approach to evaluate natural arguments.

In actualizing her desire to maintain the balance between the formal and informal approaches,[11] she (PSA) has relied on a key construct of informal logic, Johnson and Blair's RSA criteria of relevance, strength, and acceptability, to provide an account of good argument. She has slightly modified the terminologies, using Acceptability, Relevance, and adequacy of the Ground so that the criteria stand for the first three letters of ARG-ument. Having borrowed the ARG criteria from Johnson and Blair, she adds more layers to the criteria for discussing natural language argument. In defending her use of the triad criteria, she told me:

> I believed that [the triad] was correct and I couldn't think of anything that was a greater improvement. It just–it seems to me that when you have those three criteria–they also give you a way of describing what is a good argument. Like, you know, a good argument from analogy would satisfy these criteria in this particular way. Or good inference from a best explanation would satisfy these criteria in a different way. Or, a good deductive argument would also satisfy these criteria. So I think the criteria can be applied across the board. And I also think you can use the criteria to discuss fallacy. You can say, for instance, we have these criteria, which in their system would be ARS and, in mine would be ARG, then you can say: Well, what's wrong with an appeal to

[11] It is open to question whether the balance she has attempted to maintain between formal and informal approach assigns an equal role to the two. Given that her research has focused on further classes of argument and further standards of good argument, the argument can be advanced that she is oriented more toward the informal approach than the formal approach.

> ignorance? Well, it violates relevance. Or what's wrong with what, um–begging the question–well, you don't have the "A" condition satisfied. What is wrong with a hasty generalization? The "G" condition is not satisfied. So, I think you can use it as a general framework. So, certainly the three conditions are from them [Johnson and Blair]…but...I think the use of it in that more general way is actually my contribution to it.

Her answer to the question and the short description in the preface capture how she viewed the triad criteria with reference to her pluralistic theory of good argument,[12] marking a clear departure from the original RSA criteria in two respects.

First, while Johnson and Blair (1977) have used the criteria for understanding how fallacies violate the standards of good argument (xiv), Govier (PSA) has used them to understand four different ways in which premises of an argument can be "*properly* connected to" a conclusion—deductively, inductively, analogically, and conductively (emphasis in original, 63). One type of

[12] While the chapter on good argument has been titled "When is an argument a good one?" since the first edition of *A Practical Study of Good Argument*, the way Govier describes a good argument has changed over time. She (1985) used "argument soundness" in the first edition but (PSA 1988) changed it to "argument cogency" or "cogent argument" in the second and kept it in later editions. In the third edition she (PSA 1992) discusses why she uses "cogency" instead of "soundness" as "the most general term for argument evaluation" (68). While the traditional account of 'soundness' is linked with deductive entailment and truth, deductive entailment is just one way to meet the relevance criterion in her pluralistic theory of good argument (70-71). In addition, the acceptability criterion that makes use of common knowledge, testimony, and acceptance for the sake of argument, as well as necessary truth, may well conflict with the truth requirement (PSA 1992, 68). Finally, it would be confusing to add a new sense to "soundness" different from the one commonly understood in some other textbooks (PSA 1992, 68). Here we find another tactic she uses to introduce new ideas for argument evaluation while staying consistent with the traditional philosophical account of soundness.

proper connection is deductive entailment, in which a true premise set guarantees that the conclusion is also true (103). A second type is inductive arguments, in which "a hypothesis is confirmed by extrapolation from previous experience of similar events" (104). Although inductive arguments cannot prove absolutely the truth of their conclusion, the conclusion is probably true because of the assumption that regularities in the past would repeat in future as well. A third type is analogical arguments. They assume that when two cases are similar in some respects, they would be similar in further respects as well (103-104). The fourth type is conductive arguments, in which a normative conclusion is drawn based on separate lines of support (105). Defending a thesis that these four different types of argument properly connects a premise set and conclusion in different ways, Govier constructs her pluralistic view of good argument. Although it took her two more years to publish *Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation* and further develop her pluralistic theory of argument, the basic blueprint of her four argument types and the standards for good arguments was presented in the first edition of *A Practical Study of Argument* in a manner that was both concise and accessible for teaching purposes.

While Govier accommodates deductive, inductive, analogical, and conductive arguments in the ARG criteria, Johnson and Blair (1977) maintain some distance from deductive and inductive logic in advocating the RSA criteria. They state that

> a host of topics has not been covered in this text. We have not, for instance, gone into the distinction between inductive and deductive logic; we have not even mentioned validity, soundness, or inference patterns. All of these topics are more than adequately dealt with in the burgeoning number of formal logic texts, and we could see no point in duplicating their treatments. If such material is important to you, it can be introduced at

> many junctures in the text. (Johnson and Blair, 1977, xiii)

Dismissing deductive and inductive logic in *Logical Self-Defense*, Johnson and Blair (1977) construct a strong tie between the three criteria and fallacies (12). In contrast, Govier sees some benefit of utilizing formal deductive logic and inductive logic and incorporates them into the ARG criteria. While both she and Johnson and Blair use the triad criteria as the general conditions for good argument and uncogent or fallacious argument, their approaches to deductive logic and inductive logic constitute a clear and sharp contrast. Because of this, Govier's textbook is more likely than Johnson and Blair's textbook to appeal to philosophers who want to include in introductory courses some deductive and inductive logic as well as informal logic.

Secondly, while fallacies play the central role in Johnson and Blair's (1977) RSA criteria, they play a supporting role in Govier's (PSA) ARG criteria. Johnson and Blair (1977) establish the inherent connection between argument and fallacy, stating that

> the text has three sections or phases. Phase I quickly introduces the basic concepts: argument and fallacy. Since argument is at the core of most persuasive appeals, since fallacies are violations of the standards of good argument, and since our approach is to provide the tools of logical self-defense for consumers of everyday persuasion, Phase II presents an inventory of the main and representative kinds of fallacy. (xiv)

In their textbook, the RSA criteria are introduced in Phase I of the textbook and used to describe three basic fallacies, all violations of standards of good argument: irrelevant reason, hasty conclusion, and problematic premise. Other fallacy types are introduced in the subsequent chapters as variations of these three (Johnson and Blair 1977, 12).

Johnson and Blair ask students to detect those fallacy types and to argue how a particular fallacy is committed in actual argumentative discourse. Govier (PSA) expresses concern about the fallacy approach to argument evaluation:

> Teachers worry that an approach to argument that is based solely on informal fallacies may be "too negative" and risks turning students into facile and hostile critics. Students reflect on the approach and began to wonder whether there are any good arguments anywhere. Although the fallacies are interesting and important, there is a growing sense that they cannot tell the whole story about natural argumentation. In an attempt to meet these concerns, I have treated informal fallacies against the background of various standards of good arguments. (ix-x)

Because of this concern, Govier (PSA) first uses the ARG criteria to show how different argument types can meet the criteria, and then discusses specifics of the acceptability criterion and the relevance criterion in subsequent chapters (53-124). One chapter lists situations in which premises are acceptable, then moves on to describe situations in which premises are unacceptable, where the fallacy of begging the question is discussed (79-100). Another discusses ways of being relevant in deductive, inductive, or analogical arguments and then notions of irrelevance (101-105). Then it examines specific fallacies involving irrelevance such as straw person, *ad hominem*, and guilt by association (109-119). Throughout these chapters, her main focus is on accounting for good or cogent argument from a pluralistic view, and fallacies are discussed only insofar as they help to illuminate good argument in her theory.

Contrasting *Logical Self-Defense* with *A Practical Study of Argument*, we can come to understand that the latter is an extension of the former. Both adopt the same triad criteria for good argument, but Govier (PSA) has used it in different ways than Johnson and Blair (1977).

The ARG criteria provide general conditions under which argument can be cogent in different ways: deductively, inductively, analogically, and conductively. Also, since the ARG criteria bring good argument to the fore, fallacy plays a secondary role in evaluating argument. These two features give *A Practical Study of Argument* a larger scope than *Logical Self-Defense*, allowing the book to simultaneously address needs of different audience groups, namely informal logicians, critical thinking instructors, and formal logicians.

4.2 North-Americanizing examples

Besides incorporating non-deductive, non-inductive argument types into the category of good arguments, informal logic emphasizes use of actual arguments, instead of contrived ones for pedagogy, so that examples for explanation of key concepts and for exercises are of great importance for learning and theorizing. The significance examples play in teaching is reflected in *Informal Logic Newsletter*'s including an example passage for analysis in its very first issue, and examples being published as supplements on a regular basis. Subsequently, the journal decided to make it a regular feature, beginning with volume 20.

While the emphasis on examples has helped to make logic more practical, applied, and informal, it has simultaneously created challenges for instructors. The examples must be accessible and understandable to both instructors and students. For example, evaluating the logical cogency of an argument based on the RSA/ARG criteria requires that students assess whether the premise is acceptable in and of itself. If a premise is not necessarily true, it might be examined to see if it is acceptable when judged by common knowledge. Since common knowledge varies according to time and place, it is easier to evaluate what one knows well. We can presume, for example, that US students know more about US social, cultural,

economic, or political issues than their Canadian, European, Asian, or African counterparts. Similarly, we can presume that Canadian students know more about Canadian issues than their US, European, Asian, or African counterparts. The lack of textbooks dealing with Canadian examples was part of the motivation for Johnson and Blair (1977) to write *Logical Self-Defense* (xiii-xiv), and they, in Johnson's (2007) word, "Canadianized" Kahane's textbook with real-life Canadian examples.[13] While their strategy may have appealed to the Canadian market, it was likely less attractive to the American market given American instructors' and students' relative lack of familiarity with Canadian issues.

With the limits of instructors' and students' common knowledge in mind, Govier made the decision to pursue a third way, North Americanizing the textbook by including both American and Canadian examples. Asked to what she attributes the success of *A Practical Study of Argument* in American and Canadian markets, she replies:

> (W)hen I wrote the textbook, I tried to put in American and Canadian material. I wanted a combination of both. That was a deliberate effort. The publisher wanted me to remove all the Canadian material, and I refused to do that, because I just said that I'm a Canadian, and I write in Canada, and I won't do it. And so they didn't insist. And, actually, some American professors have told me they appreciate the Canadian material. They don't at all mind telling their students that there is a city called Ottawa and that there is a Prime Minister and so on. They think its fine for their students to know this. I guess the book is quite successful because it has so many editions, but I have to emphasize that the sales numbers are not enormous. There are a number of books in this area,

[13] Interview of Ralph Johnson by Takuzo Konishi at University of Windsor, March 6.

> so I mean, there are many, many books besides mine. Yes, it's lasted for quite a while.

We have seen that the two rhetorical strategies Govier has used in writing *A Practical Study of Argument* reveal her inclusive approach to the pedagogy and theorizing of informal logic. Instead of omitting formal deductive logic and inductive logic and focusing solely on non-deductive or non-inductive argument types, she has developed her pluralistic theory of good argument and included four different argument types; instead of focusing only on good arguments or fallacious argument, she has attempted to establish the notion of cogent arguments and relate fallacious arguments to it; and instead of limiting herself to Canada- or US-specific examples, she has 'North-Americanized' the content by including both. By adopting this inclusive approach, she has succeeded in maintaining a tie with the tradition of logic, accommodating new ways of teaching courses in logic, critical thinking, and argumentation, and helping to disseminate them to a larger public.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter I have situated Govier's early work in informal logic in a historic-rhetorical context in order for us to better understand her contributions to the informal logic movement of the second half of the 20th century. By tracing what brought her to the teaching of informal logic and participation in the *First International Symposium on Informal Logic*, as well as what led her to inquire into theoretical issues involved in the practical activity, I have defended a thesis that Govier embodies what I (2009) mean by pedagogy-led informal logician.

Even before being inspired by Scriven to start her theoretical inquiries, Govier had worked as a practitioner of informal logic, reviewing the manuscript of *Logical*

Self-Defense and using the textbook in her own classroom teaching. Through her teaching, she started to shape her own ideas on informal logic, then exchanged those ideas with colleagues in the field and developed her pluralistic theory of argument in *A Practical Study of Argument*. In short, her teaching practice was a source of theorizing, and the constructed theory was, in turn, reflected in her textbook. Both played equally important roles in making Govier a key contributor to the informal logic movement.

I understand that there is much more left to say about Govier's contributions to informal logic, critical thinking, and argumentation. This chapter does not discuss her more theoretical works in later years, such as *Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation*, *The Philosophy of Argument*, and *Selected Issues in Logic and Communication*. Nonetheless, it is clear, even from the writings from the limited period covered here, that Govier is an important figure in history and philosophy of informal logic and argumentation, and that consideration of the later period would certainly provide further evidence of her significance in the field. The case made here is that Govier deserves status as a key contributor to the informal logic movement, together with Scriven, Kahane, Hamblin, Johnson, Blair, Woods, Walton, Hitchcock, and Pinto.

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2. The Practical Teaching of Argument

MOIRA KLOSTER

Summary: *A Practical Study of Argument* has been in continuous use for 31 years. This is an impressive legacy. Its longevity invites us to contemplate the evolution of teaching reasoning. Concerns that were barely discussed in the 1980s now present significant challenges to the tradition of reasoning as a generic practice available to all. Govier rose to the emerging challenges by presenting reasoning as an engagement with community and with students as members of the community. Yet even the well-designed progress she made may not be sufficient to meet challenges we face now in teaching reasoning.

1. Introduction

Textbooks for reasoning and critical thinking never hit the giddy heights of print runs in the 10,000 copy range. They sit in a publisher's "B list:" print runs of 4-6000 copies dropped into a highly competitive market, in the hope that after their normal four year life span they will have sold well enough to earn a second edition. (The "C list" is the specialist scholarly text with a print run of about 2000 copies, not expected to live into a second edition.)

As a result, the critical thinking textbook market is competitive. The people who teach the courses gener-ally start with whichever textbook they themselves learned from. When they find that they or their students struggle too much, they cast about for other options. Into that window of opportunity fly all the new and different approaches out there, all the publisher's samples sent as options for a beginning reasoning course. Eventually, some of us who teach the course for years write our own texts, perhaps even joining the crowd of published texts.

Against that background of competition and instability, Trudy Govier's text *A Practical Study of Argument* stands as one remarkable example of innovation

and longevity. Its second edition came out in 1988. I remember my first look at it, and my enthusiasm for its originality. It reached its 7th edition in 2009; an enhanced version of this edition kept it current for 2013. This remarkable longevity tells us that Govier's approach and the book itself have become a tradition. When it first appeared, everybody teaching these courses was breaking new ground: there were no such courses when we were undergraduates. People teaching from it now may have been the ones learning from it in the 1980s and 1990s.

What can we learn from this development of Govier's text from innovation to tradition? Earlier in this volume, Takuzo Konishi discusses Govier's role within the critical thinking movement, including the influence of her text on her own development and on the field. Its solid grounding in educational concerns and theory make it a practical way to teach argument. However, it is a greater challenge now than in the 1980s to teach reasoning as a stand-alone course.

In the spirit of constructive and collegial scholarship that Govier herself consistently exhibits, I shall extend Konishi's reflections to consider how her text handles the challenges, using the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 7th editions to trace changes from 1988 to 2009. (I was unable to locate copies of the first edition from 1985 or the 6th edition from 2004.) I will investigate why we teach courses in reasoning, who takes them, what is involved in learning, and how reasoning courses fit into academic and social practices. The results will show we are at a turning point: even an approach as well-considered as Govier's, focusing on the practical aspects of reasoning in daily life, may not be sufficient to meet current instructional needs arising from recognition of students' diversity.

2. The teaching of reason: Why do we do it?

I have lived through the same period of the development of reasoning instruction as Govier has. When we began, it was considered a fairly straightforward matter to improve people's reasoning. Everyone could reason more accurately and reliably, and it should be easy to show them how. If we taught the structure of argument, showed learners the difference between valid inferences and fallacious reasoning, and showed them why it matters to reason correctly, they would improve their own reasoning and their judgment of the reasoning of others.

This optimistic perspective is reflected in the original courses and texts. Introduced either as a replacement for logic courses or as a new course, a "reasoning" course has often come to be considered foundational. Students could (and should) take the course early in their programs, because it covered what they could (and should) learn easily and then apply elsewhere: the basic human skill of logical reasoning. People who developed texts and courses were either dissatisfied with their students' progress in formal logic courses or recognized the wider appeal of a less formal approach to reasoned argument. Konishi, earlier in this volume, speaks of this approach to the development of reasoning theory as "pedagogy-led:" the teaching drives the theory. Konishi describes why the steps Govier took away from symbolic logic strengthened the position of reasoning courses as a separate practice.

There was an economic incentive to follow her lead. The place of reasoning courses in a post-secondary education is connected to changes in wider academic and social preferences. As general reasoning courses became more popular from the 1960s to the 1990s their development was congruent with institutional and departmental economic objectives. Enrollments would be assured if a "reasoning requirement" was judged important to further study or employment. I was a graduate student

at Simon Fraser University in the late 1970s when its reasoning course, Philosophy 001, was successfully repositioned from a 30-student elective course to a required course routinely registering 200 students. The Department had persuaded programs such as Business and Economics that it could deliver the reasoning skills their students seemed to lack or not acquire easily in their current required courses, and that a single generic course could suffice to let students apply reasoning wherever needed.

Since the 1990s, the apparent value of having a "reasoning requirement" has waxed and waned depending on educational or economic concerns. The number of reasoning courses has been influenced by factors far outside any instructor's control, in how the post-secondary sector and education in general position themselves between theory and government funding priorities. (These concerns will be seen clearly in Laura Pinto's paper, in this volume.) My institution has seen four waves of discussion related to its Bachelor of Arts degree requirements. The arguments have sometimes been purely economic: can we fit a burgeoning number of students into a limited number of sections of a course, or, conversely, will we lose students if we constrain their options by requiring courses they would not freely choose to take? Sometimes the arguments have been educational: does a reasoning requirement make sense as a foundational course if students often delay taking it until their final year? Does a stand-alone course add anything to what students already learn within discipline-specific courses?

Each institutional review of curriculum reimagines the purpose a reasoning course might serve. Who needs to learn it? Can the learning be applied across disciplines and outside the academy? Is reasoning an individual skill or a social practice? Is reasoning as taught in academic courses useful in a global economy? Since the early 1980s when Govier's text first appeared, the answers to these questions have changed.

The original purpose of a reasoning course was to build the same logical reasoning ability practiced in mathematics, symbolic logic, or Latin. Converting arguments from persuasive rhetorical language into objective inferences should help us avoid being swayed by the language itself. Then we could settle disputes across significant differences of opinion. Logical thinking was something a normal human brain should have developed by adulthood. During the period that general reasoning courses were first developed, these claims appeared to be strongly supported. Jean Piaget's cross-cultural studies seemed to show that between the ages of 11 and adulthood at about age 18, people naturally began to do abstract thinking, "including the ability to employ adult logic/deductive and inductive reasoning" (Herman 2012, 26).

Does this justification of reasoning courses as improvement of core abilities of human minds stand up today? In the next section, I will consider some of the evidence that has made it less likely that "the ability to employ adult logic/deductive and inductive reasoning" is either a natural or an easily acquired practice.

3. The teaching of reason: How easy is it to learn?

One built-in difficulty for teaching reasoning is that fallacies are so seductive. About the same time as the initial rise of general reasoning courses, psychology began to report studies which indicated that human logical ability is fragile: unreliable at best and stubbornly resistant to correction at worst. Johnson-Laird (1983) was a leader in establishing empirically that some forms of syllogism and some constructions of "if/then" inference, such as "unless", were far harder to get right than others, even though there was no logical difference between them. Studies of persistent inabilities to recognize the logical equivalence of different questions about statistical

reasoning won Daniel Kahneman the Nobel Prize in 2002 for his research with Amos Tversky.[14]

The studies, however, had little impact on the teaching of reasoning. Reasoning theorists contended that these studies were flawed because the people tested typically had not had the advantage of direct instruction in symbolic logic or general reasoning. For many years, my colleagues in this field and I held out the hope that any problems were due to lack of good instruction, which surely we could provide! This hope remains alive and well but it is not clear that good instruction works.

Empirical studies of the extent to which direct instruction in reasoning reduces the commission of fallacies are difficult because it is hard to limit the variables to the instruction received. There is no strong evidence that instruction works, only some small encouragement. For example, in "On the road toward formal reasoning: Reasoning with factual causal and contrary-to-fact causal premises during early adolescence" (2014), Markovits reports that instruction can make a difference to the ability to hypothesize and think counter-factually. With limited empirical evidence, we should be wary of assuming that instruction will remedy inaccurate reasoning.

Govier appears neither to ignore the studies nor to concede much to them. In her extensive coverage of fallacies, none are singled out as less easy to recognize or avoid. For example, from the 4th edition (1997) onwards, she discusses "confirmation bias", one of the common errors. Govier assumes that the error can be avoided by following standard practices of argument. This is unlikely; such errors are extremely persistent, possibly even built

[14] Tversky died in 1996, so could not qualify for the award. For a description of their research and its implications see Kahneman, *Thinking Fast and Slow*, 2011. There are now many popular overviews of these studies including Tavris and Aronson, *Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me): Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts* (2008).

into how reasoning is normally done by the brain (Kahneman 2011) and attempts to educate biases away can even backfire and reinforce those very biases (Beaulac and Kenyon 2014).

As we aim to improve reasoning, we are looking for the "sweet spot" where the learning we want to introduce is both accessible and interesting to the learner. The influential education theorist Vygotsky called this "the zone of proximal development", described by Wass and Golding (2014) as "the range of tasks that individuals can complete with assistance, but cannot complete on their own" (674). To make reasoning accessible, Govier made changes in each edition to better meet student needs and to reflect her own scholarly work in argumentation.

In all editions she addresses three learning problems usually experienced by students. The first is finding and interpreting arguments: a comprehension task that Govier, like others, deals with by carefully defining arguments and by using "standardization": the conversion of prose arguments into a linear sequence of distinct claims leading up to a conclusion. The second problem is acquiring confidence in argument analysis, dealt with by explicit discussion of why analysis is important, and by including a wide variety of examples. The third problem is the ability to use argument skills after the course is over – the problem of "transfer".

Govier deals with the first and second problems by making changes to address comprehension and confidence. The 2nd edition (1988) includes simpler exercises and a review of key terms. The 3rd edition (1990) uses shorter paragraphs for easier reading; examples include a wider variety of content and a wider range of difficulty. Chapter summaries are added to consolidate understanding. The 4th edition (1997) adds diagrams to reveal the structure of arguments, and increases the explanation of several key topics; the book is 50 pages longer than its predecessor. In the 7th edition, the discussion of good argument precedes the chapter on

language "for pedagogical reasons" (though the reasons are not given), and emotional aspects of language are introduced before definitions, "in deference to student interest and instructor preference." Govier also makes changes for theoretical reasons. In the 2nd edition (1988) she uses "cogent" to replace "sound", answering concerns raised by instructors about her non-standard use of "sound". She refers instructors to her books, *Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation* (1988), and *The Philosophy of Argument* (POA) for discussion of theory, and as adoption of Govier's approach became more common, her theoretical approach became a standard.

While her changes were no doubt appreciated by instructors and students, they do not entirely resolve student difficulties in learning. More explanation and more practice may be the best we can do for individual comprehension and confidence, but we still have the third problem: skill transfer. We assume that students who have learned from us will carry forward their new competencies to perform better in new tasks. However, to the fascination of psychologists and the dismay of instructors, good performance in the classroom or on a single subject is no guarantee of good performance in the world at large. This problem was recognized even in the early days of reasoning courses. Scriven (1977) noted, "the evidence from educational psychology seems entirely overwhelming with respect to one point, namely that so-called 'transfer of learning' or 'generalization' always turns out to be less than educators had previously supposed" (xiv-xv). Extensive studies in psychology offered various causes of and solutions for the problem.[15]

If transfer does not easily happen, reasoning courses are on shaky ground. Can students learn to apply reasoning skills and standards wherever they encounter

[15] See for example, "Learning and interactivity in solving a transformation problem," Guthrie et al. (2015), which mentions many of the earlier studies.

arguments? From the 3rd edition forward, Govier addresses this concern by including longer essays for reflection and analysis, so students at least could make a practical connection with reasoning in other post-secondary courses.

Trying to design for comprehension and transfer of skill beyond the course leads into the wider issue of what is accessible to post-secondary learners. In teaching reasoning, we are teaching something we presume to be accessible to everyone, and of interest to anyone who has not yet considered the study of argument as a subject in its own right. These assumptions bear questioning.

4. The teaching of reason: Who is ready to learn?

One assumption in the "pedagogy-led" approach is that students aged between 18 and 25 can be treated as young adults with some existing competence in abstract thinking. This assumption traces back to the popularity of Piaget's "stage theory" of human development, mentioned earlier: the claim that abstract reasoning ability begins in early adolescence and is typically complete by adulthood. While this is still a plausible claim, the difficulty is that the boundary of "adulthood" has changed.

Mental development continues over a much longer period than previously thought. Those aged between 18 and 25 may not have the abstract thinking capabilities we expect. Recent studies of adolescent development indicate that the brain is still in stages of adolescence until the age of 23, perhaps even 25.[16] Introductory reasoning courses

[16] Fortunately, the studies are not entirely discouraging. In "Reasoning and self-awareness from adolescence to middle age: Organization and development as a function of education" (2009), Demetriou and Bakracevic studied the performance of four age groups, 13–15, 23–25, 33–35, and 43–45, on tasks involving spatial, propositional, or social reasoning. Performance in spatial and propositional reasoning stabilized in early adulthood, which

are typically offered to learners below this threshold of adulthood. Even if 18-23 year-olds have not yet matured into good propositional reasoners, they are also expected to master discipline-specific applications of reasoning. This raises a question that has nagged reasoning instruction since the 1980s: why offer a general reasoning course if students can't or don't learn reasoning as a general skill? How useful is it, if they will eventually get what they need when they have to learn to reason within the disciplines they major in?

5. The teaching of reason: How generic is it?

General reasoning courses maintain the proud claim of transcending disciplinary boundaries. From a "core skills" perspective, access to specialized areas is considered to be possible only through first acquiring basic literacy and numeracy – and reasoning competence.

From the mid-1970s until the late 1990s, writing and reasoning were seen as practices common to all disciplines. "Good writing" in any field would be writing so clear that even people outside that field would understand and appreciate it. "Good reasoning", as befits a practice to be used in academia and in public life, should be of such clarity and accessibility as to be persuasive to members of the public.

In the 21st century, the possibility of such generic reasoning is questioned. The challenge is not new: in 1981, John McPeck argued in *Critical Thinking and Education* that there was no reasoning independent of disciplines. Each discipline had specific, distinctive standards of evidence and traditions of formulating arguments. Thinking must always have some subject matter, and the

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Demetriou and Bakracevic define as the 23-25 age range. Social reasoning performance, however, continued to improve into middle age.

subject matter would inevitably shape what counted as good reasoning in that subject. It was not possible to "reason well" generically, only to "reason well about history" or "reason well about English."

This argument remained unpopular through the 1990s, as many post-secondary institutions developed Writing Centres and Writing Across the Curriculum movements to teach and judge writing as "good writing" independent of discipline. Nevertheless, the academic paradigm shifted to see nuances that made writing different in each academic discipline. McPeck was ahead of his time.

In the face of this gradual change, Govier's approach remained firmly based in discipline-independent reasoning. Yet she also creates at least a partial framework for confronting trends to discipline-specific instruction. As Konishi points out in this volume, Govier made a deliberate step away from deductive logic and the inductive-deductive distinction into a broader presentation that included analogical and conductive reasoning. This positions her very nicely to acknowledge the possibility of different standards for different purposes, while affirming that we also have to be able to discuss these standards beyond their boundaries.

This step is important because Govier presents reasoning not simply as one step in gaining the competence to master a discipline, but as a step towards functioning beyond the academy. She consistently uses her studies of political and moral philosophy to make her reasoning text engage with social concerns. Her readers are citizens in the making, preparing for a lifetime of participating in their community. Govier herself never seems to treat this approach as a radical challenge to other texts or theorists, yet elements of this approach challenge the common view that reasoning is a matter of an individual's independent competence.

6. Reasoning as individual or social practice

The design of reasoning instruction usually presents good reasoning as personal, independent, systematic thinking – as indicated so nicely in the title of Johnson and Blair's classic text, *Logical Self-Defense* (1979; 1983). Throughout the 1980s reasoning was usually presented as the way to help individuals avoid being deceived or manipulated, and resist unwarranted pressure to conform. Johnson and Blair specifically appealed to the needs of "the consumer in our society" and for the consumer as citizen to be equally cautious about "areas of social, political, and economic persuasion" (1983, xiii).

This principle of independence is not so strong in Govier's text. She does ground argument in principles of individual rational thought, but gradually weaves in a growing concern for relationships. This is consistent with her concern that humans should learn to flourish in community, a concern explored by other papers in this volume: Pinto considers the importance of relationships over impersonal objectivity in teaching; Radzik discusses how relationships help us deal reasonably with wrongdoing; Little and Verwoerd speak of the need to "humanize" others before reconciliation is possible.

In the 5th edition (PSA 1999) Govier begins to step away from treating argument analysis as a question of individual objectivity, and connects argument evaluation to interpersonal relationships. Learners are addressed as members of a community, rather than just as individuals whose intellectual development requires skilled independent analysis of arguments. Interpretation of arguments becomes a matter of co-operative and respectful community practice, not just individual objectivity in constructing interpretation. These concerns also motivate her monograph on argumentation theory, *The Philosophy of Argument*, published the same year.

Other changes in this edition also position argument as requiring management of relationships.

Emotion and its possibly distracting role in evaluation are considered, and the importance of the dialectical context of argument is explained. The "principle of charity" is presented not as an ethical principle, a matter of individual integrity, but as a co-operative principle, an expected part of communication in general.

Govier presumes neither that all communities engage in argument, nor that argument is a practice we should all master. Reasoning draws on the fact that we do interact across boundaries of discipline, social identity, and culture. To handle these possibly difficult interactions, Govier appeals directly to the need for a general respect for others. To those who ignore an argument by failing to notice it or to comprehend and assess it, Govier says, "You are failing to respect the other person by leaving out his or her reasoning for thinking as he or she does, and you are depriving yourself of an opportunity to think, reflect, and possibly change your mind" (PSA 2001, 87).

This wording did not appear in earlier editions, which moved directly from defining arguments to standards for evaluation. For example, the 3rd edition (1992) had a section on "The challenge of argument," but it described a refusal to engage another person's argument only as "talking at cross-purposes," and counts the behaviour just as "a common way of avoiding the challenge of argument." Respect as key to reasoning was introduced in the 4th edition (1997), at the same time that Govier worked on *Social Trust and Human Communities* (STHC) and *Dilemmas of Trust* (Dilemmas). This suggests that she now saw good relationships as an important context for argument evaluation. In the 7th edition (2009) her wording speaks even more directly to maintaining relationships: failing to attend to the argument "displays a kind of disrespect for the reasoning and thinking of the other person" (104). Still, Govier retains a concern for individual objectivity and our obligations to ourselves: "There is a sense in which we are also cheating ourselves

if we do this: we deprive ourselves of an opportunity to reflect on reasons for and against our beliefs" (104).

The same concern for relationships runs through Govier's wider body of work. In her work on ethics Govier deals explicitly with the need to establish at least a minimum social connection before engaging in argument. In the chapter "Restoring Trust" in Dilemmas of Trust, she lists preconditions for argument: finding ways to learn to listen, understanding others before challenging them, and ways to exhibit trustworthiness oneself so as to deserve being listened to (1998, 165).

Govier's approach to reasoning welcomes learners into a reflective community in which the most experienced members still question their practice. The text positions her as a voice of experience, yet still actively thinking through what is involved in argument. Govier's voice in the text is as you'd hear it in person and as you see it in her scholarly books. She is no-nonsense yet compassionate, focused on how individuals and communities can flourish. In *A Practical Study of Argument* she speaks to what matters to each of us whether we or not we are expert reasoners:

> What we think is important: it can be a matter of life and death. Even if something is a "matter of opinion," that is no reason to think hastily about it. We should seek well-founded and sensible opinions, grounded in factual accuracy and coherent and plausible background theories. (PSA 2001, 3)

This is closely comparable to the tone and style in her books for scholars, both in her work on reasoning theory and in her work on social relationships, for example, in this excerpt from *Forgiveness and Revenge*:

> To respect each other as persons, we must mutually acknowledge our worth, feelings, goals, capacities and human dignity, and we must honour human dignity and worth appropriately, taking into account

> the capacity for reason and reasoned choices – and also human feelings, beliefs, values, interests and goals. To fail to do this is to violate a fundamental moral norm. (FR, 168)

For Govier, reason is a practice that deserves our time and attention throughout our lives. It helps us find our way through personal decisions and work collectively through difficult debates. The more we can persist in respectful and objective questioning, the more we have a chance of resolving deep differences of opinion.

Although promising, this approach to reasoning also creates some significant difficulties. Govier's attention to welcoming a diversity of perspectives suggests an egalitarian approach to disagreement. In an egalitarian model, any differences between us in terms of our lived experience will be relevant only in so far as the experiences provide us with support for our arguments. The difficulty here is whether we ever can be equal in this way. It depends so much on who is to become part of the reasoning community, especially in a classroom where the students and teacher do not meet on equal grounds. The next section will show that it is painfully easy to alienate people we most hoped to include.

7. Reasoning as social practice: What is a community?

In the spirit of Govier's entire body of work, we can see the teaching of reasoning as an ongoing exploration of how good citizens can deal fairly with one another. Whoever our students are, we hope their education will help them to become good citizens of their local, national, and global communities. Reason could help us understand and resolve differences of opinion in a community; however, people begin with different beliefs and principles from which they generate their arguments. Does reasoning, as a

social practice, deal effectively with diversity in its participants?

Even if logic is a natural human brain function, it may be shaped by cultural traditions. Students are not just groups with commonalities of age or academic background, but distinct individuals with a wide range of cultural backgrounds. Reasoning might aim to transcend differences between people, but it would be unwise to expect logic to be practiced or valued in the same way across all cultures. An influential study done by A.R. Luria in the 1930s uncovered what appeared to be radically illogical thinking by Uzbek peasants who had no Russian schooling (*Cognitive Development*, 1976) and did not hesitate to propose that the solution was to give them this schooling. By the 1970s, when Cole and Scribner were doing work in Liberia and Bloom was doing studies in China (see Cole and Scribner 1974, Bloom 1981, Au 1984), it was more controversial to use the frequency of "wrong" answers as evidence of illogical thinking. Ever since, it has been debatable whether the reasoning done in Western academies can be required on a global scale or in culturally diverse local communities (Linker 2011).

The concern is cultural imperialism. In a debate closely related to whether reasoning is a general human skill, writing theorists question whether scholars of all cultures must adopt Western academic writing styles in order to present or publish their papers. Scholars come to North American institutions from around the world for higher education; peer-reviewed Western journals are the gold standard for credibility. Yet China, which has experienced dramatic changes of scholarly culture from Confucianism to Maoism to the current entrepreneurial model, and India, which still struggles with the educational legacy of British colonialism, are at best reluctant to accept that Western standards should be required for participation

in global scholarship.[17] In Canada, the same concern is raised by indigenous scholars, who find that the standardized models of reasoning practiced in academic research are alien to their preferences and traditions. They have developed a less universalist, more narrative and personal form of argument; this methodology is at odds with the traditions of reasoning as we currently teach it (e.g. Wilson 2008).

Govier's steadfastly systematic approach and her promotion of a respectful stance towards fellow-citizens may not be enough to meet current needs in working with the diversity in our classrooms and communities. Texts like Govier's imply that reasoning, done systematically, carefully, and politely, is the best form of argument practice and will create a "safe" space within which to discuss any topic. Is this enough to build the social trust that is such an important objective of Govier's long career? That is not so clear.

As indicated by the discussion of academic scholarship practices, there is a significant risk of alienating people we want to include. The same risk has also received attention from a feminist perspective, by authors including Phyllis Rooney (2010) and Catherine Hundleby (2013), who question the alleged generality of reasoning standards and practices.

Rooney argues in "Philosophy, Adversarial Argumentation, and Embattled Reason" (2010) that philosophy – the discipline from which informal logic emerged – has tended to assume an adversarial stance and a misleading metaphor of battles to describe debate or disagreement. Hundleby argues in "Aggression,

[17] See, for example, Flowerdew and Li (2009), "English or Chinese? The trade-off between local and international publication among Chinese academics in the Humanities and Social Sciences;" Liu (2012), "Exploring the impacts of cultural globalization on cultural awareness/values and English writing in Chinese context;" Wu (2014), "Let's see where your Chinese students come from: a qualitative descriptive study of writing in the disciplines in China."

Politeness, and Abstract Adversaries" (2013) that Govier's emphasis on respect does not go far enough to ensure reasoning will be able to engage diverse members of a community. For Govier, adversarial argument is a key component of reasoning, because opposition is important to test views when resolving social issues. Yet even when politely expressed, adversarial argument is still a method of challenging, probing, and resisting. Hundleby notes that this probing and challenging upholds a standard which favours the social practices of Euro-American white males. Such adversarial practices limit or repress women, people of other gender identities, ethnicities and social classes, and children. Consequently, although reason may be intended as a tool to handle differences of opinion, it can also create more difficult problems.

Can we persist in systematic questioning if that is unfair to people for whom dispassionate or persistent questioning is exactly the wrong way to handle disagreement? Western post-secondary education teaches particular patterns of speech and writing, including adversarial tone and format, as "academic." However, these patterns are not common to all students. They cause difficulties not only in reasoning courses. In "Making stance explicit for second language writers in the disciplines: what faculty need to know about the language of stance-taking" (2014), Z. Lancaster notes it is often difficult for second-language speakers to understand why or how to write in ways that will be academic: "recognized by readers as appropriate and authoritative – i.e., assertive, knowledgeable, critically distant, and aligned with a specific disciplinary culture" (269-270). Students' inability to use "critically distant" expressions can appear to instructors as an inability to reason well.

If critical stances and questioning methods are not familiar or comfortable to students, then unfamiliarity and discomfort can arise even in the examples we choose to illustrate lessons on how to reason. In an equitable classroom, examples should have a reasonable chance of

being intelligible and interesting to all students, but this is hard to achieve.

Some texts "meet the students where they are," using examples that should already be familiar from their current lives. Some texts "meet them in the classroom," with examples that highlight only the logical content being taught. Some texts, including Govier's, "meet them where we want them to be," by using examples they will encounter in academic life or future civic life. All of these options are defensible, and all are problematic.

Meeting students where they are means using language and examples we hope will resonate with them. This is risky. For example, B.N. Moore and R.Parker (8th ed., 2007) start with a discussion of the unreasonableness of deciding to open a tanning salon in the sun-baked Sacramento Valley. Presumably, tanning is familiar to many students, so they will understand why the business is obviously a bad idea in a sunny area. However, it may puzzle other students who don't understand why white people like to tan. Others, who know it costs money to use a tanning salon, may feel excluded because the example concerns people who can afford to start businesses or spend money on luxuries. Choosing to connect to students' own experiences requires a considerable repertoire of examples to draw everyone in.

Some texts offer examples that are constructed for a classroom environment, placing the focus not on familiar content but on logical structure. For example, the classic truth of symbolic logic, "It is raining or it is not raining," is not a conversational remark and does not expect to connect to any learner's interest in the weather. This approach also has its problems. For example, John Woods, Andrew Irvine and Douglas Walton (2004) use as their first example: "Archimedes must be either a hero or a martyr. After all, anyone who dies in battle is one or the other and, as we know, Archimedes perished during the capture of Syracuse." This approach illustrates the assumption that logic is comprehensible to anyone who

can understand the words, even if they are not among the "we" who already knew Archimedes died at the battle of Syracuse. Comprehension, however, is not so easily achieved. Archimedes may be unfamiliar to many students, and the example also slips in the phrase "as we know." Who are "we"? The phrase welcomes all learners who have previously heard of Archimedes or Syracuse. However, it simultaneously alienates those who have never heard of Archimedes: even if they follow the logic of the example, they recognize they are not among the welcomed "we." An indigenous person, an immigrant to Canada from outside Europe, or any learner who understands the impact of colonization on Canada, will recognize that examples like this comes from the anglophone Canadian tradition. Must they assimilate to this tradition to learn in this classroom? That would be an unfair expectation for the diverse student population from a nation that does not require assimilation to a single tradition.

Using examples of the "logical" type requires at least a willingness to stop and explain references in enough detail to bring them to life for everyone in the room. It also requires care in expression: "we" must not divide students from each other or from the teacher.

The third approach, meeting students where we would like them to be, means using examples we want them to care about, such as voting, climate change, or the plight of refugees. Govier takes this approach, which I will call a "community" approach for its emphasis on issues of citizenship and social connections or concerns. She consistently goes beyond illustrating the logical connections between sentences to challenge popular opinions. The first example in the 2nd edition is:

> There are three factors which show that a free enterprise ideal does not fit our economic system at this time. First of all, unionization protects labor from vulnerability to market conditions. Secondly,

> government supports and regulates industry. Thirdly, protective tariffs work selectively to isolate some domestic products from foreign completion. (1988, 2)

Here, while framing the example in the same "logical" language as Woods, Irvine, and Walton, Govier challenges a popular economic theory practiced in the 1980s by Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and Brian Mulroney as leaders of Britain, the US, and Canada. She uses a logical framework to show why that popular theory could be considered unsatisfactory. This would have met the students of the 1980s where she wanted them to be: even if students paid no attention to the news, she makes sure they begin to see that reason examines and challenges claims that shape their society.

In the 3rd and 4th editions (1992, 1; and 1995, 1) the first example is not a civic issue but a medical one. "Eating more than one egg a day is dangerous because eggs contain cholesterol and cholesterol can cause strokes and heart attacks." This example comes closer to the approach of meeting the students where they are. Even students who don't read or view the news might be expected to be interested in issues related to their personal health. Nevertheless, Govier is still challenging dietary advice that was accepted wisdom at the time.

In the 5th edition Govier returns to public concerns. The first example is:

> "War is a legitimate instrument of foreign policy whenever the survival of the nation is at stake, because the purpose of foreign policy is to preserve the nation." (PSA 2001, 1)

The next examples use similarly broad public concerns. The second example is, "There are no international police. It takes police to thoroughly enforce the law. Therefore, international law cannot be thoroughly enforced." The third concludes: "National goals for Canada should be

more than economic" (based on a short argument which manages to work in links to the Magna Carta, the Gettysburg Address, and the motto of the French Revolution). All three of these examples put citizenship first: we are in Canada, as part of an international community – just at the time that Canada was engaged in Afghanistan, terrorism increased, and the US moved into war with Iraq. As with her economic example, Govier challenges prevailing views by considering a defence of war at a time when the country was uncomfortable participating in wars. For the 7th edition, the first example is

> Marijuana should not be legalized. That's because sustained use of marijuana worsens a person's memory, and nothing that adversely affects one's mental abilities should be legalized. (PSA 2009, 1)

This example picks a topic that might engage students both personally and as citizens. They might consume marijuana and certainly will have opinions on whether marijuana should be legalized. However, just as she did in the 1980s, Govier makes sure the conclusion is the opposite of popular opinion. In 1988, her dispassionat-ely-expressed example would have been uncontro-versial: many people opposed legalization. By 2009 public opinion had swung towards legalization and Canada had already legalized marijuana for medical use; opposing legalization had become the more controversial position.

A community approach like Govier's, like the logical approach, builds in a need to explain examples to students unfamiliar with the topic, which can be time-consuming and challenging depending on how much background knowledge the students have. However, of the three approaches, it also allows the widest range of examples to be used, provided the explanations draw students in together to share new information and concerns. My reason for choosing the word "community"

as a descriptor is because it emphasizes that the choice of examples and the explanation of those examples should increase the sense of community between students instead of reinforcing any "us" and "them" distinction.

Choosing suitable examples raises a concern beyond differences linked to gender identity, ethnic background, or socio-economic class: students' current emotional states. For every student who is deeply engaged by a discussion of euthanasia or abortion, there may be a student currently dealing with a critically-ill relative or who has herself had an abortion. Arguments on an objectively controversial topic have a very different tone and colour for anyone whose personal experience makes him or her relive the emotional turmoil and the questioning of beliefs that accompany life-changing events. Students in such a position may need options such as private discussions outside class, or freedom to leave the room before discussion begins.

The overall problem of choosing inclusive examples can seem to be an insurmountable obstacle to teaching: how could we possibly teach reasoning in a way which is individualized to each of our student's needs? Can we be ethically obliged to limit our discussion topics to those that will not trigger individual distress? Is that even possible?

8. Learning from teaching

There are two principles I want to carry away from this close inspection of a text over its gradual evolution. The first is to maintain a reasoned response: to review my understandings of teaching through cogent argument. If this text or any other no longer sits well with the learners entrusted to me, I must find a new path between where they are and where they need to be as good citizens in a mutually respectful community. This means that I must be prepared to learn what they know and what they care

about, and find examples and explanations that can bridge their interests and what I know to be important in the local, national, and global communities they inhabit.

The second is to maintain a compassionate stance: to do more than just respect others as we engage in argument about reasoning. In the wider social context, we must share responsibility for working at the challenge of building relationships and practices to accommodate the full diversity of people with whom we share the world.

When I think back on my own experience, I realize I have changed my teaching practice incre-mentally, as I learned more about diversity. First, I learned to be explicit about reasoning as a practice and why I expect students to participate in class. Students from Asia would simply drop my class if I didn't make it clear that I was sufficiently expert in my field to be worth listening to, and that in my expert judgment, participation was required in order to learn. However, I also permit students to stay silent rather than contribute in class: some Canadian women whose parents were born in India would drop the class if I required them to speak, as would students with anxiety disorders.

I avoid examples involving economic privilege. One text had an example about buying cars; I dropped it because many students I have taught are too poor to own cars. I minimize examples connected to European history; as a child in Africa I resented learning only the history of foreign countries. I explain key differences between US and Canadian laws and traditions; students often don't know there is a difference.

I learned never to assume which student would be willing to contribute on which topic. I once invited a student who was a social worker to give an informed opinion on drug treatment issues; this made a young man in the class angry. As he explained later, he knew far more than she did because he was a former addict.

I am careful now about emotional issues. I issue a general caution that some topics trigger too much emotion

to be comfortable to practice on, and respect students' discretion to choose or avoid some topics. I do not assume what will be a "trigger" issue; instead, I say that anything mentioned in a reasoning class could hit close to home for someone, so respectful expression is always required. It is not always the teacher who triggers a problem: one student burst into tears over a topic she herself had selected and was relieved when I suggested a less distressing alternative. Conversely, I asked another student if she wanted to change her project, on arguments about euthanasia, since her mother was fatally ill, but she seemed to find it valuable to have this avenue to think about the decisions she and her sisters were facing.

I draw on experience as a Writing Centre volunteer and on curriculum committees to discuss specific differences students will see between my reasoning class and what happens in other disciplines. The more I can explain where they may need to modify their practices in other contexts, the more comfortable they are trying new techniques and accepting there may not be a clear, universal set of rules for reasoning.

Finally, I have adopted what has become general practice at my institution: an acknowledgment at the start of a course that our work takes place on unceded Sto:Lo territory and that it is a privilege to be permitted to teach here. This acknowledgment goes far beyond recognition of unresolved indigenous land claims. It indicates not only that the different traditions and expectations of people in our region can factor into assessing arguments, but also that we are in an environment which can question prevailing practices, including the practice of reason. I am also careful to include my personal experience where it is relevant to examples I have chosen, as I have done throughout this paper. Including personal detail shows that I am speaking from my lived experience, which is essential to indigenous tradition, and opens up narrative voice as another way to work with reasoning.

Do all these changes add up to a satisfactory way to teach a diverse group of students to reason using shared standards? I am sure they do not. Thirty years of trial and error only shows me that I have had to pick myself up over and over again after making mistakes. But that is what a reasoner does: she finds reasonable responses, not just to arguments but to challenges to practice or changes in relationships.

9. Conclusion

A Practical Study of Argument deserves its place as a classic text. It has brought thousands of students to an acceptable level of performance using a well-grounded theory of argument evaluation. It gives us Govier's personal voice and her engagement with the challenges of practical reasoning. An instructor just learning to teach reasoning can start here with confidence that the approach is theoretically sound and introduces topics of civic and philosophical interest. A course taught from this text will walk a practical line between the abstractions of reasoning theory and the concerns of a diverse society.

However, the practicality of teaching argument also requires us to continue to shape our teaching to our students' needs. As fellow members of our communities, students will become concerned with how a community can sustain itself. To sustain a community of people who can reason together, we need to explore when reasoning practice can still be presented as universal, and when approaches should be modified so that culturally diverse and feminist concerns are welcomed, and the style of reasoning is accessible to a range of different students.

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3. Erosion of Trust in Education: Accountability and Teacher Professionalism

LAURA ELIZABETH PINTO

Summary: This paper builds on Trudy Govier's extensive work on trust by relating it to teachers' professional relationships, with particular attention to the damaging effects of contemporary accountability-driven "audit culture." Two related policy developments affect teachers' professional trust relationships: standardized testing and curriculum; and surveillance-based professional regulation. Govier's ideas about trust allude to ways in which these policy developments mediate and, in some cases, erode aspects of trust necessary for effective education.

1. Introduction

Trudy Govier advances conceptions of trust in relation to many aspects of life, arguing that trust is an essential part of being human and operating in democracy. "Without trust," she writes, "personal and social life would be impossible" (Dilemmas, 205). She points out that trust is implicit to various streams of the literature on education, but rarely overtly referenced. Trust is a necessary condition of the education process, operating in many configurations. It occurs between teachers and parents (who entrust teachers to care for their children), between teachers and students, between administrators and teachers; and between policy makers and all those formally and informally involved in schooling. Educational goals certainly cannot be achieved if trust is lacking among these education actors and stakeholders.

This paper examines the effects of pervasive, accountability-driven education policies on trust. I limit my discussion to trust between parents and teachers and

between students and teachers, though I acknowledge that trust operates in a complex web involving many, many more stakeholders. My aim in this paper is to explore the ways in which education's current audit culture and preoccupation with regulation, both of which rely on increasingly prescriptive measures, affect trust. In doing so, I extend Govier's (Social, 92-194) account of the professions and trust, particularly her elucidation of special problems associated with the issue of trusting professionals in *Social Trust and Human Communities*.

I begin by describing the role of trust in education and schooling. Next, I outline the rise and nature of accountability in contemporary education policy reforms, with specific attention the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. I then explore the ways in which accountability-driven professional regulation has compromised trust in favour of confidence, leading to problematic surveillance and resulting in less than ideal responses to systemic conditions. Finally, I will discuss the implications of those policies and human responses for professional trust in education as it relates to teachers.

2. Trust in education

Govier describes trust as "an attitude based on beliefs and feelings, and implying expectations and dispositions" (Social, 4) with two dimensions: motivation (the intention to act well and to avoid harm), and competence (Dilemmas). She explains that trust is relative to contexts and situations – for instance, we might trust a person to do one thing (deliver a parcel) but not another (care for our children) (Social).

Central to this paper is Govier's conception of professional trust as a form of social trust. Social trust is one of two forms that Govier identifies, the other being interpersonal. The logic and structure of social trust centres on positive expectations about what the other is

likely to do, based on a sense of competence and motivation, a willingness to allow oneself to be vulnerable, and a disposition to interpret what the other person says and does in a positive way. Unlike interpersonal trust, professional trust exists towards strangers based on social role. "To know someone as a teacher, waiter or mechanic," Govier explains, "is something quite different from knowing her as a neighbour, parent, friend or citizen" (Social, 78). Govier cites three features essential to being a professional: specialized knowledge; considerable autonomy; and a high level of fiduciary[18] responsibility to serve the ends of clients. In Govier's view, fiduciary responsibility is related to trust because professionals "must not use their special position to serve their own interests." By using their professional status for their own personal gain, the interests of others whom the professionals are supposed to serve can be jeopardized (Social).

Though all professions require trust to function, the public service includes a civic responsibility to which other professions (e.g., lawyers, engineers, etc.) are generally not subject. With the first treatment of public service and philosophy of education appearing in the *Republic*, Plato defined the desirability of submitting to the ruling class, the literal meaning of "public *servant*" (Bullough, Gitlin, and Goldstein 1984). In contemporary life, the idea that public servants ought to be selfless, disinterested, unambitious, virtuous, hard-working, and obedient persists. In fact, various public service professional standards (e.g., the Ontario Public Service

[18] Though often associated with legal and financial trusts, the term "fiduciary" describes any relationship in which one person or party relies on another's judgment or counsel (Holtman 2001). It applies to formal arrangements undertaken as part of a professional obligation (for example, medical doctors, teachers), as well as informal and fluid relationships that involve an ethical component (Holtman 2001).

Oath and the Ontario College of Teachers[19] [OCT] "Standards for the Teaching Profession") emphasize the virtues of selflessness and obedient service to this day.

While all professionals in the public service are, in principle, subject to the values just described, the special goals and risks associated with caring for children and helping them develop intellectually and socially set teachers apart from other professions. In all relationships between professionals and those they serve, power and knowledge imbalances make the people involved vulnerable (Social). "In submitting her projects, interests and needs to a professional," Govier (Social, 82) explains, a parent is vulnerable in relation to a teacher, having to depend on the teacher to act on her behalf. "We need professionals and we are vulnerable to their power, hence we need to trust them" (Social, 82). Parents, therefore, need to view the teacher-as-professional as "trustworthy" in matters of care and teaching of their children, and students need to trust the teacher in order to take the risks needed to learn in classrooms.

When children are entrusted into teachers' care, the nature of risk is different from more calculable risks in other professions. Internationally, the legal doctrine of *in loco parentis* is commonly applied to teachers in judicial systems to address some of those risks and professional responsibilities. *In loco parentis* requires the teacher to act "in place of the parent" – and is known as a "duty of care." Legal doctrine governing education takes this idea a step further, demanding a "standard of care" in which the teacher is expected to act as a judicious and caring parent would (Johnson 2010). The moral and legal

[19] Established in 1996, the Ontario College of Teachers (OCT) is responsible for licensing, governing and regulating the Ontario teaching profession. In addition to setting Standards for the profession, it also investigates allegations of misconduct, carries out disciplinary hearings, and can exercise various levels of disciplinary consequences to members of the profession.

responsibilities of acting in place of a parent demand a degree of trust atypical of other professions.

Together, the duty and standard of care convey the nature of the trust that parents and children must place in teachers. At the same time, the duty and standard of care reflect the highly subjective and moral nature of teachers' professional responsibilities. To act in place of a parent means that a teacher must apply professional judgment that reflects a strong *ethic of care* to ensure the "*best interest of the child*" is paramount in all workplace decisions (Shapiro and Stefkovich 2001). Govier (1992) emphasizes that trust is a prerequisite of caring – and that caring is essential to schooling. The ethic of care pertains to students' personal safety, but also to their intellectual and social development (Applebaum 1995; Govier 1992; Shapiro and Stefkovich 2001).

As a consequence, relying on teachers as merely technical or subject-matter experts is insufficient. Teachers must inspire students to engage in learning for their social and emotional development beyond the subject-matter transmission in ways that require a strong dialogical relationship. Paulo Freire (1970) outlined three conditions necessary for that kind of dialogue in education: trust, hope and critical thinking. He observed that trust is absent in what he terms the "banking" method of education in which the teacher merely transmits knowledge to the student. Freire describes the banking model as one in which the teacher "deposits" hegemonic knowledge into the student as if she were a "bank," and relies on memorization and rote learning, with topics and curricula driven exclusively by the teacher. By contrast, Freire argues that trust can only be built through problem-posing in which education becomes a horizontal experience of collaborative problem solving for students and teachers. The problem-posing model relies on teachers to trust students to identify relevant problems, and further builds trust through collaborative, active strategies to solve those problems. An example of a culture of *distrust* resulting

from banking models of education is the historical failure of education for First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples in Canada. Canadian education systems and teachers within those systems imposed colonial and hegemonic practices and curricula with the intent of "civilizing" learners to integrate into Eurocentric society with no regard for Indigenous knowledge and Indigenous Epistemology. Culturally and physically violent residential schooling continued into the 1990s. The result is a long-standing lack of trust that will take generations to overcome. Presently, advocates of post-colonial education (e.g., Battiste 2013; Brayboy 2005) continue to struggle with ways in which non-Indigenous educators might respect, trust, and re-centre Indigenous knowledge and epistemologies, while First Nations, Inuit, and Métis learners continue to question the degree that they can trust institutions and teachers to provide culturally sustainable schooling in their individual and communities' best interests.

All professionals must decide how to apply professional knowledge in unique situations they face, and matters of "character and morality" are central to those trust relationships (Social, 89). In addition to attending to students' physical well-being, teaching requires "a nurturing role intended to foster the learning and growth of students" (Social, 87). Thus, education is fraught with "*inescapable risks*" because it entails "an emancipation from traditional custodianships and intellectual sensibility and is a pathway to human flourishing, both personal and social" (Smyers and Hogan 2005, 119). What is "at stake is nothing less than *what we become as human beings* as a consequence of what we experience as learners" (Smyers and Hogan 2005, 115, emphasis in original). For teachers, risks include having their knowledge scrutinized and found wanting, failing despite efforts on behalf of students, and exerting influence in ways that have unforeseen consequences. Students experience different kinds of risks, including failing in their studies, being rejected or embarrassed by teachers or peers, and "enduring less-than-

inspiring teachers" (Smyers and Hogan 2005, 115). In classrooms, students need trust to deal with these special risks, making it "a lubricant for knowledge creation: people share and act on ideas when they trust one another" (Avis 2003, 321).

Govier (Social, 88-89) elucidates the crucial role of student-teacher trust in post-secondary legal education. The competitive nature of legal professions often results in adversarial stances by law professors who come to regard students as opponents, even occasionally perceiving themselves as needing protection from students. She describes potentially harmful consequences of aggressive and hostile behaviour between student and teacher, leading to insecurity and, as a response to that insecurity, restriction and rigid control in the classroom, which are equally applicable to other educational settings. Philosopher Antonia Darder (2002) describes how this type of unhealthy dynamic played out in her own classroom in a high school. Early in her career, Darder wanted to make examples of misbehaving students in order to achieve discipline in her classroom. One day, a student got up to leave her classroom with a book bag in hand. Fearing he was planning to leave campus, she told him to leave the bag. The student refused and continued to exit. As he walked past, she grabbed the student's bag and again instructed him to leave it behind. She described her realization this way: "I suddenly became horrified with what I was doing. I let go and the student took the bag with him" (Darder 2002, 190). At that moment, she realized her self-described obsession with control, surveillance, and punishment – which she thought would be salvation – was in fact "dehumanizing." This highlights a failure to trust students – part of what Govier describes as the "vicious circle" (Social, 88) of struggles between students and educators. Each group makes the other worse when students distrust teachers for their "toughness" and teachers struggle against students. "Once in effect, the ethos of distrust seems to be self-perpetuating, generating

a need for itself" (Social, 88). In addition, self-perpetuating distrust also exists with respect to the failures of schooling for Canadian First Nations, Inuit, and Métis people described earlier.

The examples just described highlight trust's reciprocal nature. In "Responses to Professional Dilemmas of Distrust," Govier (Social) explains that reciprocity in professional trust means that teachers must be able to trust those they serve. While she acknowledges those served bear some responsibility to be "'alert consumers,' this does not go so far that it removes responsibility from professionals themselves" (Social, 100). Apart from being inefficient in achieving goals, the absence of trust in professional relationships makes for "less than pleasant dealings" (Social, 89), such as the vignette related by Darder (2002).

Certainly, the presence of trust does not guarantee improved educational performance, but its absence signals failure (Sahlberg 2010). Empirical educational research has primarily focused on the relationship between trust and "student achievement" – a fashionable term alluding to student performance on standardized tests. Researchers have concluded that higher levels of student-teacher trust correlate to higher achievement (see, for example, Kensler, Caskie, Barber and White 2009; Bryk and Schneider 2002; Goddard, Tschannen-Moran and Hoy 2001). A few studies have examined teacher-student trust with respect to discipline and behavioural compliance in the classroom (see Gregory and Ripsky 2008; Daly 2009), concluding students and teachers report feeling less threatened when trust is present. Research has also explored teacher-administrator trust, focusing on the effects of such trust on "school effectiveness," another educational buzzword that refers to policy compliance and reform implementation (Kensler et al. 1995; Louis 2007). Other research has looked at trust in relation to issues of teacher professionalism, collaboration and learning (see, for example, Tschannen-Moran 2004). Finally, several studies

outside of the field of education proper have attempted to quantify levels of trust among students and teachers.[20] As a whole, the research just described provides a limited view of the nature and role of trust. Quantitative instruments tend to reduce trust to a variable tied to narrowly-defined ends (i.e., trust to ensure control and compliance). Rather, Govier, like other philosophers, offers a richer and more nuanced conception of trust that extends beyond the measurable achievement and behavioural indicators just described.

While it may be difficult to pinpoint the degree to which professional trust with respect to teachers is on the decline, Govier (Social, 92) cites Barber's (1983) observation that professional trust (in general) had been declining into the 1980s for three reasons: (1) more power and professional knowledge; (2) a more competent and educated public; and (3) increasingly egalitarian values. Govier argues that in recent decades, highly-publicized media reports of professionals (doctors, lawyers, teachers, professors, etc.) who have not acted in client interests have tarnished professional reputations, contributing to declines of professional distrust. Kumashiro (2014) offers a similar explanation for the perceived decline in trust towards teachers: public scapegoating of teachers has been widely used in neoliberal reform arguments since the 1990s to attribute educational problems to individual ("bad") teachers, something I will explore in more detail later in this paper.

[20] In the United States, trends over the past 30 years show that today's youth are less likely than earlier cohorts to have faith in humanity, to feel that ''people in general'' can be trusted. (Flanagan and Stout 2010, 749) The Canadian Education Association's study on youth confidence found that self-reported levels of "trust" varied – from a relatively low 40% trust in media and people in the community. Less than half reported that they trusted "most of the people" in their community; 49% reported they had someone to discuss personal problems at school. The study authors conclude that "a low sense of trust in others may signal that community cohesion and social networks are weak" (Freiler 2013, 42).

3. The rise of accountability-driven 'audit culture' in education policy

Policy always prescribes; but in current education systems, policy is increasingly detailed and prescriptive in ways that decrease the scope for professional judgment under the guise of accountability. In recent years, accountability measures have become central features of large-scale education reform (Apple 2005; Ball 2003; Biesta 2004). Neoliberal ideologies have driven these reform policies since the 1990s worldwide, most notably in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom (Pinto 2012). Corresponding neoliberal accountability agendas feature standardization in curriculum and testing, and new governing institutions that monitor and regulate the teaching profession (Apple 2005). My intention in this section is to describe the nature of accountability in contemporary education policy as it relates to trust.

In a general sense, accountability poses two sorts of questions: *accountable to whom?* and *accountable for what?* The answers to these questions – and the very scope and meaning of accountability – extend in numerous directions in the education literature. Conceptions range from accountability as being called to account for one's actions, to institutional control of individuals, to outcomes stemming from those behaviours. Biesta (2004) offers two distinguishable conceptions of accountability: (1) a technical-managerial conception that depends on measurement; and (2) a more general conception that defines accountability as a form of responsibility that carries with it connotations of answerability (Biesta 2004). That is, responsibility has to do with being answerable for something or someone, and is non-reciprocal, since A is *responsible for* B, and this responsibility is based on what B *wants* or *needs* (Biesta 2004). However, the contemporary education reforms tend to over-represent

technical-managerial account-ability, while compromising responsibility and trust (Biesta 2004, 236).

A number of scholars have explored the effects of technical-managerial accountability policy on professionalism and trust outside of education. David Carless asked whether managerialism becomes a substitute for trust – has accountability become "a source rather than a remedy for distrust?" (Carless 2013, 79). Ellen Kuhlman asks whether accountability and regulation policies compromise models of trust within "contradictory developments between seeking trust and demanding control" (Kuhlman 2006, 608). She questions whether professionals can earn and sustain trust when their autonomy to apply professional judgment is limited by policy, and professionals' actions are highly scrutinized in public forums. In healthcare, she observes, trust relationships between practitioners and clients have been *replaced by* regulation, managerialism, target-setting accountability, and market reforms (Kuhlman 2006, 528). While these questions address other professional fields, they are certainly pertinent to the current educational landscape.

Audit culture (Apple 2005, Pinto 2012), a common feature of contemporary accountability agendas, relies on business-derived concepts of supervision and measurement to evaluate the performance of public servants. Audit culture emerged as techniques from financial accounting were applied to societal and political matters. Audit-based accountability measures have become instruments "to make institutions at least formally accountable to their stakeholders" (Hoecht 2006, 543). The result is an attempt to provide an "impression of certainty and control in a world where risks are increasing" in an environment where the public is "skeptical about the role of experts and professionals and their advice and judgment" (Hoecht 2006, 544).

At its worst, audit-driven accountability displaces "trust with various criteria of performance and indicators

for review and accounting" (Svensson and Evetts 2003, 9). In education, audit culture marks a shift away from accountability based on the idea of professionalism, where a teacher has autonomy to exercise professional judgment consistent with the standard of care, towards accountability based on measurement: rules and surveillance use quantitative indicators to audit professional performance and even competence. Audits are often tied to punitive measures designed to control performance, such as student performance impacting teacher salaries or school funding (Apple 2005). Rose goes so far as to argue that audit replaces the trust once accorded to professions: "the constant demands for audit both witness to, and contribute to, the erosion of trust," establishing new relations of control between political centres and public goods (Rose 1993, 295). That emphasis on control (over trust) underscores how audit culture is not, in Govier's conception, a reasonable response to vulnerability in education because it undermines the very forms of trust that are necessary for effective education.

Govier (Social) posited that professional trust can certainly coexist alongside regulation, but the degree to which trust is maintained depends on the nature of the regulatory policies themselves. Well-intentioned regulatory policy certainly has potentially positive aspects, though they are accompanied by dangers (Carless 2013). Certain types of regulation are absolutely necessary to protect children. Teachers work with vulnerable populations, and there is no question that conduct endangering students necessitates professional regulation. Extreme cases – including student-teacher sexual relationships, abuse of students and the like – unquestionably call for discipline and removal of teacher certification. Govier provides a number of examples of publicized reports of professionals (doctors, lawyers, teachers, professors, and so on) failing to act in the interest of those they serve – including fraud and collusion (Social). These examples all deal with actions directly

related to "on the job" activity, and the misconduct is typically dealt with under criminal law. Professional regulation, in these cases, falls back on the judicial system: that is, law over policy is used to remedy serious cases of misconduct.

Policy, if designed well and enacted as policymakers intended, can have benefits in classrooms. It can encourage promising or evidence-informed practice among professionals, and it can attempt to limit or prevent misconduct or damaging actions. It can create time and provide material resources to support professional learning and development. Standardization of curriculum holds a promise of equality of opportunity for students, and test scores attempt to pinpoint and remedy deficiencies in teachers and schools. Yet, each measure a policy prescribes detracts from an aspect of professional autonomy. The professional loses a degree of her ability to exercise professional judgment – an important aspect of parent-teacher and student-teacher trust relationships.

Contemporary accountability policy in education, however, disproportionately relies on the technical-managerial conception, focusing almost exclusively on test score measures as success indicators (Darder 2004). In the United States, the accountability agenda defined by the *No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act* and *Race to the Top (RTTT)* uses student testing as the principle measure of success. In Ontario, standardized testing of students is carried under the *Education Quality and Accountability Office (EQAO) Act*. Under this legislation, third parties administer standardized tests to measure student achievement.[21] In these and other jurisdictions, test results are shared not only with schools, but with the general public. Test scores affect school-based funding, and in some states are linked to teacher performance appraisal. This has important educational consequences, since

[21] The emphasis on "achievement" ignores learning and change in performance.

performance scores are not used to help students learn, instead linked to punitive consequences such as school rankings, teacher pay and performance appraisals, and even property values.[22]

The accountability systems just described leave the relationship between student and teacher undernourished because the teacher's responsibility to the government is prioritized through audit, taking precedence over her responsibility to the learner. The "responsibility to" questions of accountability become distorted whenever teachers are controlled by external performance measures tied to punitive consequences. *NCLB*, *RTTT* and *EQAO* measure performance in the form of one-time student "achievement" scores as the only things counted. In such systems, teachers' responsibility (at least in part) shifts away from responsibility to the student, to the goal of fulfilling government requirements. Ontario teachers overwhelmingly claim that provincial tests are not designed to provide the detailed information necessary for meaningful diagnostic decisions about individual students (Klinger and Rogers 2011). Instead, the high stakes exacerbate the emphasis on performance: teachers need to focus on scores to secure their livelihoods, while school and district administrators have an interest in the financial implications of test performance. School systems lose sight of broader purposes of education and teachers become engrossed in standardized test preparation, test execution, and curriculum mandates (Sahlberg 2010).

Darder refers to this as a "closed system of accountability" that ignores any exploration of social conditions, unexamined assumptions, and other effects on schooling. These important issues are "deemed irrelevant

[22] Realtors often misuse rankings based on test scores to attract homebuyers to the extent that ranking affects neighbourhood housing price to the consequence parents 'have pressured schools to achieve high test results in order to keep their property values high' (Ohemeng and McCall-Thomas 2013, 470; also see Koretz 2008).

or scientifically irrational," when not captured by standardized scores and are subsequently left out of educational debates (Darder 2004, 208). The resulting shift in focus from the quality of teaching from "best interest of the child" central to an ethic of care to "quality control" reduces education to "teaching to the test" (Darder 2004, 208). Hargreaves (2008) observes that this form of accountability and the standardization within it leaves little room for professional judgment and interpretation in practice.

Coupled with high-stakes[23] audits is an increasingly prescriptive curriculum. In the United States, the introduction of the national *Common Core State Standards* (*CCSS*) has led to highly prescriptive curricula. Likewise, Canada's K-12 provincial curriculum policy documents are highly prescriptive (Pinto 2012). In some places, this has led to scripted lessons, where mandated scripts supersede a teacher's ability to apply professional judgment to meet students' needs (Milner 2013). Darder observes that monitoring teachers' curriculum compliance through audited script use eliminates teachers' ability to stray from standardized curricula, reducing classroom practice to "dispensing packaged fragments of information" (Darder 2004, 87) at the expense of richer learning experiences designed for the individuals in their classes in the spirit of the ethic of care which would demand adaptation of classroom activity that would be in the best interest of the child.

If, as Govier argues throughout her work, trust exists between people, teachers ought to be trusted to act based

[23] The term "high-stakes" is used in the educational literature to refer to policy that ties outcomes of standardized measurement tools (usually, but not exclusively, standardized test scores) to decisions that impact individuals and schools. Those decisions affect students (e.g., whether they may graduate based on performance on a standardized tests); educators (e.g., pay tied to standardized performance measures); and schools, and districts (e.g., school closures or changes to funding based on standardized outcomes) (Au 2007).

on their professional judgment in applying professional expertise (that is, making curricular and assessment choices) and in other decisions about what is in the best interest of students. By standardizing and externalizing professional activities – tests, curriculum, scripted lessons – a teacher's job is reduced to technical compliance, with accountability to policy-makers trumping responsibility to students and parents. This redefinition of the teacher's job eliminates the very types of actions that can instill trust. The profession is "unmade" by such policy: autonomy and judgment are questioned; internal criteria are replaced by external criteria (Svensson 2006).

4. Seeking trust while demanding control: Regulation, surveillance, performativity

The effects of the types of accountability policy I just described are exacerbated by a related set of policies designed to regulate and control teachers. According to Govier, "trust in a professional has two aspects: respect for the credentials and self-regulation of the profession and a sense of trust based on the individual encounter" (Social, 102). In North America and the United Kingdom, teacher credentials are established by central governments and other regulatory bodies, who also issue certification and licensure. My focus here is on how professional regulation operates, and how policy aimed at *confidence* via surveillance negatively affects *trust*.

Trust must not be confused with confidence in the profession and the institution. Confidence governs everyday interactions where role expectations, norms, expert knowledge, regulation, and law are clearly defined and shape professional action (Harrison and Smith 2004). Trust, on the other hand, is necessary where there is vulnerability or uncertainty (Harrison and Smith 2004). Despite an obvious need for regulation, not all cases of unprofessional conduct involve criminal activity. Govier

acknowledges that less severe professional behaviour is often dealt with institutionally, through ombudsmen and "ethics codes." While codes of ethics "can be useful in addressing the image problems" of a profession, they only work when members take them seriously *and* the public believes that they do.

Too much emphasis on such confidence in institutions instead of trust in people obscures the essential uncertainty associated with professional judgment. That uncertainty, especially when working with vulnerable populations, requires trust (Harrison and Smith 2004). Harrison and Smith (2004) refer to the "dysfunctional consequences" of reliance on confidence over trust in professionals. While the policies that govern professions (including teaching) are usually filled with morally loaded imperatives, basing confidence on policies diminishes the role of morality in the relationship between professionals and those they serve. Confidence alone cannot provide answers to the morally difficult dilemmas that characterize the work of teachers. Moreover, increased surveillance to measure compliance may deter teachers' moral motivation to act beyond policy compliance (Harrison and Smith 2004).

A growing movement under the guise of accountability is centralized professional regulation of teachers in ways that are more prescriptive and result in extreme forms of audit. Centralized performance appraisal schemes in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom tie teacher evaluation to observable "look fors" that aim to quantify policy compliance (Page 2013; Pinto, Portelli, Rottman, Pashby, Barrett and Mujawamariya 2012), resulting in institutional confidence (at best) over professional trust. Yet, confidence alone cannot provide answers to the morally difficult dilemmas teachers face every day.

What makes teachers' professional conduct especially unique is regulation that extends to conduct in their personal lives. Govier makes a point of distinguishing between the public (professional) and private roles of

individuals. "A person in a particular social or occupational role is not quite the person as such. Although people in roles are not necessarily inauthentic, neither are they always able to act according to their individual wishes. Social and occupational roles carry with them expectations and demands, ranging from the general and open-ended expectations of a 'friend,' to the specific requirements of a judge or counsellor" (Social, 78).

The OCT and its magazine, *Professionally Speaking*, attempt to instill public confidence through regulation, but they are far from vehicles that build trust. Disciplinary decisions are published monthly in a *Professionally Speaking* section titled "The Blue Pages," transforming teacher discipline into a spectacle involving "public flogging for offenses that critically damage the public trust that teachers are bound to uphold" (Page 2013, 237). The inclusion of decisions on minor or questionable misconduct in summaries of disciplinary action skews statistics, and does so in an attempt to "promulgate the image of a government that is decisive in tackling problem teachers" (Page 2013, 237), thus reinforcing institutional confidence over trust. Even if a teacher conducts herself with utmost professionalism, she may be subject to false or inappropriate allegations from anyone – a disgruntled student or parent or co-worker. In other situations, teachers may engage in conduct they deem ethical, yet face disciplinary action that is reported out of context.[24] This fear of surveillance, at best, adds stress to daily work. At

[24] For example, "The Blue Pages" regularly reports instances of misconduct in which Ontario teachers fail to adequately follow standardized test preparation instructions (e.g., providing homework questions similar to those which will appear on a future test). Yet, in-depth research by Childs and Umezawa (2009) reveals that Ontario teachers claim that in cases where they perceive test instructions to be unreasonable, they do not view violations as unethical, since they believe their actions are in the best interest of students. Those teachers are disciplined for what they view as asking in the best interest of the student and in the spirit of an ethic of care, rather than blind compliance with procedures outlined in policy.

worst, it can result in extremely unpleasant consequences associated with (sometimes severe) disciplinary action. James Avis argues that this creates a "blame culture" punctuated with tight surveillance and limits teacher risk-taking for fear of repercussions (Avis 2003, 328).

The prescriptive regulatory policies that allow public floggings over private conduct leave teachers caught between their professional responsibilities during work time, and their rights as citizens to engage in perfectly legal behavior on their own time. Beyond shaming within the institutions themselves, the media amplifies the floggings when incidents (especially minor ones) make headlines or spread virally through social media. Headlines featuring teachers disciplined over private, off-work behavior abound as educators find themselves under a "morality microscope" (Turley 2012). A Georgia teacher was forced to resign after the school principal found vacation photos of her on Facebook holding what appears to be beer because the photo "promoted alcohol use," and a Pennsylvania teacher was suspended after a third party posted a Facebook photo of her at a bridal shower with a male stripper (Turley 2012). In the United Kingdom, "having pupils as your Facebook friend," failing to report an absence properly, and encouraging students to create get well cards to a prisoner warranted formal discipline from Ofsted (Page 2013).[25] Ontario teachers face discipline for legal and appropriate off-time actions (giving a student a ride home, writing a letter of reference) under a regulation that allows for broad interpretation of "conduct unbecoming to a member."[26] Teacher unions have advised teachers not to use email or any other electronic means (including class or course websites) to

[25] Ofsted (Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills) is the body responsible for inspecting and regulating services and professions that care for children and youth in the United Kingdom.

[26] This appears in *Ontario College of Teachers Act*, 1996 - O., Regulation 437/97: Professional Misconduct.

communicate for fear that those emails could lead to misunderstandings that launch OCT investigations. When the media report cases like those just mentioned, the public floggings carried out by governments, employers and professional regulatory bodies call attention to teacher misconduct; discouraging parents', students', and members of the public's trust in teachers. The floggings support the positions of Govier (Totalitarianism) and Kumashiro (2014) pertaining to the role of public shaming as a contributing factor to the erosion of trust. Ironically, as accountability "provides parents and politicians with more information, it also builds suspicion, low morale, and professional cynicism" (Sahlberg 2010, 57).[27] This is especially the case when teacher misconduct makes headlines, and media consumers may (mistakenly) arrive at the conclusion that many teachers are involved in transgressive behaviour based on one salacious example. While Govier (Social) reminds us that the best way to "*seem* trustworthy is to *be* trustworthy" (102), fallacious conclusions or extra-polation of isolated cases that make headlines compromise trust, underscoring how external audit and surveillance amount to unreasonable responses to the issue of trust.

The practices just described rely on surveillance to "catch" teachers in allegedly unprofessional acts. Ball (2003), Avis (2003), Page (2013), and Govier (Totalitarianism) all discuss the role of surveillance in relation to trust. Govier's account has to do with totalitarian regimes, which are characterized by a lack of safety and distrust of others who could, at any time, report a person to the state. This situation ruptures relationships and destroys trust. Watch out, she warns, because you never know who is watching (Totalitarianism). With the

[27] It is interesting to note that empirically, the publication of NCLB test scores actually erodes support of schools (Jacobsen, Saultz, and Snyder 2013). Moreover, validity of interferences made in the media about teacher and school quality based on NCLB test scores are unwarranted (Linn 2006).

professional accountability policies in place described here, the teacher never knows who might be listening or who might make a complaint against her. This, paralleling Govier's account of totalitarian regimes, leaves the teacher potentially distrustful of others, including students, parents and colleagues.

A consequence of surveillance-based regulation and audit just described is performativity[28] in which a policy exists in a dual form of culture and mode of regulation that employs judgments, comparisons and displays (such as public floggings) as a means of incentive or control with corresponding rewards or sanctions (Ball 2003, 216). By focusing on measurable indicators, performativity takes the shape of individual and organizational *performances* that attempt to display measures of "quality." Ball argues that what it means to be a teacher has "subtly and decisively changed" as teachers act to avoid punitive sanctions. At times, this leads teachers to perform inauthentic professional identities that make them *appear to* be complying with policies or achieving high-stakes indicators (Ball 2003, 218).

Performativity can manifest itself in situations in which teachers and principals "game the system" in order to manipulate outcomes under the pressure to meet criteria. Such behaviour most certainly fails to engender professional trust. For example, a former student of mine who now teaches in the United Kingdom recently explained in a personal email, "in order to maintain my school's national reputation of nearly all sixth-form graduates getting into the university of their choice, school administrators actually cannot wait to push out students

[28] While Ball (2003) acknowledges Butler's (1990) seminal work on performativity as a basis for his conception, Ball (2003) is not concerned with gender performance. Rather, his conception specific to policy focuses on the ways in which policy (as a "technology") shapes and defines professional identity, and how teachers as individual objects of that policy respond to the identities imposed upon them by policy mandates.

[from the school] who are not performing well." Similarly, an Ontario educator observed how principals assigned "weak teachers" (his words, referring to those whose classes tend to have low scores) to early phases of school improvement initiatives then move different teachers into those very classrooms to pull aggregate scores up (Pinto 2015).

Bait-and-switch tactics like the two examples just described typify "gamesmanship" (Ball 2003, 218). Teachers and principals feel they must play "games" of compliance to make it appear as though they are "measuring up" to external benchmarks. In this process, management control models of audit replace models of trust between management and professionals (Svensson 2006), between teachers and students when the former feels she must place external accountability (*to* governments, *for* benchmarks, *in place of* responsibility to the student), and between teachers and parents. The example above illustrates how, to meet external criteria, educators act in ways that may not be in the best interest of students who find themselves "pushed out" of educational opportunities just for the sake of national standings.

While Ball does not directly address the issue of trust, inauthentic identities arising out of performativity most certainly compromise reciprocal trust. Earlier in this paper I detailed the ways in which potentially well-intentioned policies designed to instill institutional confidence or shape education systems for the better have been enacted to such extremes that they constitute unreasonable responses to issues of trust on the part of policy-makers. Yet, the various forms of performativity in response to policy that educators view as unreasonable fail to instill trust in educators – to repeat Govier's (Social) point referenced earlier in this paper, the best way to "*seem* trustworthy is to *be* trustworthy" (102). Certainly, trust is broken when a parent or student discovers that a teacher has engaged in a "game" to beat the system in a

performative act – even if that action was in the best interest of the student. That gamesmanship begs the question, if the teacher cannot be trusted to carry out mandated policy, then can she be trusted to care for students? This dilemma of trust, rooted in potentially unreasonable responses to audit culture, will continue to vex the profession so long as policy attempts to mediate confidence and trust through standardization.

5. Conclusion

I began this paper by laying out Trudy Govier's conception of professional trust, and exploring how it is compromised against a backdrop of policy that features narrow accountability agendas. A pervasive audit culture characterized by heavy reliance on standardized testing, prescriptive policy, and punitive forms of regulation affects trust in two ways. First, it shifts teacher responsibility from students to government. Second, trust relationships are replaced by regulation, exacerbating audit while leaving teachers potentially fearful in a manner similar to Govier's (Totalitarianism) account of totalitarian regimes. Teachers "never know who is watching," thus compromising trust towards students. Similarly, confidence measures in the form of discipline and data may compromise parent-teacher trust relationships. The result is a "trust dilemma" rooted in the problem that "trust relationships that are not embedded in personal relations cannot be solved by installing guardians of impersonal trust" (Hoecht 2004, 544). That is, the policies and their corresponding enforcement technologies (amounting to confidence at most) displace trust between the teacher and student, and teacher and parent. Whereas "quality control" used to be in the form of education and induction (i.e., acquiring academic credentials to teach) before licensure (i.e., being granted a license to teach in a jurisdiction), the pre-practice controls (i.e.,

accomplishments acquired prior to licensure) are increasingly replaced by controlling the outcomes of practicing professionals (Svensson 2006).

In this paper, I have taken issue with features in education policy, not the existence of policy itself. I have attempted to make clear my agreement with Govier that professional trust can certainly coexist alongside professional regulation, but its success depends on the nature of the policies themselves. There is no question that accountability has a place in education, but the prevalent technical-managerial accountability has dire consequences for professional trust in education settings when that form of policy remains an unreasonable response to issues of teacher trust. In spite of policies that exist, trust remains critical for addressing the vulnerability inherent in educational pursuits.

Can educational policy be designed to promote trust in relation to educational contexts? Sahlberg (2010, 2011) and Hargreaves (2008) call attention to alternative education policy regimes that contain explicit features to promote professional trust, rather than damage it. In Finland, a nation lauded for exceptional educational outcomes including top performance on international tests such as Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), external accountability is noticeably absent from its national education policy (Chung 2015; Hargreaves 2008; Sahlberg 2010, 2011). Rather, Finnish policy emphasizes building professional responsibility over external accountability. One of the four strategic principles upon which education policy is founded includes "strengthening professionalism of and trust in teachers" (Sahlberg 2010, 56). Finnish educational policy emphasizes specific strategies for building trust, including raising the professional status of teachers, decentralizing leadership to allow for professional judgment without prescription, and devoting significant time each day to

professional learning communities in schools (Sahlberg 2010).[29]

Transforming the problematic policies described in this paper in order to strengthen trust requires a fundamental change to the ideologies that underpin contemporary, accountability-driven education policy. Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom tend to politicize educational policy, relying on punitive, high-stakes consequences as quick fixes to purported educational problems (Pinto 2012). Conversely, Finland has taken a more leisurely approach to developing and enacting education policy grounded in long-term thinking (Chung 2015). Loosening central control of education systems, especially tempering or eliminating prescriptive and punitive accountability structures, would require immense political will and abandoning the desire for "quick results" associated with the short political tenure of contemporary election cycles (Pinto 2012).

Given current political and policy environments in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, teachers will continue to face punitive accountability measures and audit cultures that compromise trust for the foreseeable future. Teachers must strive to reclaim their responsibility as professionals and bring back a closer "proximity" to teacher-student and teacher-parent relationships (Biesta

[29] While a full discussion of Finland's education policy climate is beyond the scope of this paper, several details may be of interest to readers since the policies differ from those in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. Finland's education reforms began in 1971 in an effort to improve schooling that featured class size reductions, substantial teacher salary increases, and a requirement that all teachers complete a Masters degree within 5 years of joining the profession (Chung 2015; Sahlberg 2010, 2011). Finnish students spend less time in direct instruction than their international counterparts and do not participate in any standardized testing, while teachers have dedicated time for professional dialogue and learning each day (Hargreaves 2008; Sahlberg 2010, 2011).

2004, 245).[30] If professional trust is to be strengthened, policy-makers, teachers, parents, and students must revisit the core questions of accountability: *accountable to whom? Accountable for what?* The answers to these questions must be asked of policy and regulation. . In the absence of a strong foundation of professional trust in the spirit of Govier's conception, educational pursuits cannot flourish.

[30] Biesta's (2004) elaboration of a Levinasian idea of proximity refers to a suppression of distance between the teacher and student and the teacher and parent through emphasis of relationships between individuals. By emphasizing proximity, relationships are strengthened and humanized – reducing or even eliminating the need for mediation of trust through policy and audit.

4. Relationships and Respect for Persons

LINDA RADZIK

Summary: Many theorists writing on the aftermath of wrongdoing have been influenced by Trudy Govier's emphasis on interpersonal relationships. But George Sher has recently challenged this talk of relationships. Read descriptively, he argues, claims about the interpersonal effects of wrongdoing are either exaggerated or false. Read normatively, relationships add nothing to more traditional moral theory. In this essay, I argue that Govier's relational framework both avoids Sher's dilemma and enables her to develop the notion of respect for persons in ways that improve upon traditional Kantian discussions.

1. Introduction

The concept of a relationship plays a prominent role in Trudy Govier's discussions of the moral issues that arise in the aftermath of wrongdoing (DistrustPP, FR, and TWS; Prerogative, PPApologies, and National; and Invitational). Over the past decade, a number of theorists have followed her lead. For example, relationships figure importantly in Margaret Urban Walker's work on forgiveness (2007), T.M. Scanlon's account of blame (2008), Christopher Bennett's defense of punishment (2008), Colleen Murphy's theory of political reconciliation (2010), and my own account of atonement (Radzik 2009).[31] However, George Sher argues that, while it is unclear whether the claims being made about relationships in this literature should be read descriptively or normatively, both readings lead to problems (2013).

[31] The types of wrongdoing addressed by relational theorists, including Govier, range from everyday slights and betrayals among friends, to criminal acts, to large-scale atrocities. Unless otherwise indicated, I will use "wrongdoing" to refer to this broad class of misdeeds.

In this essay, I will argue that the combination of descriptive and normative concerns that we find in Govier and the writers she has influenced is defensible. As I read Govier, she provides a bridge between an ideal, Kantian ethic of respect for persons, in which human beings are conceived of as rational moral agents, and the messier facts of life, in which moral agents are imperfectly rational, emotionally complicated, deeply social, epistemically limited, and intensely vulnerable. Govier's relational moral-theoretical framework enables her to both diagnose the moral problems that arise in the wake of wrongdoing and show how an ethic of respect offers meaningful guidance to real world actors.

I will not present a close reading of Govier's writings or those of the other authors in this literature. I agree with Sher that relational theories of the aftermath of wrongdoing have been ambiguous or under-described in ways that have left them open to his critique. Yet when I first read *Forgiveness and Revenge*, its relationship-centered moral perspective resonated with me (FR). In this essay, I try to articulate and develop my understanding of that perspective. Trudy Govier may not agree with everything that I say here. But I hope that she will recognize how much I have learned from her.

2. Sher's dilemma

The relational moral theories that Sher targets aim to justify one or another response to wrongdoing: blame, punishment, forgiveness, or atonement. Sher characterizes these responses as "backward-looking," which captures the idea that such judgments and actions are intelligible only insofar as they harken back to some past wrongful action (2013, 48). For example, one cannot forgive if there has been no wrong. Furthermore, in characterizing these responses as backward-looking, we appeal to the intuition that past wrongdoing intrinsically calls out for some kind

of response. The very fact of the past wrong seems to place someone (the wrongdoer, the community, or the victim) under normative pressure, such that simply continuing as if the wrong had not occurred would be morally problematic. I would add that relational theories are also typically forward-looking. They hope to show that a proper response to wrongdoing will normally lead to a better state of affairs. Blame, punishment, forgiveness, and atonement, at least when done well, aim toward some future good. Whether these backward-looking and forward-looking concerns – giving the past its due while building a better future – are ultimately compatible is one of the issues with which relational theorists wrestle. The tensions are perhaps clearest in the cases of political wrongdoing that Govier has treated in her work with Wilhelm Verwoerd (Prerogative; PPApologies; and National). For example, did the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission wrongly prioritize future political stability over the justified claims of the victims of apartheid?

Relational defenses of responses to wrongdoing generally follow a similar pattern, which can be summarized with the following argument schema:

1. People stand in relationships with one another.
2. Wrongdoing damages relationships.
3. Relationships are (partially) repaired through blame, punishment, forgiveness, or atonement.
4. We morally ought to repair our relationships.
5. Therefore, such responses to wrongdoing are morally justified (or perhaps even required).[32]

[32] This schema fits some examples better for others. For example, Scanlon's key claim about blame is that it *registers* the fact that relationships have changed, not that it helps repair them (2008, Ch. 4). However, he does mention the possibility of reparative effects in some cases.

Here, the concept of a relationship provides the link between the backward-looking and the forward-looking concerns that animate the theorist. The problem posed by the past is the damage that has been done to relationships. In repairing that damage, we set ourselves on a better path. Our concern for the past and our concern for the future are reconciled.

In developing a relational justification of any particular response to wrongdoing, one attempts to show how it properly acknowledges the significance of the past while contributing to a better future. So, for example, defenders of forgiveness emphasize its peace-building potential, but they must also address the objection that a victim might subtly condone wrongdoing by forgiving in the absence of an apology (Hieronymi 2001; Holmgren 2012, Ch. 4). A relational justification of blame points to the possible good effects of blaming practices, such as the moral education of wrongdoers or the broader communication of norms (Radzik 2014). Relational defenders of punishment argue that, by punishing, the community sends victims messages of respect and helps them rebuild trust and self-esteem (Bennett 2008; Ciochetti 2003).

Sher objects that relational arguments of the form presented above are ambiguous. The claims that correspond to premises (1)-(3) in my schema often sound as though they are making descriptive, empirically verifiable claims about human relationships. But at other times, (1)-(3) are clearly meant to convey normative standards for how people should relate to one another. So, should we read them as descriptive or as normative? Sher argues that neither reading yields a compelling theory.

Consider first the descriptive reading. People in fact hold certain attitudes toward and expectations of others. They interact according to certain patterns. A wrong committed by one person against the other tends to cause changes in the ways they regard each other and interact with one another. Blaming, punitive, forgiving, or atoning

responses generally cause further psychological and behavioral changes. Sher's first objection to this descriptive reading is what he calls the "problem of the stranger." Since "a stranger is, by definition, someone with whom one has no relationship," an account of wrongdoing and repair that assumes an actual relationship exists will "fail to accommodate many—perhaps a majority—of the cases in which blame, punishment, or the making of amends seems appropriate" (2013, 55 and 48). Govier anticipates the problem of the stranger, writing that, although there may have been no relationship between two strangers prior to the wrong, the wrong itself creates a powerful form of relationship, which is in need of moral improvement (FR, 47-8).[33]

This move may help us to extend the relational argument schema to the entire class of interpersonal wrongdoing. However, Sher further objects that when we read claims like (1)-(3) as empirical generalizations about actual human psychological and behavioral phenomena they seem "remarkably implausible" (2013, 57). Highlighting relational accounts of crime and punishment, Sher doubts that all or even many crime victims are emotionally damaged or rendered less capable of trust as relational theorists suggest. "Where most crimes are concerned," involving as they do things such as petty theft or property damage, "common experience suggests that most victims simply shrug it off, some sooner and some later, and get on with their lives" (2013, 57). Nor does the punishment of criminals seem to heal victims' wounds as effectively as relational defenders of punishment would like us to believe. "[A] crime victim who needs psychotherapy before the criminal is convicted will almost

[33] Here, Govier provides an explicit response to the problem of the stranger. However, I believe that her work also implies a second response, namely that, strangers always, even prior to any wrong, stand in a distinctively normative relationship with one another (see, for example, DistrustPP, 52). I will develop this second response to the problem of the stranger in section 3.

certainly continue to need it afterward" (2013, 57). Unless relational damage is actually caused and actually repaired, this version of the argument is unable to justify practices of blame, punishment, forgiveness, or atonement.

If we read claims (1)-(3) as normative rather than descriptive, we can avoid the problem of the stranger. Premise (1) now says merely that people *should* think of themselves as participating in norm-governed relationships with others, even strangers. Premise (2) means that wrongdoing violates the norms that properly govern these relationships. (3) states that responses such as blame, forgiveness, punishment or atonement somehow make more positive normative judgments appropriate. These normative judgments may be applied to situations involving strangers as well as those involving friends.

But given this normative interpretation of relational theories, Sher objects, it is unclear what talk of relationships adds to more traditional moral theories, such as Kantianism (Sher 2013, 51). What is gained in describing the transgressing stranger as having damaged some idealized relationship rather than simply as having violated Kant's categorical imperative, "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end" (1993, 36)? What does the claim that relationships within society are repaired by punishment add to familiar theories that justify punishment through a mix of desert claims and appeals to deterrence? Reference to a relationship appears to be an "idle wheel" in contemporary moral theory (Sher 2013, 55). In the dilemma Sher poses, neither the descriptive nor the normative reading of relationships is compelling.

Sher is correct that the relational argument is ambiguous between descriptive and normative readings. In what follows, I try to clarify the relational approach in a way that dissolves Sher's dilemma. I proceed by examining various possible interpretations of each of the premises in the argument schema. I conclude that the

strongest version of the argument brings in both descriptive and normative claims at a number of different points. In response to Sher, I argue that modest versions of the descriptive claims suffice and that, far from being an idle wheel in moral theory, the concept of a relationship supports a valuable interpretation of an ethic of respect for persons.

3. People stand in relationships with one another

Let us start with the first premise in the argument schema: 'People stand in relationships with one another.' In the relational literature, writers tend to alternate between describing actual patterns of human attitudes and interactions and endorsing normative standards for interpersonal attitudes and interactions. In this section, I will clarify these different ways of talking about relationships.

In describing actual relationships, we attend to the beliefs, attitudes, emotions and expectations people in fact hold regarding others and the actual patterns of interaction shaped by these psychological states. Importantly, the phenomena of interest are *interpersonal*. I hold beliefs, attitudes, and expectations with regard to my car, but theorists would not describe me as having a relationship with my car (in the relevant sense) because the car does not, in turn, hold beliefs, attitudes and expectations toward me. Govier's conception of relationships in *Forgiveness and Revenge* emphasizes the awareness that the other party is a person; he is someone, who, like me, acts for reasons, has preferences, and feels emotions (FR, 164-68). To apply a well-known distinction from P.F. Strawson, one person can be described as standing in a relationship with another person when she adopts the "participant" stance toward him rather than the "objective" stance (1962). Rather than viewing him simply as a complex organism to be studied, hypothesized about, and manipulated, someone

who takes the participant stance perceives him as a responsible agent who will make choices for reasons and with whom she is bound in a web of mutual demands and expectations. As Strawson notes, we are also psychologically capable of viewing other people from the objective stance, at least for a little while. We might do this "as a refuge, say, from the strains of involvement; or as an aid to policy; or simply out of intellectual curiosity" (Strawson 1962, 195). But I suggest that when relational theorists talk about relationships in a descriptive sense, we can interpret them as referring to the psychological phenomenon of people taking up the participant stance with regard to another person.

Strawson coined the term "reactive attitudes" to draw our attention to interpersonal attitudes, such as resentment and gratitude, that are reactions to the attitudes that one person interprets the other as holding (1962, 192). I do not resent someone who unavoidably steps on my foot but only someone who I perceive as acting with an improper attitude toward me, such as animosity or indifference to my legitimate interests. To occupy the participant stance with regard to another person just is to be liable to these sorts of reactive attitudes.

This descriptive conception of what it is to stand in a relationship with another person provides a sense in which we are capable of having relationships with strangers as well as with friends and family members. Though we hold particularly robust expectations of the people close to us, we frequently also inhabit the participant stance with respect to strangers. Insofar as we interact with them, we tend to expect their behavior to be guided by certain norms, and when those expectations are violated we are liable to react with negative attitudes, such as resentment and indignation. Such reactions are signs that we did, in fact, harbor such expectations prior to the breach, even if we may not have noticed them.

Reading Strawson in this way, as identifying distinctive psychological phenomena, we have a rough

interpretation of the descriptive use of the term "standing in a relationship." It refers to a distinctive set of attitudes, expectations, emotional and behavioral dispositions that one person may hold toward another, which we refer to as taking up a participant stance.

The shift to a normative conception of relationships is made when we combine this description of interpersonal relationships with a Kantian ethic, which tells us that we *must* always take the participant stance toward other human beings.[34] That is, we are morally required to regard other human beings as moral agents. We are obliged to interact with them in ways that reflect awareness of their status as persons. Furthermore, a full and proper appreciation of their personhood provides a set of moral standards for these interactions. We are not allowed to treat other people as if they were mere means rather than ends in themselves. Our behavior, and also our intentions and attitudes, must be consistent with their dignity. In addition to avoiding disrespect, a proper appreciation of their value also requires us to have some degree of goodwill toward them, even though we are typically free to choose upon whom we will bestow benevolence (Kant 1993, 32).

This point is important to answering Sher's critique of the normative reading of relationships. For most relational moral theories, normative talk about relationships is not meant to provide an alternative to an ethic of respect for persons, but rather an interpretation of it. What Kant states in terms of obeying the categorical imperative can be translated into the language of maintaining morally appropriate relationships. But the relational framework also helps us articulate significant aspects of the situation that are often occluded by other, more individualistic, Kantian language. For example, I consider not just the

[34] A Kantian may permit adopting the observant stance toward another person for a particular purpose, such as scientific research. However, one must also, at the same time, take the participant stance if one is to remain aware that the other person is not merely a means for advancing science but also an end in himself.

universalizability of my maxims but whether my actual relationships match up to the ideal of morally appropriate relationships. Conceptualizing the other as a participant in a relationship, I am aware of the other person being aware of me (cf. Darwall 2006, 43). This awareness leads me to consider how she might interpret my intentions and respond to them emotionally, and how these responses may affect our future interactions. When thinking of myself as standing in a relationship with her, I am better prepared to recognize that our beliefs, attitudes and expectations regarding one another will be limited by our epistemic circumstances, personal history, social context, and emotional dispositions. I am led to consider the vulnerability of relationships to miscommunication, failures of rationality, emotional complexity, and unwieldy, socially constructed meanings. All of these factors affect the possibility of restoring relationships of respect and goodwill in the aftermath of wrongdoing.

By conceptualizing persons as standing in norm-governed relationships with one another, a relational moral-theoretical framework can also easily accommodate consideration of special as well as general moral obligations. We are bound up in webs of legitimate expectation and dependency with other people, not just as fellow human beings, but also as friends, colleagues, or family members.

Finally, when we express our normative ideals in terms of achieving morally appropriate relationships with other people, rather than, say, forming our own maxims correctly, we may be primed to attend to the social conditions that enable higher quality relationships. (In this way, relational theory strikes Hegelian as well as Kantian notes.) In many post-wrongdoing scenarios, improved relations turn on issues of trust. Govier argues that basic trust, "a sense that others, even those who are total strangers, have no intention to harm us, [is] a necessary condition of a viable social life"; it is "essential for communication and effective cooperative action"

(DistrustPP, 52). A healthy moral community will be one in which people regard one another with respect and goodwill and feel confident that other people regard them with respect and goodwill in return. Translating Kantian respect for persons into a relational moral-framework helps us see how the achievement of our moral ideals requires an awareness of such social dynamics.

So far we have distinguished a descriptive conception of relationships (people stand in relation when they in fact take the participant stance toward one another) from a normative conception of relationships (people are morally required to take the participant stance toward others and their attitudes, expectations and actions should meet standards of respect and goodwill). As Sher's "problem of the stranger" highlights, if the basic argument of the relational theorist is to apply to all cases of wrongdoing, premise (1), that 'people stand in relationships,' must be given a normative interpretation. If we instead used the purely descriptive interpretation, then one could evade calls to repair relations simply by failing to take the participant stance toward the other parties in the wrongful interaction. Let us, then, read (1) normatively:

> 1n. All people ought to take up the participant stance toward one another and cultivate relationships of respect and goodwill.

The "ought" marks (1n) as a normative claim.

4. Wrongdoing damages relationships

The second premise in the relational argument schema is 'wrongdoing damages relationships.' Sher has pointed out that this claim is ambiguous between a descriptive reading and a normative reading. Let us consider in more detail what each version of this claim would look like. Then we will be in a better place to decide which will contribute to

building a compelling version of the relational argument schema.

Let us begin with the simpler, descriptive interpretation of the claim that wrongdoing damages relationships. On this reading, (2) offers a description of typical psychological and social consequences of wrongdoing (call this the "actual-consequences" interpretation). The claim is that wrongdoing generally causes negative changes in how the victim, the wrongdoer, and sometimes also other members of the community relate to one another following the wrong: their beliefs about one another, the attitudes they experience (such as resentment, anger or hatred), the degree to which they trust or are willing to rely on one another, etc. These factors often combine to result in negative behaviors, such as outright wrongdoing (e.g., revenge) or reduced cooperation. Stronger or weaker versions of this descriptive version of premise (2) would draw stronger or weaker correlations between wrongdoing and such consequences. As we have seen, Sher doubts that these correlations are as robust as relational theorists usually seem to believe. In order to avoid that problem, I recommend a weak version of an "actual-consequences" premise:

> 2ac. Wrongdoing sometimes actually causes negative changes to the involved parties' beliefs, attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors regarding one another.

The claim that wrongdoing "sometimes" leads to such consequences is so modest that it would be hard to deny.

A second, normative interpretation of the claim, 'wrongdoing damages relationships,' starts with the thought that, although the actual relations between the parties to a wrong might remain unaffected in a particular case, it would be *reasonable* if they did worsen. Let's call this the "normative-consequences" version of (2).

Wrongdoing provides reason for the involved parties to negatively adjust their actual relations with one another. For example, victims of rights-violations would typically be justified in feeling resentment, limiting cooperation, and reducing their confidence that the wrongdoer will behave justly in the future. The strength of the reasons provided varies with the details of the particular cases, of course. I have greater reason to distrust a co-worker who intentionally destroyed my work in order to win a promotion for herself than a co-worker who absent-mindedly broke a promise to cover my shift. Furthermore, these reasons are usually merely permissive reasons and not requirements. There may be nothing irrational, imprudent, or immoral in failing to resent or distrust my promise-breaking colleague (though, there may be in special circumstances). The idea is instead that it makes sense for vulnerable, social beings like us to change how we relate with wrongdoers in response to their misdeeds.

According to the normative-consequences reading, then, to say that wrongdoing damages relationships is to say that wrongdoing provides normative reasons for actual relationships to worsen among beings like us. This claim is not empirical. The point is not to describe or predict how actual people react, psychologically and behaviorally, to experiences of wrongdoing; it is to make a normative claim about what is reasonable—about what a fair, prudent, or at least blameless reaction to a wrong would be. However, the normative-consequences claim is also informed by our experiences with wrongdoing. If our bodies were impervious to the blows of others, if our self-respect were less vulnerable to other people's attitudes toward us, if we did not need other people's cooperation and company to lead fulfilling lives, then what would count as a reasonable reaction to wrongdoing would be different.

So, in developing a normative account of justifiable reactions to wrongdoing, we reflect upon people's actual tendencies to react. But, most important are the emotions,

attitudes, suspicions, and impulses people tend to experience *when they occupy the participant stance with regard to the parties to a wrong*. Sher may be correct that most victims of petty crime simply shrug off their losses. But this might simply be a sign that their relations with other people are already in a poor state. Their lack of resentment seems to indicate that they do not actually expect strangers to treat them with respect. In saying that resentment is a reasonable consequence of crime, the relational theorist (on this reading) is not making an empirical generalization about the actual correlation of crime and resentment, but a normative claim about what would be a fitting response among people like us were we to view one another as fellow participants in a community regulated by equal respect and moderate goodwill. In a healthy community (or at least one that grants property rights), thefts would be resented.

The normative-consequences reading also deals well with other cases that are sometimes presented as counterexamples to relational theories in the literature. For example, Susan Wolf resists the claim that wrongdoing damages relationships by pointing to the everyday wrongs that are part of family life (2011). These wrongs—such as the unauthorized borrowing of clothes among siblings, neglected chores, and excessive nagging by parents—are typically trivial. Though they may lead to fleeting displays of heated emotions, in healthy families, no damage is really done to the underlying relationship. But the normative-consequences interpretation allows us to reply that these little injustices do indeed provide their victims with reasons to negatively adjust relationships, although these reasons are overpowered by stronger reasons to maintain robust goodwill and trust. There is still sense in referring to this as a very mild kind of relational damage or, better yet, as threatening (rather than as actually damaging) the relationship. Even strong interpersonal bonds can be weakened over time by the repetition of minor wrongdoing. One can repeatedly give one's friend a

reason to break trust without actually losing his friendship, but it is like adding straw to the camel's back; one risks a rupture.

So, according to the normative-consequences interpretation, the claim that wrongdoing damages relationships is to be read as the claim that wrongdoing provides reason for the parties to a wrong to adjust their actual views of and interactions with one another for the worse. We should note, though, that while some negative changes are permitted in the aftermath of wrongdoing, there are limits. Central to the Kantian ethic is the principle that a person's moral value is not conditional on his good behavior, but is instead intrinsic to his status as a moral agent. There are fundamental forms of respect, which Stephen Darwall calls recognition-respect, that must always be maintained (1977). If John cheats me, I am not allowed to cheat him in return, or have him beat up, or watch him drown when I am able to save his life. But I am permitted to lose what Darwall calls appraisal-respect for John. I need not think as well of him as I used to. Nor must I bear him as much goodwill as I did before. Since the duty of benevolence is merely imperfect, I can choose to bestow my benevolence on someone other than John. As Scanlon notes, I can also stop seeking out John's company, taking pleasure in his success, or even hoping things go well for him (2008, 144-45). These sorts of negative changes to my actual relations with John can all be reasonable and involve no wrongdoing on my part.

Let us formalize the normative-consequences interpretation as follows:

> 2nc. Wrongdoing provides the involved parties with reasons to negatively adjust their beliefs, attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors toward one another.

The suggestion that wrongdoing always provides such a reason appears to be a rather strong claim, but I believe

that this is moderated by the fact that the reason in question is both merely permissive (one is not typically *required* to negatively adjust one's relationship) and defeasible (it may be trumped or outweighed by other reasons). A more precise version of (2nc) would say that *some* of the parties have reason to adjust *some* aspects of their relationships with one another. For example, if Marie cheats on her spouse, it is far from clear that her coworkers have even a permissive reason to adjust the level of goodwill and patterns of cooperation that characterize their coworker relationships with her (cf. Radzik 2011). But since we are working toward an argument schema rather than a polished argument, let's leave out these details.

We have, then, two different interpretations of the claim that 'wrongdoing damages relationships' that seem promising: (2nc) and (2ac). Recall, the actual-consequences version, focuses on the *actual harms* that sometimes follow wrongdoing:

> 2ac. Wrongdoing sometimes actually causes negative changes to the involved parties' beliefs, attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors regarding one another.

In contrast, the normative-consequences version, (2nc), brings our attention to the idea that wrongdoing *permits* or *justifies* some negative adjustments to relationships, even if the parties have not, or have not yet, made these changes.

We will need both of these interpretations in order to fill out our argument schema for relational justifications of blame, punishment, forgiveness, and atonement. Recall, the main idea of the argument schema is that blame, punishment, forgiveness, and atonement are valuable responses to wrongdoing because they repair relations. (2ac) and (2nc) point out two different ways in which relationships may stand in need of repair. They may have *actually* degraded, as compared to our moral ideal of interpersonal relations, or they may be *threatened* or

undermined by the fact that their degradation would be reasonable. If someone continues to trust and show goodwill to her friend only because she does not know that he is the person who wronged her, (2nc) allows us to describe that relationship as threatened, as undermined, and in need of repair. Another reason to keep both versions of the second premise focuses on the fact that actual responses to wrongdoing are not always reasonable. For example, victims may be filled with malice toward the wrongdoer and a desire for revenge. This kind of damage to the victim-wrongdoer relationship may not be reasonable, but it is in need of repair. One thing forgiveness does, on many accounts, is to moderate inappropriate or excessive reactions to wrongdoing (Butler 1827, Sermon IX).

5. We morally ought to repair our relationships

Let us momentarily skip over premise (3) in our argument schema and turn next to premise (4): 'we morally ought to repair our relationships.' How should we interpret this claim? The key term in (4) is 'repair.' In thinking of what repair involves, let us refer back to the two interpretations of damage with which we ended the last section: the actual-consequences and the normative-consequences claims. From these follow two interpretations of repair:

> 4ac. Any negative changes that wrongdoing *actually* causes to the involved parties' beliefs, attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors regarding one another ought to be reversed or ameliorated, other things being equal.
>
> 4nc. Any *reasons* that wrongdoing provides to involved parties to negatively adjust their beliefs, attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors

toward one another ought to be counteracted or nullified, other things being equal.

The notion of repair at work in (4ac) is one of rectifying some kind of damage that has already taken place in a relationship. A wrongdoer apologizing to angry victim would be an example of an attempt to repair a relationship that is already, actually damaged. In contrast, the notion of repair in (4nc) is more like disarming a threat than rebuilding something that is already broken. An illustration of this notion of repair might be apologizing to someone who claims not to care about having been mistreated.

Both (4ac) and (4nc) are left intentionally vague because they are designed only for my argument schema rather than for a complete argument. For example, 'ought' might convey either a full-fledged obligation or the weaker idea that it would be a morally good thing if the relationship were repaired. If we were building an argument about atonement, the language of obligation would be appropriate. On the other hand, forgiveness is typically a matter of virtue rather than obligation; so in building a relational argument about forgiveness we would likely choose the weaker reading of 'ought.' Similarly, both (4ac) and (4nc) fail to clarify to whom the 'ought' is addressed. This again is necessary given the fact that my schema is meant to be adaptable to defenses of a number of responses to wrongdoing. Obligations to atone are addressed to wrongdoers; recommendations to forgive are typically addressed to victims. The 'other things being equal' caveat on both versions is meant to convey the idea that whether one ought to repair a relationship is sensitive to other factors, such as whether restoring trust or cooperation would be unreasonably imprudent or conflict with one's other obligations.

Still, even with all of this ambiguity, I think that both (4ac) and (4nc) suggest compelling moral ideas—ideas that provide an interpretation of respect for persons. We

should live with one another on terms of respect and goodwill. When the actual terms upon which we live with one another become degraded as a result of wrongdoing, we should endeavor to bring them into a more ideal state. Insofar as we give other people, or perceive other people as giving us, *reason to* worsen our relationships, we should try to counteract those reasons and create a context in which we have better reason to relate on good terms.

I imagine that this latter claim, which is associated with (4nc), might cause some puzzlement. The claim that we ought to repair relationships that are actually damaged is understandable enough. But why must we race around trying to erase these free-floating "reasons"? Why does it matter if a reason to worsen relations is in some sense "out there" if no one actually accepts it as their own? My first response is, again, that too many straws break the camel's back. This is just another way of saying that risks of future, bad consequences should be avoided. But this is not a very satisfactory answer. If those risks are low enough, why not take them? Why not continue breaking little promises to my husband? I am confident in his love and capacity for patience. I think I can get away with it for another fifty years. Of course, the proper response is that even if I could "get away with" such behavior, given his virtuous nature, I would not be living on proper terms with him. This state of affairs would be intrinsically bad. At this point, Sher might repeat his objection that the relational theory only works insofar as Kantian principles of right and wrong action are presupposed by it. Yet, as I claimed earlier, most relational discussions are not meant to be alternatives to an ethic of respect for persons; they are an articulation of it. If I am to properly respect with my husband, I should not give him reason to resent me. The mere fact that he (patient, loving fellow that he is) does not actually resent me is no assurance that I am living up to that standard.

6. Relationships are repaired through blame, punishment, forgiveness, or atonement

We are now in a better position to address the third premise in our argument schema: 'Relationships are repaired through blame, punishment, forgiveness, or atonement.' I should first mention that not everyone drawn to a relational framework must agree that all four of these responses to wrongdoing should be counted as reparative. Nor must they all be willing to follow the argument schema to its conclusion and claim that a reparative function makes that response morally justifiable, let alone obligatory. Some might follow the schema to defend the value of forgiveness, while doubting that blame is best seen as a form of reparation, or remaining skeptical about whether punishment can be justified at all.

To say that a response such as forgiveness or atonement repairs relationships could mean one of two things, which correspond to the actual-consequences and normative-consequences lines of thought. The first claims that these responses have a kind of causal power.

> 3ac. The negative changes to the parties' beliefs, attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors toward one another that actually result from wrongdoing can sometimes be reversed or ameliorated by blame, punishment, forgiveness, or atonement.

For example, Govier describes forgiveness as a process through which a victim rids himself of resentment and comes to a new view of the offender as someone who is capable of better action in the future (FR, 59). Acts of atonement from wrongdoers, such as apologies, sometimes enable victims to restore trust. Punishment of a criminal by the state might cause the victim to feel a more secure self-respect. In expressing blame, a witness to wrongdoing might successfully convince a wrongdoer to

change her ways. I have included the word "sometimes" in (3ac) to avoid Sher's objection that relational theorists tend to exaggerate the causal efficacy of these sorts of responses to wrongdoing.

The second, normative version of premise (3) focuses on how responses to wrongdoing affect the *reasons* we have for relating to one another in better or worse ways.

> 3nc. The reasons wrongdoing provides for negatively adjusting beliefs, attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors can be nullified or counter-balanced by blame, punishment, forgiveness, or atonement, when performed appropriately.

Indeed, writings on relationships in the aftermath of wrongdoing are filled with claims that fit this basic pattern, such as: When a community blames a wrongdoer for a misdeed, the victim typically has less reason to feel vulnerable to future abuse. By making amends, the wrongdoer removes or weakens the reason she gave the victim to fear or distrust her. In regaining his ability to view the wrongdoer with compassion, a forgiving victim might counter-balance the reason he has to avoid the wrongdoer. In fairly punishing a criminal, the state may give community members a reason to put the past behind them and once again include the criminal in schemes of social cooperation.

7. Conclusion

It is time now to rebuild our argument schema with the pieces we have fashioned in the preceding sections. The result is less ambiguous, though certainly more cumbersome.

1n. All people ought to take up the participant stance toward one another and cultivate relationships of respect and goodwill.

2ac. Wrongdoing sometimes actually causes negative changes to the involved parties' beliefs, attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors regarding one another.

2nc. Wrongdoing provides the involved parties with reasons to negatively adjust their beliefs, attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors toward one another.

3ac. The negative changes to the parties' beliefs, attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors toward one another that actually result from wrongdoing can sometimes be reversed or ameliorated by blame, punishment, forgiveness, or atonement.

3nc. The reasons wrongdoing provides for negatively adjusting beliefs, attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors can be nullified or counter-balanced by blame, punishment, forgiveness, or atonement, when performed appropriately.

4ac. Any negative changes that wrongdoing actually causes to the involved parties' beliefs, attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors regarding one another ought to be reversed or ameliorated, other things being equal.

4nc. Any reasons that wrongdoing provides to involved parties to negatively adjust their beliefs, attitudes, emotions, expectations, or behaviors

toward one another ought to be counteracted or nullified, other things being equal.

5. Therefore, such responses to wrongdoing are morally justified (or perhaps required), other things being equal.

While this is still a long way from a complete and convincing defense of any of the four responses to wrongdoing, I hope that it helps put to rest Sher's objection that the relational approach is irretrievably ambiguous and implausible.

I hope to have also communicated what I find so compelling in the relational approach to the issues that arise in the aftermath of wrongdoing, which Govier has so greatly influenced. Wrongdoing is an obstacle to our living together on the terms of respect and goodwill that form our moral ideal. It is an obstacle both because of the myriad ways in which wrongs actually cause relationships to deteriorate and also because at least some of these forms of decay are perfectly legitimate. Resenting, distrusting, and fearing wrongdoers are reasonable responses to injustice. Govier asks us to think hard about cases from South Africa to Rwanda to Chile, where mere peaceful coexistence can seem like a miracle given the horrors of the past (Cases). The practical and moral challenges that the past poses to the present come to the fore much more effectively when we adopt a relational framework as opposed to a more traditional, and less social, Kantian one. For this approach, both descriptive and normative discussions of relationships are necessary.

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5. "Hello. My Name is Inigo Montoya": Revenge as Moral Address

ALICE MACLACHLAN

Summary: Trudy Govier offers a sweeping moral critique of revenge, arguing that even non-violent, limited, acts of revenge are wrong, insofar as they necessarily treat the target as an instrument of the revenger's satisfaction (offending against respect for persons) and thus morally diminish the revenger. I challenge Govier's critique by broadening her account of revenge, focusing in particular on its communicative complexities. Revenge aims to address rather than *use* its target, I argue, for the revenger to be satisfied. It is plausibly described as a kind of forcible persuasion, in which the revenger aims to convince her target of the target's moral desert and the revenger's moral authority. Nevertheless, the unilateral nature of this address and the morally simplistic worldview on which it depends present significant (and likely fatal) moral risks to any project of vengeance.

> My father was slaughtered by a six-fingered man… When I was strong enough, I dedicated my life to the study of fencing, so the next time we meet, I will not fail. I will go up to the six-fingered man and say, 'Hello. My Name is Inigo Montoya. You killed my father. Prepare to die.'
> —*The Princess Bride* (1987)

1. Introduction

As I write, vengeance is very much en vogue. The phenomenon of "revenge porn" – posting explicit photos of one's ex on dedicated internet sites – has become so pervasive that a number of jurisdictions, including California and New Jersey, have passed legislation against it. In pop culture, the last few years have seen a major motion picture remake of *Oldboy*, the second film in Park Chan-Wook's *Vengeance Trilogy*, as well as the hit

American TV drama, "Revenge" – which took a narrative reminiscent of Alexandre Dumas' *The Count of Monte Cristo* and placed it in a fashionable Hamptons setting. Over the last decade, global politics have been dominated by multiple US-led wars, both of which are plausibly conceived of as acts of retaliation against states more or less dubiously associated with the 9/11 terrorist acts in 2001. Meanwhile, Internet activists like Anonymous and the Perverted Justice Foundation continue to pursue vigilante campaigns against perpetrators of sexual violence, pedophilia, and online bullying, which the wider public views with an ambivalent mixture of condemnation and gratitude.

Those who study and promote reconciliation may well cite political and pop cultural phenomena as evidence for a pressing need to counteract the vengeful spirit of our age. At the same time, the popularity of vengeance is perhaps evidence for the opposite conclusion, that the impulse toward revenge needs to be taken seriously and cannot be condemned out of hand. Revenge deserves our consideration both for its formidable motivating power in the world, and for the – perhaps illusory – moral kernel at its heart, namely, the intuition that those who commit irreparable harms deserve to pay, that institutions are not always effective, and those most acquainted with and affected by wrongful harm have a role to play in effecting their perpetrators' deserts. Revenge is dangerous precisely because it compels not only our worst impulses, but some of our best: sympathy for the downtrodden, righteous anger at their oppressors, the rush and surge of emotion spurred by agency regained, and our satisfaction at a karmic universe, where things work out as they should. Condemnations of revenge that fail to take seriously its appeal will only poke holes in a straw opponent.

For this reason (among others), Trudy Govier's groundbreaking contributions to philosophical discussions of reconciliation in *Forgiveness and Revenge* (Govier 2002) – hereafter, FR – are notable because they start by

taking seriously the moral standing many give to revenge. Govier carefully weighs arguments for and against the value of vengeance, distinguishing the empirical from the conceptual, and acknowledging the apparent connection between revenge and a sense of justice, the victim's self-respect and regained agency, and what we might call cosmic balance. Yet, she concludes, whatever goods an act of revenge might appear to achieve, a successful campaign amounts to "satisfaction at having brought about the suffering of another human being" (FR, 11) and is thus morally objectionable, given basic moral commitments to respect for persons. There are, of course, other downsides to revenge – its famously obsessive nature, the risks of escalating vendettas, the tendency to spiraling violence, and potential harms to innocent third parties – but none of these is *intrinsic* to revenge, argues Govier, in the same way the message that "[the] other human being is fit to be an instrument for her own satisfaction" (FR, 12) sits at its core. Someone could commit an act of revenge that avoided each of these pitfalls, but it would remain morally objectionable.

Moral justifications for revenge fail, she argues, because:

> Underlying the moral case for revenge is the assumption that *it can sometimes be right for a person to be the agent of deliberately bringing harm to another person, for the sake of enjoying having brought that harm.* (FR 12)

Govier identifies revenge with its motive and condemns it in light of that motive: "deliberately bringing harm… for the sake of enjoying having brought that harm."

While there is much that is insightful in her analysis, in this paper I offer an alternative picture of revenge – one which highlights the communicative dimensions of revenge, ultimately describing the transaction between revenger and target as a form of (admittedly imperfect) moral address. My reading lessens the charge that

vengeance always, necessarily, offends against the principle of respect for persons. Nevertheless, I conclude, there remain conceptual as well as empirical reasons against endorsing widespread practices of revenge.

2. Satisfaction at suffering: Govier on revenge

I begin by outlining what I take to be the core elements of Govier's account of revenge, and the critique she develops out of that account. Govier isolates three key elements to successful revenge:

a) the intention to harm another in response to their initial harm;
b) the revenger's agency in that harm;
c) the actual suffering of the one who is harmed.

Someone intends to commit an act of revenge when she responds to the person who hurt her by aiming to "get her own back and settle accounts" (FR, 2) – that is, when she tries to do something that will hurt her target as much as they have hurt her. The desire for revenge is not simply a desire that something bad happen, i.e. that her target is harmed, but a desire that she – the one seeking vengeance – is the cause of that harm. Should her target slip and break an arm, or get an expensive parking ticket, or succumb to illness, this will not be satisfying to the would-be revenger, even if such accidents produced *more harm* than she had originally intended. Her agency in causing harm to her target is key to the satisfaction of revenge, as much as the harm itself is. Also, the vengeful act must actually cause the target suffer. Should she aim to harm and end up helping her antagonist, this would be equally unsatisfying, as Govier illustrates with the example of Ann, who retaliates against Michael – a workplace bully – by telling his wife he is having an affair, only for Michael to find this a relief and blessing (FR, 2-3).

What of the moral case for and against revenge? Govier notes that philosophical defenders of revenge – most notably Robert Solomon and Jeffrie Murphy – tend to emphasize the naturalness of the vengeful impulse, the sense of balance created by the exchange of harms, and the ways in which revenge at least appears to promote justice, the victim's self-respect, equality of agency and stature between victim and perpetrator, and victim satisfaction (Murphy 1995; Solomon 1990). Solomon and Murphy take these to be a *prima facie* moral case for revenge, placing the burden of proof on those who wish to rule it out. They succeed in doing so only by focusing only on benign examples, Govier argues, such as "a single discrete act of a bland and non-violent nature" (FR, 3) – for example, a nasty remark made in passing or a vote against someone's pet project at a meeting. This focus allows them to downplay the "exaggerated, unreliable, and anarchic tendencies of personal revenge" (8) – as do fictional revenge fantasies, like Fay Weldon's novel *The Life and Loves of a She-Devil* (Weldon 1983), which narratively constrain the effects of vengeance so that only the guilty are hurt, the cause remains righteous, and all are morally improved as a result (6-7). Outside of fiction, revenge is far more likely to spiral outwards into violence, vendetta, and vigilantism. Moreover, Govier notes, the satisfactions of revenge are often hollow to the revenger: a beaten, downtrodden opponent is less formidable, and so their defeat is less cathartic (9-10).

We might describe the disagreement here as varying levels of skepticism about the constrained nature of revenge – defenders believe that the practice can, at least at its best, maintain certain internal limits, so that revenge *need* not involve violence, illegal action, and escalating or spiraling cycles of retaliation. Skeptics about revenge, on the other hand, see the hazards of revenge in practice as inevitable. Once someone is compelled to revenge, he or she cannot avoid all the risks involved in undertaking such a course of action. Such debates often reduce to

discussions of those reactive attitudes seen to motivate revenge, which Jeffrie Murphy calls "the vindictive passions:" resentment, anger, vindictiveness, and even hatred. Those who see a moral role for such attitudes are less likely to conclude that these emotions are necessarily socially destructive, or will inevitably overtake other moral considerations and rational caution.

Ultimately, questions about the psychology, escalation, and side effects of revenge are empirical issues, external to the question that most concerns Govier: namely, the moral status of revenge itself.

> Suppose it were non-obsessive, non-violent, kept proportional and within bounds, applied to those who really were the wrongdoers and not inflicted on innocent third parties, and satisfying in the end. In such a case, could revenge be right? In other words, is there anything wrong with the desire for revenge or the quest for revenge *as such*, considered apart from its consequences? (11)

For Govier, the answer is yes, for two reasons. First, revenge necessarily treats another as the instrument of my satisfaction, offending against the Kantian principle of respect for persons. Second, revenge "morally diminishes the [revenging] victim" (13). Recall that on Govier's account, revenge has three key elements: the intention to inflict harm in response to harm, the revenger's agency in inflicting that harm, and the actual suffering of the target as a result of the harm inflicted. In revenging, my aim is to inflict suffering on a particular person, and my aim is satisfied if that suffering is inflicted. Moreover, the connection she draws between purpose and satisfaction is deeper—my aim, in inflicting suffering, is to experience exactly that satisfaction that comes from having inflicted it. I aim to inflict suffering because I know I will be satisfied when I have inflicted it, and not for some other purpose. This connection distinguishes revenge from some other satisfaction at suffering: suppose, for example, my

sense of honesty dictates that I tell someone a difficult truth, knowing that hearing it will cause them suffering. My purpose in the latter case that my audience possess the knowledge – knowledge I am aware will be painful for them – and I am satisfied in my purpose when they possess it (and are thus suffering), but I do not set out to tell them in order to gain satisfaction from that suffering. The hearer's pain is a necessary, foreseeable, consequence of the satisfaction of my purpose, but does not consist in it.

In other words, the core aim of revenge on Govier's definition is that another person suffer *for* my satisfaction. Their unwanted, non-consensual suffering means that I treat them as a means and not an end, in a manner inconsistent with their dignity as a person. Moreover, this disrespect is particularly insidious, since my satisfaction in this case requires that they *suffer*. Requiring that someone be amused or pleasured for my satisfaction and without their consent would also be disrespectful, but would not have the additional elements of pain and disutility. The first moral strike against revenge is significant: if indeed it requires instrumental suffering in this way, then revenge necessarily offends against respect for persons.

The second aspect of the moral case against revenge is predicated on the first. Govier claims that the desire for revenge is an evil desire, and that to act on that desire is thus "to indulge and cultivate something evil in ourselves" and to "commit [ourselves] to maliciousness and hate," resulting ultimately in moral diminishment (13). There are two things worth noting here: first, the idea that the desire for revenge is an evil desire depends on the prior argument for the moral wrongfulness of revenge. If revenge is not wrong, then the desire for revenge is not wrong, either. Second, the claim that the desire for revenge is not simply a bad desire but an *evil* one is a very strong claim. It is true that desiring to treat another as a means rather than an end and desiring to cause pain are hardly commendable wishes, but what warrants the appellation evil? Recall that Govier's focus is on the moral status of revenge that is

"non-obsessive, non-violent, kept proportional and within bounds" (11) – and, in order not to beg the question, limited to non-violent, legal forms of retaliation. Failing to limit her cases in this way would confuse the issue, since illegal or violent actions may be immoral on their own merits, apart from their status as acts of revenge.

Why, then, is the desire for revenge an evil desire? Govier's case revolves around the psychological status of the revenger, yet she describes more than one psychological state. We are first told that the revenger gained satisfaction from the suffering of her opponent, and then, told that the revenger "desires to bring harm to another so that [she] may contemplate with satisfaction that harm," and further, that "when we seek revenge, we do so in order to take pleasure in the fact that *the offender has been made to suffer* and *it is we who have brought this about*." Govier goes on to describe the desire for revenge as "the wish to deliberately bring suffering to another human being and contemplate that suffering for our own satisfaction and enjoyment" and she concludes that the emotion of revenge is "hatred that goes so far as to include joy at the evil meted out to another person… positive joy in the fact that we have caused the suffering of another person" (13).

The emotions and reflections described in the previous paragraph are distinct and increasingly distasteful psychological states. There is a difference from experiencing satisfaction at some act, on the one hand, and doing that same act so that you might later contemplate it with satisfaction, on the other. The latter implies a willingness to dwell, indulge, and inhabit the experience in memory and reminiscence longer than is necessary. This, in turn, suggests an enthusiasm and affinity that is incompatible with someone who commits revenge perhaps out of a sense of honour, a moment of self-assertion, or from righteous indignation. The shift from "satisfaction" to "pleasure" is starker still. There are many forms of satisfaction that are not also pleasures, but are rather

experienced as a sense of relief, escape, closure, catharsis, or duty fulfilled. To equate the satisfaction of desire with pleasure at that satisfaction is mistaken, and risks committing to a simplistic psychological hedonism. The distinction is important, since the idea of pleasure at someone's suffering is more morally troubling than satisfaction through someone's suffering, since it suggests sadism or cruelty in addition to vindictiveness. There are many instances where relief or closure is an appropriate reaction, but pleasure would not be.

In other words, the claim that revenge necessarily diminishes the character of the revenger is defended here with reference to a particular, and more extreme, picture of the psychological state of the revenger than is initially contained in Govier's definition of revenge. It is not hard for me to imagine a committed revenger who can truthfully say that they take no pleasure in the task they have set themselves but, rather, feel compelled to act – whether from a sense of injustice, duty (if they believe revenge to be not only permissible, but required), family loyalty, or the need to strike back against ongoing bullying and cruelty.

Someone could meet Govier's initial standards for revenge – aiming to settle accounts by inflicting some harm on the one who did wrong – and possess none of the hatred, cruel pleasures, and vindictive joys she goes on to describe. That is not to say that such hatreds and cruelties are not often associated with vengeance, in practice, but recall the task Govier has set herself is to determine whether there is something morally wrong with appropriate, proportionate, non-violent revenge *in principle*. The claim that revenge morally diminishes the revenging victim seems to rest, largely, on her description of the psychological state of the revenger – a description that may seem extreme, given the range of revenging acts under consideration, i.e. those that are non-violent, non-obsessive, proportionate, and legal.

Without such a vivid psychological picture, we can only say the project of revenge morally diminishes the revenger insofar as revenge is (as argued above) morally wrongful, and the desire to commit a morally wrongful act always in some sense diminishes the one who desires it – especially when such a desire becomes my will, and I act upon it. This is, in some sense, true; the virtuous person does not desire the bad, and *a fortiori*, does not act on a desire for the bad. But the strength of this objection will falter if the bad in question is not a serious wrong. Thus the moral case against revenge ultimately hinges on the first claim: that its satisfaction depends on treating another instrumentally, and not with the respect persons deserve.

But is this the only way to view the act of revenge? Govier acknowledges that the desire for revenge is "a highly complex emotion, involving as it does notions of agency, wrong, responsibility, and rightful suffering" (13). Surely the purpose of revenge is, in part, to express this emotion and communicate these complex notions to the intended target. Indeed, acts of revenge are sometimes colloquially described as "sending a message". But ordinarily, we do not think of the recipients of our messages as instruments, but addressees – i.e. persons capable of receiving, understanding and interpreting what we communicate. And so, if revenge is – among other things – a communicative action, and if the message revenge communicates contains moral themes such as injustice, defiance and redress,[35] then might the recipient of my revenge be better described as a moral addressee, rather than an instrument to my purposes? Below, I consider another reading of the revenge transaction.

3. The Six-Fingered Man: Revenge as moral address

[35] That is, these themes are moral in the sense that they contain references to moral concepts and principles, not moral in the sense that the revenger is necessarily good or just.

Conceiving of revenge as a communicative act is significant because it changes and broadens our understanding of the revenger's motive. Govier's case against revenge is compelling because, if true, it condemns act of vengeance that would otherwise be not only legally but also morally permitted. The revenger's motive, i.e. the satisfaction of seeing her tormentor suffer through her agency, is sufficiently wrongful that wrongfulness carries over to the act itself. Thus even a benign act – a vote at a meeting – becomes wrong if it is, at the same time, an act of revenge. But what if that motive were more complicated than Govier allows?

Indeed, let us examine in more detail the example of a negative vote at a meeting. Take two colleagues: Leah and Mateo. Mateo has ruthlessly and persistently bullied Leah over many years, and Leah has come to see herself as having little power and few options. Leah sits on a committee where she suddenly found herself in a position to vote to defund a pet project of Mateo's – and she did so. Mateo was not a member of this committee, and will never know the individual votes. Moreover, since the meeting was split fairly evenly, Leah's swing vote determined the outcome. Leah did not consider the project's merits (if she had considered them, her vote would have been the same, since his project lacks merit). Rather, she did so because this was the first time she found herself in a position to hurt Mateo, and she desired very much to hurt him as he has hurt her. Leah's act counts as revenge on Govier's account.

Yet, from Leah's own perspective, will she feel that she has adequately revenged herself? Perhaps – Mateo's project is important to him, and he is hurt by its cancellation. But unless Mateo knows that she, Leah, voted, and how and why she voted, and unless he knows Leah's vote was the deciding factor, Mateo's relationship to Leah will not change. Leah hasn't yet 'gotten her own' back, or sent the message of "agency, wrong, responsibility, and rightful suffering" (FR, 13) that she

wishes to communicate. Why not? Mateo doesn't understand that he was defeated *because* he is the kind of colleague who bullies and belittles others, who manipulates and torments them. There is no connection, in Mateo's mind, between his ongoing cruel and non-collegial behaviour, on the one hand, and his sudden burst of professional bad luck, on the other. Mateo has not been made to see himself as Leah sees him, to experience his defeat as Leah's victory. Mateo will not experience his disappointment as *punishment*, and so the act, while causally effective, remains voiceless. Leah may well remain dissatisfied – not because her revenge is unsatisfying – but because her actions do not yet constitute revenge. Leah has retaliated against Mateo, but she has not committed revenge.

What, exactly, does the vindictive person desire when she desires revenge, in particular? Govier is right that she wants to cause her target to suffer harm, but this is not the whole story. The would-be revenger wants to draw a connection between the pain her target now suffers and the pain she, the revenger, previously suffered. She wants her target to understand that he is suffering because the revenger wants him to suffer and because he deserves to suffer, and, further, that he deserves to suffer *on account of suffering* he initially inflicted on the revenger. In other words, the revenger needs her target to know that this is an act of revenge. The satisfactions of revenge arise, at least in part, from the successful communication of this message, since this message is what expresses agency, moral indignation, and the aim of 'restoring balance'.

In other words, the revenging agent doesn't merely wish that her target feel certain things (i.e. pain and suffering). She wishes that he come to believe and understand certain things (i.e. the connection between the pain and suffering he now feels, and the moral blameworthiness of his previous actions). Moral philosopher Adam Smith describes vindictive emotions and desires (i.e. those that fuel revenge) in the following:

> Resentment would prompt us to desire, not only that he should be punished, but that he should be punished by our means, and upon account of that particular injury which he had done to us. Resentment cannot be fully gratified, unless the offender is not only made to grieve in his turn, but to grieve for that particular wrong which we have suffered from him. He must be made to repent and be sorry for this very action (Smith 1976, 63).

The first few elements here match Govier's picture: the vindictive person wishes that her perpetrator should suffer ("be punished") and that he should suffer through her own agency ("by our means") because he has hurt her ("that particular injury…"). But Smith goes further; it is not enough for the target to suffer ("grieve") and even experience regret as a result of that suffering. He must regret his current state in light of *his own past behaviour* that led to his suffering ("grieve for that particular wrong which we have suffered from him"). The would-be revenger wishes to hurt her target, yes, but the hurt is not the final aim—or at least, is not the complete, final aim. The aim of revenge is not only harm, but *transfor-mational* harm. What Smith describes here is a fantasy of forcible moral persuasion.

We now possess a very different description of the relationship between revenger and her target. Whereas previously the target was described as merely playing an instrumental role in the ultimate aim of revenge – i.e. the revenger's satisfaction or pleasure at witnessing his suffering – now the target is not merely instrument, but audience. The revenger does not merely aim to hurt her target, she aims to show him something, to make clear to him the moral picture that consumes and motivates her. We can add to Govier's initial conditions of revenge, that the revenger aims to harm her target in such a way that he understand a) it is she who harms him and b) that she harms him on account of the harms he committed against

her – she wishes him to share her perspective on their history and on his just deserts, even if he does not agree with it. She must not only inflict her agency on the target in some way, she must *address* him. Revenge is, among other things, a complex form of communication.

The clearest illustration of the communicative element to revenge can be found in the cult 1973 William Goldman novel and 1987 film, *The Princess Bride* – though the particular act of revenge in question departs from the constrained, non-violent, legal model discussed until now. The Spanish fencer Inigo Montoya explains his life's defining passion in the following manner:

> "My father was slaughtered by a six-fingered man… When I was strong enough, I dedicated my life to the study of fencing, so the next time we meet, I will not fail. I will go up to the six-fingered man and say, 'Hello. My Name is Inigo Montoya. You killed my father. Prepare to die.'"—*The Princess Bride* (1987)

It will not suffice for Montoya to hurt, or even to kill, his father's murderer – at least, not without explanation. That would not be revenge. For his revenge to succeed, he must speak the words to the six-fingered man. He must address his target ("Hello"), identify himself ("My name is Inigo Montoya"), name and explain the wrong in question ("You killed my father") and connect it – both morally and causally – to the suffering he is about to impose ("Prepare to die"). Montoya practices this address as he practices his sword fighting, since these words are as essential to his purpose as his skill. Indeed, when he eventually finds and confronts the six-fingered man – the nefarious Count Rugen, who is himself an excellent swordsman – at the climax of the narrative, Montoya speaks and repeats the words over and over, drawing strength and focus from them even as he is wounded. And the words themselves seem to hurt the six-fingered man – who screams at him,

"Stop saying that!" – well before it is clear that Montoya will rally enough to win the fight.

There is much we might criticize about Montoya's actions; few moral philosophers endorse lethal sword fighting, after all. But in seeking to revenge his father's murder, does he necessarily treat the Count with disrespect? Again, for some, this question will be ridiculous: in most moral frameworks to murder someone is always, necessarily, to treat them with disrespect. But let us put the *method* of revenge to one side. Recall that the question at hand is the intrinsic wrongfulness of revenge, apart from its frequent association with violence. Suppose Montoya were to approach his target, and utter instead, "Hello. My Name is Inigo Montoya. You killed my father. Prepare to be revenged" – and the revenge that followed were some harmful but appropriately constrained, legal, non-violent act, as initially stipulated. It is true that Montoya will nevertheless intentionally harm another human being –but this harm is inflicted not only, or even primarily, for Montoya's satisfaction (let alone his enjoyment). It is inflicted to communicate the moral message Montoya wishes to express, and that he summarizes in his initial address: that the Count has hurt Montoya, and was wrong to hurt Montoya, and deserves to suffer for hurting Montoya, and that Montoya is here to ensure that this state of affairs takes place. Revenge necessarily involves intentional harm, but arguably, it is intentional harm in the service of moral address as much as it is intentional harm for the revenger's emotional satisfaction alone.

Lest this be taken as a ringing endorsement of vengeance, a few things ought to be noted. Few real-life examples of revenge will meet the moral and narrative standards of *The Princess Bride*. In many cases, actual revengers will fall short of the communicative ideal described by Smith and exemplified by Montoya. In my example above, I suggested that Leah would not be satisfied by her anonymous act of harm against Mateo –

but if she is not particularly reflective, she may well be simply treasuring it as a secret talisman the next time Mateo mocks or bullies her. If so, then what Leah really desired was retaliation of any kind, and not revenge in particular. Revenge's conceptual connection to retributive justice is found in its communicative complexity, and the link the revenger attempts to draw between suffering and desert in the target's worldview. I take this communicative complexity to be intrinsic to the act of revenge, and to the suffering imposed in the act of revenging.

Does this expanded, communicative account of revenge as a form of moral address fully answer Govier's concern regarding respect for persons? On the one hand, when I address someone, intending to persuade them of something, I necessarily take their personhood seriously, insofar as I see them as someone capable of persuasion. On the other hand, even non-violent revenge as communication has a potentially serious strike against it: it is intended to *end*, rather than *continue* moral conversation. Contrast the forcible finality of revenge with what Govier has to say about rational argument, for example:

> The other person is addressed as a rational being, as a person with beliefs and values of his own, as one who thinks and is capable of changing his beliefs on the basis of reasons and evidence. To present someone with an argument is to attend to his or her mind and thinking processes and to do so in a non-manipulative way. It is to honestly acknowledge differences of opinion and belief, not to skirt over them, hide them, or seek to avoid them…to show respect for [arguers] as autonomous thoughtful people. (POA, 8)

Revenge falls short of this profoundly respectful account of persuasion not because of its vindictiveness or its viciousness, but because of its unilateral nature. Argumentative persuasion is a potentially reciprocal

address; the one who persuades is ideally open to being persuaded, in turn. This is not the case with revenge. While, in practice, a single act of revenge often spirals into further retaliation (which we could call reciprocal acts of address), the revenger never intends that it do so. She does not see her target as a moral interlocutor – who is able to respond in turn – but as a passive audience. Revenge fails to participate in a moral dialogue – or if it does so, it also always aims to shut that dialogue down, ending the moral conversation. The revenger must assume the rightness of her own cause, and so she aims to persuade without being open to reciprocal persuasion.[36] Address without the possibility of response has a place in communicative life with others, but it carries the risk of disrespect. And in the case of revenge, this risk is significantly heightened.

4. Against revenge: Complexity and entanglement

I have suggested that even if the communicative account of revenge draws our attention to its redeeming features as a form of moral address, this communication fails to be wholly respectful insofar as it is unilateral, and not open to reciprocal address. This worry is compounded by the worldview necessary to engage in 'forcible' persuasion of this nature. Above, I quoted with approval Govier's remark that the vengeful impulse is a "highly complex emotion" (12) embedded with multiple moral notions. This is true – and yet, at the same time, revenge necessarily communicates a simple, even simplistic, story. The decision to revenge oneself rests, in part, on two beliefs: that the target deserves to suffer, and that the revenger has the authority to impose that suffering. Both conditions – desert and authority – are tied to the shared history of the revenger and target: the target deserves what he deserves because he has caused suffering, and the revenger has the

[36] Thanks are due to Susanne Sreedhar for pressing me on this point.

authority she has because she experienced that suffering (French 2001). According to the logic of revenge, the revenger's own suffering both determines another's desert and confers her authority to exact that desert.

Revenger's logic cannot hold without a simplistic worldview to support it. To see her suffering as capable of conferring authority and determining desert in such a clearly defined and discrete manner, the revenger must see herself as exceptional – as distinct and different, or at least examined in isolation from others around her. If she thinks about her experiences in a broader context, the starkness of her suffering becomes diluted and it begins to lose its capacity to ground her purpose. To illustrate this, let us return to Leah and Mateo. Reflecting on her vote, Leah might reassure herself that she had every right to retaliate, given her suffering at Mateo's hands. Then she thinks about other, more junior colleagues, whom he has also hurt, and who lack this opportunity – and indeed, whom she herself has failed to protect or defend. She might think about other bullies in the workplace who have not targeted her but whose torments are worse than Mateo's, all things considered. She might recall that Mateo has been left (unfairly) stagnant in this position for the last 10 years, while other, younger colleagues have moved on to better positions. She might think back and flush, recalling times she has been cruel or callous in the past, inflicting suffering through carelessness or cruelty. If she is conscientious in these ramblings, the thoughts "Who am I to inflict this?" and "Is there more to the story?" may cross her mind.

Note that this kind of comparison would not necessarily (and should not) affect a jury's deliberations, or a moral philosopher's determination of culpability for wrongdoing. The retributive logic of revenge is more direct than either of these, and does not invoke questions of reciprocity, the social contract, or shared membership in a kingdom of ends. These are impersonal sources of moral authority, and the revenger's authority is necessarily

personal. Revenge draws a direct link between the initial imposition of suffering ("You killed my father") and the subsequent decision to revenge ("Prepare to die) – the equation is karmic, not contractarian or Kantian, in nature. Revenge seeks to correct for wrongful suffering by placing it in balance, but this balance of sufferings is only possible if considered in isolation. A broader, more attentive examination of the various sufferings in which we are implicated and which touch us, as secondary and tertiary victims, is staggeringly complex. Indeed, some have argued that this is not just an empirical claim, but an *ontological* one.[37] To be the kind of human creatures we are is necessarily to be caught up and implicated in complex webs of suffering – ranging from the chains of production that create our daily sustenance (food, clothing, energy), to our inherited histories of oppression and injustice, as well as the more mundane pains of a world where affection and love are not always requited, courtesy and manners not always returned, and the needs of loneliness and depression go unmet. Revenge as a moral address can only ever communicate an incomplete moral picture because the logic of revenge can only function if we block out our wider entanglements in webs of interdependence and responsibility.

Thus, revenge as moral address now has two strikes against it, which, taken together, leave it fraught with moral risk. Revenge as moral persuasion communicates an incomplete (and thus, a false) moral picture, and revenge as moral address does not treat the addressee as an interlocutor, thus shutting down any corrective response. In fact, the satisfactions of revenge – i.e. the sense that karma has been achieved, and a balance been struck – require that the revenger's worldview *not* change, that she not move past her identity as wronged victim and avenging

[37] See, for example, Alexis Shotwell, "How do we respond to suffering? Interdependence, food, and responsibility" (Unpublished). Shotwell draws on Donna Haraway's book *When Species Meet* (2007) in making her case for an ethics of entangled embodiment.

agent. In this sense, Govier is right that revenge may morally diminish the revenger—not because it requires a particular range of distasteful psychological states, but because it effectively freezes her in a particular role and that role's subsequent perspective.

It is telling that Govier goes on to argue, in the later chapters of *Forgiveness and Revenge*, that one benefit of forgiveness – as an alternative to revenge – is that it allows all parties to move past the identities of victim and perpetrator, finding new relational balance in reconciliation. While I disagree with Govier's core understanding of revenge as pleasure at another's suffering, I share her intuition that a commitment to respectful engagement with other moral agents may require we put down the revenger's mantle, and look for other ways to resolve wrongdoing and its aftermath.

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6. Private and Public: Practitioner Reflections on Forgiveness and Reconciliation

ALISTAIR LITTLE AND WILHELM VERWOERD

Summary: This reflective essay draws on the life experience of Little and the facilitation work of Little and Verwoerd with former combatants and survivors, mostly from the conflict in and about Northern Ireland. In the first half of the essay Little describes his path from paramilitary violence to respect for those he had opposed. He shows how unclear is the distinction between victims and perpetrators and the fraught and delicate nature of peacemaking and, particularly, forgiveness. Little's experience speaks to analysis developed by Govier and Verwoerd, that Verwoerd extends in the second half of this paper. He reflects on a particular example from his work with Little, emphasizing the challenge of making an essentially private process of humanization between former enemies more public. He highlights the need for a sensitive, remote form of publicity, in part because effective public work toward reconciliation or forgiveness demands personal honesty and openness. He stresses the promise of a more indirect route to forgiveness, with even the language of "reconciliation" and "forgiveness" potentially being too freighted to take up directly.

1. Introduction

Trudy Govier's work prominently features the "promise and pitfalls" of apology, forgiveness, reconciliation. While aiming for greater conceptual clarity Govier always has a keen interest in real world application. It is therefore appropriate in this chapter to offer some practitioner reflections on the complexity of (public) forgiveness. We will be drawing mostly on our work with former

combatants and survivors from the conflict in and about Northern Ireland (NI).[38]

This reflective essay is based on input Alistair Little and Wilhelm Verwoerd gave to an international conference that brought philosophers (including Trudy Govier) and practitioners into conversation around the theme of "Public Forgiveness" (Nijmegen, 2010). Verwoerd's input was a continuation of a conversation with Trudy Govier that started during his time as a researcher within the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SA TRC)(1996-8). This conversation and the joint series of articles on reconciliation, forgiveness, and apologies that grew from it were invaluable in his reflective work and teaching on the SA TRC (Govier and Verwoerd 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2004, 2011). He drew on both the conversation and his friendship with Trudy Govier while working as a facilitator on the island of Ireland between 2002 and 2012. During this period this conversation became greatly enriched by the personal journey and practical wisdom of Alistair Little, a former combatant himself and a facilitator in NI and beyond of "Journey through Conflict" processes, which he developed with Verwoerd (Little and Verwoerd 2013).

We begin with Little describing his path from paramilitary violence to respect for those he had opposed. He shows how unclear is the distinction between victims and perpetrators and the fraught and delicate nature of peacemaking. Little's experience speaks to analysis developed by Govier and Verwoerd, that Verwoerd extends in the second half of this paper. He observes the

[38] The phrase 'in and about Northern Ireland' is an attempt to accommodate those who are for and those who are against the continued existence of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. Facilitators would typically alternate between the terms 'Northern Ireland' (used by Unionists/Loyalists) and 'North of Ireland' (to be inclusive of Nationalists/Republicans), with some also using the deliberately ambiguous phrase 'island of Ireland.'

value of making the private public even though that may require a remote form of publicity and in part because effective public work toward reconciliation or forgiveness demands a personal honesty and openness. Ultimately, an indirect forgiveness expressed without saying "sorry" may be absolutely necessary; even the language of "reconciliation" and "forgiveness" can be too freighted to take up directly.

2. Alistair Little: A former combatant and practitioner perspective

I (Little) continue to struggle with the concepts "reconciliation" and "forgiveness." If I've learnt anything so far, then it is to approach concepts such as "forgiveness" with humility and extreme caution. In my experience these are not only concepts. People's lives are involved – people who are struggling on a daily basis with their pain and continuing to grieve their loss.

My grappling with these concepts is rooted in my personal journey. I first became involved in violent political conflict as a teenager and then gradually started to question the use of violence. Eventually, through a complex, ongoing process, I committed my life to peacemaking (Little and Scott 2009).

I grew up during the years of mounting political and sectarian tension between Protestants/Unionists /Loyalists and Catholics/Republicans/Nationalists[39] that

[39] The complexity of the conflict in and about Northern Ireland is reflected in the use of these terms. Broadly speaking one might say that 'Catholic' or 'Protestant' are the most general descriptors, with the added complication that these terms can be used both in a cultural and a religious sense. (Being 'Catholic' is typically connected with being Irish, while 'Protestant' is often used interchangeably with 'British'.) The next, more specific layer is explicitly political, with 'Nationalist' referring to those committed to a political vision of a united Ireland and 'Unionist' designating those striving to maintain the political union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. These terms

erupted into violence and the deployment of British Armed Forces to NI in 1969. My hometown experienced many bombings and shootings. People I knew and cared about were killed. Those responsible and the Catholic/ Nationalist/Republican community they came from were demonized. This demonization quickly led to violence, as it did for many other young people, mostly men, on both sides of our conflict. By the time I was twelve years old I was fighting on the riot lines against those I saw as my enemy, and the enemy of my community and the way of life we valued. In response to the on-going violence, at the age of fourteen I joined a violent Loyalist paramilitary organization, believing that neither the police nor the British Armed Forces were able to effectively protect us. To be honest – even though it is still painful today to admit this – my actions were fueled by fear and hatred and the desire to inflict suffering on my enemies (Little and Scott 2009). (It is not possible to do justice here to the messy mixture of fear, violence from the enemy, and political manipulation that stoked this hatred and desire for revenge.)

I went to prison when I was 17; I was released at the age of 30. Probably for the first four or five years of almost 13 years of imprisonment I was quite content to be in prison. I was among men who'd been involved in similar acts of violence. Given the demonization of the enemy and our desensitization, we were able to justify to ourselves what we had done, strengthening each other in our belief that our cause was righteous. There was no consideration or even acknowledgement of the suffering

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also tend to refer to those from middle class backgrounds. The terms 'Loyalist' and 'Republican' include the above layers of meaning, but tend to refer to those with a working class identification and typically has the further connotation of those who are or have been willing to use violence or physical force to pursue their ideals. For instance, Alistair Little would mostly be seen as a 'Loyalist', though his political views are Unionist, his religious background is Protestant, and his cultural identity is British.

of the enemy: in fact, I felt superior to my enemy seeing them as less than human, certainly less human than I was. These feelings were shared by my peers in prison. We were separated in prison into our different political categories, so there was very little contact with those that we saw as the enemy. In the process, and with the conflict still raging outside prison, the demonization of the enemy and our exclusive awareness of our own suffering – what had been done to us – were reinforced.

My early understanding of forgiveness was formed by the fact that I grew up in a Christian home and as a young person had a strong belief that "God was a Protestant." My thinking was that "if God was a Protestant and I was a Protestant, then He was on our side" – and, therefore, in terms of any wrongdoing that I might be involved in or any questions around the violence and the need for forgiveness, "I would be okay with God because we were the good guys." A number of things happened while I was in prison that led me to begin to question these beliefs. For example, I once saw prison guards – "screws" (the common enemies of all prisoners) – laughing and rubbing their hands because the Irish Republican Army leader Bobby Sands had died on hunger strike. I remember that their laughter made me angry. I remember attacking the prison guards verbally, saying "Bobby Sands had more courage than you would ever have!" I remember going back to my cell, disturbed and thinking "Why am I defending Bobby Sands, someone who's my enemy?"

Working through those feelings I asked myself the question, "Could you starve yourself to death for something that you believe in?" Now, my ego and intellect wanted to say "yes", but in my heart I knew that the answer was "no" – that it takes a special type of human being to starve oneself to death for something that they believe in. For me it wasn't about what I thought of Bobby Sands or what he stood for – it was a recognition of his courage. In recognizing the courage of an enemy, I was recognizing, for the first time, his humanity. This recognition of his

humanity, in turn, helped to rekindle my own humanity, which had been desensitized by violence and hatred before I went into prison.

3. Beyond demonization

The rekindling of my own humanity via the recognition of the humanity of my enemy contributed to my questioning further the use of violence and thinking more deeply about the suffering of the enemy. But in doing so – even simply considering the suffering of my enemy – I felt that I was betraying who I was. With the benefit of hindsight I now see that this early and unwanted consideration of enemy suffering, this unexpected glimmer of empathy, was an important step on what became a risky journey of internal transformation. It was a journey without clarity about where I was heading, and I often grappled with powerful feelings of betrayal and confusion and painful, lonely, isolating, fearful awakenings of my own humanity.

Looking back, I appreciate that the seeds for this journey were planted in prison and included conversations about peace and the peace process with men who had actually been engaged in violence. But at the time, I had no understanding that even just thinking about the suffering of the enemy was for me the beginning of "reconciliation", an opening up of the possibility of "reconciliation." I certainly did not understand this process in terms of "forgiveness." It was only much later, when looking back, that I realized that for me the questioning of violence and beginning of considering the suffering of my enemy were really the first steps on my journey beyond demonization and desensitization.

The word "reconciliation" remains for me a very hard thing to describe or to define. But I know what it feels and looks like from my journey of rehumanizing former enemies and myself: it begins with going into a room with your enemy simply to score political points, to state your

story, not to listen to theirs. Eventually, months and repeated meetings later, you might make eye contact. Then you might simply nod your head when you're making eye contact. Months and months down the line, you may actually use someone's name, and ask how they're doing. You may then find yourself sitting in a circle and knowing inside yourself that you agree with what your enemy is saying, but you're not going to acknowledge that publicly, given how that would be perceived in your own community. Eventually you come to the place where you're trying to be true to yourself as a human being – you're thinking about risk-taking in relation to "reconciliation" and "peace building," realising that others (including the young Alistair) would not be happy. These risks include publicly acknowledging that you actually agree with what has just been said. The most frightening stage is when you begin to realize as a human being that you actually like this person. But what do you do with that? How do you acknowledge that you like a former enemy, when you're still living in your community, where many people still believe in violence and who weren't on that inner journey?

4. Complexity of forgiveness in practice

"Forgiveness" is a term I use with caution because of my personal journey and my experience as a peace practitioner who places an emphasis on storytelling between former combatants and victims/survivors (Little and Verwoerd 2013; Senehi 2002). In NI today, there are many former combatants who now have strong working relationships. They work on important projects together, and form friendships, but there has never been talk about the need for "forgiveness." Forgiveness between former politically motivated combatants simply is not an issue. They had been involved in a war, they had done nothing wrong, so there's no need to acknowledge it or anything to be

forgiven for. But for victims or survivors of the conflict, the denial of the need for forgiveness is very difficult. They hear the words of those who are responsible for their pain and suffering but don't even seem to recognize any wrongdoing.

The issue of recognizing wrongdoing brings me to the complex role of religion in forgiveness, especially in NI. If someone comes from a strong Protestant Reformed faith, as I do, forgiveness can be offered only if there is acknowledgement of wrongdoing, genuine repentance, a change in attitude and behavior. And because in NI forgiveness tends to be viewed primarily as a religious concept, many people who do not have a faith or who do not believe in God feel that forgiveness has nothing to do with them, and, therefore, conversations around "forgiveness" tend not to happen. Another complication comes from the potential for faith-based forgiveness to be experienced as emotional blackmail: many people I work with no longer attend church on a regular basis because they were told that "as a good Christian, you must offer forgiveness as part of your faith." At the time, however, they did not feel ready to forgive and many lost their connection with the church, with some even talking about a sense of betrayal by their church.

It is, of course, not only the language of "reconciliation" and "forgiveness" that is complicated. I've used the terms "combatants" and "victims" or "survivors" above, which are also very controversial in NI. There is a questioning of who the (real) victims are, leading to what has been called a hierarchy of victims – with "innocent victims", who did not "deserve" their suffering at the top and (non-state) combatants, who deserve any suffering as a result of their actions, at the bottom. There are also questions about who the perpetrators are – simply the men who were engaged in paramilitary organizations, or those who went to prison. What about those who supplied information, washed or burnt clothes after an act of violence, gave financial aid or

collected money, or doctors who treated paramilitaries so that they wouldn't have to go to hospital? What about the governments, what about the institutions such as the churches, who in different ways directly and indirectly contributed to sectarianism and violent conflict? While one must be careful not to justify the actions of those who, like me, were engaged in violence, there is also a need to guard against the demonization and scapegoating of certain people and groups in the context of a deeply rooted political conflict (Verwoerd and Little 2008). Thus, the contested and multi-layered nature of "victims" and "perpetrators" also makes the issue of forgiveness and reconciliation much more complex (Govier and Verwoerd 2004).

Given the complications referred to above it is not surprising that in my experience as a peace practitioner (public) forgiveness in the Northern Irish context has been problematic. Let me mention a few examples. In one case, a person was killed and, immediately the father publicly said that he forgave the killers. People were shocked, disturbed, and angry. Some said that the father's forgiveness cheapened the notion of forgiveness, that it undermined justice, and that it encouraged the killers to continue their actions because, having been offered forgiveness, they had nothing to worry about. So, in this case the offering of forgiveness in public caused a huge outcry. On the other hand, there were a number of questions raised by these strong reactions: Does another person have the right to comment on an individual whose son has been killed and who offers forgiveness as part of his journey of dealing with his grief? What is it about one individual who offers forgiveness that angered and upset people? Perhaps the reaction comes from the feeling that the example is one that they couldn't follow and, therefore, made them less of a person.

The second example was a mother whom I worked with as part of the storytelling or sharing of life histories work that I do with victims and former combatants. This

mother, whose husband had been shot dead and who had reached a stage in her personal journey where she was considering participating in a life histories workshop, was told by her daughter: "If you step into that room with the men who represents the organization that killed my father, if you even consider going into the room, you are no longer my mother. If you do that you betray my father." What does that mother do? What does that daughter need? This example highlights the long term impact of a violent death on the family and loved ones – not only did those responsible kill a husband and a father, they also contributed to the possible further destruction of the family because of the mother's consideration of forgiveness and the daughter's being at a different place in her journey and inability to accept it. Unfortunately forgiveness can be a highly destructive process that can destroy families. I remember saying that to a minister in the church one day and he looked at me aghast, saying "how can forgiveness be a destructive process?" The destructive potential of forgiveness is something that he hadn't even considered, but this is what ordinary people on the ground are struggling with every day.

Another woman put this struggle of living forgiveness to me as follows: "I regret that I offered forgiveness; I feel I betrayed my loved one; I think I've betrayed my loved one." And a few months later she returned and said: "I feel okay with it again. I'm okay now. I can make sense of it. I don't regret it." But a few weeks later, the smell of food reminds her of her loved one, or a song on the radio, or something said in a conversation, and once again, she was plunged into this doubt and this turmoil about having offered forgiveness. Does that make the forgiveness that she offered real or not? Or is that lived experience a reflection of what forgiveness is really about –that it is not a place that you go to, that it is something you try and struggle to live with on a regular basis, while still carrying your memories and your pain and your loss?

The third, very public example I want to mention briefly is a recent TV series, involving encounters between victims and former combatants and chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. I was involved in the early stages of this programme and was going to participate myself. However, I quickly withdrew, as did a number of other people, once it became obvious that this was going to be a dangerous, overly choreographed, sensationalist process, without adequate preparation and support for participants and their families, and with undue pressure on participants to "reconcile", to shake hands. When the series of encounters were broadcasted there were people who were watching the television at home, who saw for the first time the person that was responsible for killing their father. They were not informed that the programme was going to be shown. They rung a help line and all they got was an answering machine.

Of course, people outside of NI were amazed – "here are men who had killed, facing people who had lost loved ones – how wonderful is that!" Many outsiders thought it was a very successful and very powerful programme. However, in my experience (and having talked with many others) it was quite destructive in NI.

Moving from "public forgiveness" to a more personal level again, I would stress that in my own life and with regard to my own violent past actions, I also continue to struggle with questions around forgiveness. I believe that I am not entitled to ask for forgiveness. I don't think that a person who perpetrated violence on a family has the right to go to that family without being asked. Without them requesting such a meeting, there is a risk that their suffering could be increased. My experience has been that most people who ask for forgiveness, are driven more by their need to move on rather than being concerned about the family's needs. I think forgiveness is a gift. If forgiveness is offered, that's different. But I don't think someone engaged in violence has the right to ask for it.

The implication is that to some extent I can never have inner peace. This lack of inner peace is something that I have to carry for the rest of my life. I've learned to come to terms with that so that I'm still able to function, and work and have a life, but it is something that is always there. And there is a part of me that feels that there is a justice in this lack of inner peace, so I don't complain.

I think there is a positive side to that human cost as well. At times, when I get angry or get into conflict, I'm always aware of that lack of inner peace, which reminds me of the consequences of violence, to not go down that road again, to find a different way of resolving that conflict. So I'm always aware of the pain that I caused, and this awareness prevents me from causing more.

My own pain and my own consciousness of the pain that I caused enable me to do the work that I do, to go into dangerous places in order to try and resolve conflict. I thus use my life experience to try and work with other people to help them to move away from violence by understanding the human cost involved.

5. A need for humility

I think my personal and work experience highlight the problems that can be caused by those who insist – without enough humility – on defining "reconciliation" or "forgiveness." If someone had come along and told me in prison that I was talking about reconciliation when I was thinking and feeling my way through those strange, initial thoughts and feelings of change arising from beginning to consider the suffering of my enemy, I would have resisted and turned away from what was happening inside of me. So, a sense of timing and place is important, coupled with humility in our use of language given what human transformation can cost an individual, a family, a group, a community or society in general.

I also have come to understand that people who reject the terminology of forgiveness, for example those without a faith base, nevertheless do talk about the reality of forgiving in a different way. “Letting go” or a willingness to engage with others they would not have engaged with before, stepping into the room with others to listen or to deepen understanding without agreeing with, all the things that people would never have considered doing before, all the little or maybe not so small changes that take place. Some call these steps “forgiveness” but I tend to think of it as “change.” This change – in the ways we look at ourselves and our enemies, individually and collectively – sometimes happens to us unintentionally; it often comes out of something else we are engaged in, and often we can be surprised by it.

I am grateful that my work has also taught me more. I've personally experienced that those who have suffered the most, tend to be those that are most gracious, the most willing to reach their hand out, even to me. Those that often tend to be the most bitter or the most resistant towards peace are those that haven't suffered as much as those that have lost loved ones. I've had people that have shaken my hand, people who have come up and hugged me who have lost loved ones, and they've said to me that they never thought in all of their lives that they'd be able to do that. They've sent me cards, phoned me, thanking me for the work I've done with them, and all of them have suffered and lost loved ones. These experiences have been very humbling.

6. Wilhelm Verwoerd: Another practitioner perspective

My (Verwoerd’s) first in depth experience as a practitioner was working as a researcher within the SA TRC, from 1996-1998. My second experience, from 2002 to 2012,

was as a NGO[40] co-ordinator and facilitator of workshops with former combatants, victim-survivors and members of wider society connected with the conflict in and about NI. The SA TRC – a national, large scale, "top-down" process – was probably one of the most public and the most publicized international processes of dealing with "reconciliation" and "forgiveness" thus far. In contrast, most of my work surrounding the conflict in and about NI was about sensitive, behind-the-scenes, confidential, "bottom-up" engagements and relationship cultivation.

Thus, my journey over the last almost 20 years has to some extent been a move from the public to the private. It has also been a journey from a South African process where the language of truth, reconciliation, forgiveness, justice, held a very public and prominent – though contested – place (Verwoerd 2007; Govier and Verwoerd 2002c), to a context where Alistair and I tend to avoid using concepts such as "reconciliation" and "forgiveness."

Given the negative baggage that typically comes with those words in the context of NI, we try to use different concepts, such as "humanization;" we focus on the need for "understanding," of "finding creative, non-violent ways of dealing with difference;" we talk about "journeying through conflict."

Having had this experience of both working in the TRC and working with Alistair and others linked to the conflict in and about NI, I find it quite challenging to reflect on the theme of "public forgiveness." In addition to the points that Alistair has made about the need for caution and humility regarding the language of forgiveness and victims-survivors – with which I agree – I therefore would like to reflect on one example from our joint work that to some extent can be seen as a process that includes "public forgiveness."

(The focus here is not on a more obvious meaning of "public" namely "by public representative(s)." For a

[40] NGO stands for Non-Governmental Organization.

philosophical exploration of this meaning of "public forgiveness" as expressed in the SA TRC and especially the prominent role of Archbishop Tutu in this regard, see Verwoerd (2007). In the latter exploration I draw on distinctions and insights arising from work with Govier (Govier and Verwoerd, 2002c; 2002d; 2011). These distinctions include the secular, conceptual exploration of the affective, temporal, ethical reframing and release aspects of 'forgiveness;' plus they separate forgiveness from 'reconciliation.' Distinctions between unilateral forgiveness, bilateral forgiveness and unilateral forgiveness initiatives, with attention to how these processes can or cannot be applied at individual/small group and large group or collective levels, have also been helpful. And I drew on distinctions between primary, secondary, and tertiary 'victims.' These distinctions, amongst other things, led me to a cautious conclusion that Archbishop Tutu's passionate advocacy for forgiveness as Chairperson of the SA TRC can also be interpreted as a unilateral forgiveness initiative, at a national level, on behalf of tertiary victims.)

7. A highland journey through conflict

Drawing on decades of our own conflict experiences (Verwoerd 1997, Little and Scott 2009) and many years of working together Alistair and I gradually developed a small group conflict transformation process entitled "Journey through Conflict" (Little and Verwoerd 2013). This carefully facilitated process weaves the sharing of life histories ("storytelling"), deep dialogue, and nature-based activities together, and includes individual and group preparation and follow-up activities.

The selection of groups of ten to fifteen participants is guided by the search for as much as possible inclusivity and diversity in terms of conflict experience, cultural-political and regional backgrounds, gender, and

age. Unless there is a need for "single identity" work, we include those who have been directly engaged in armed conflict (former combatants from state and non-state backgrounds), those directly affected (victim-survivors) from Irish, Northern Irish/British, and English backgrounds, as well as representatives of key parts of broader society (such as business, education, churches).

We have found that this kind of inclusivity allows us to work with complexity – having multiple voices in a group makes it more difficult to stick to simplistic oppositional categories of "us" and "them." In the process there is more room to look beyond rigid conflict labels and generalizing stereotypes, and thus to humanise relationships (Verwoerd 2006; Halperin and Weinstein 2004).

The ideal process allows for a series of residential workshops, including venues that are relatively remote and away from the glare of publicity and other everyday distractions or conflict associations. This series of engagements provides opportunities for former enemies to humanize their relationships, for participants from opposing conflict backgrounds to deepen their understanding of each other and of themselves, and hopefully to come to some point where they are willing to work together back home, in their own communities.

Throughout many years of doing this kind of work we have been very cautious about publicity – generally no cameras or even observation has been allowed. On one occasion, relatively early on, we did allow a group process to be filmed in order to develop an educational resource for wider use.

Despite extensive consultation with all involved, the filmmakers did not stick to the agreement. This significantly added to the difficulties of a tension-filled process that included a group from opposing backgrounds, with different needs and levels of trauma.

Around 2008 we were approached by a Japanese documentary team who were interested in trying to capture

something about the process of reconciliation in NI. We expressed our strong reservations about allowing filming, but after extensive discussions we agreed on the following: we would select a group that agrees from the start to be filmed; there will be a strict agreement, including with participants, about how the documentary team would operate to minimize interference with what had to be an authentic process; the documentary will only be shown in Japan.

Alistair and I proceeded with the selection of 10 people, who all agreed to the making of the documentary. For some, this was an opportunity for the loss of loved ones to be more widely acknowledged; others wanted to be part of getting a message out about the difficulties of dealing with the legacy of violent conflict. For those with local security concerns it was vital that the documentary was restricted to Japanese television. We then co-facilitated a Journey through Conflict process, including preparation and follow-up meetings in NI and five day workshop in a remote house in the Scottish Highlands. The whole process was successfully filmed.

This group included Gerard, who is from a Catholic background. In the 1970s two of his brothers were lured away by Protestant "friends" in their workplace to go and play cards in a Protestant neighbourhood. Both brothers ended up being shot dead by the UVF, the organization that Alistair belonged to. This family experience of trust being brutally betrayed made it very difficult for Gerard to accept our invitation – based on a recommendation from his victim's support group – to go away with us to a remote place in the Scottish Highlands. But he also felt that his brothers' deaths were never given the full acknowledgement and public recognition that some other victims were getting. So, for the sake of his brothers and his family, he wanted to be part of a process where there was a public dimension to it. We also made it very clear to him that this process was not about

reconciliation or forgiveness; it was about deepening understanding, it was about humanization.

He arrived in the process with a visible cloud hanging over his face. One could see that here is a person who after all these years is still sitting with the trauma, with the heaviness, with the shadow hanging over him. He displayed little emotion, his face looked quite dead. Through being given the space to share his life experiences, and to listen deeply to what others were saying - and in his case for the first time hearing what someone with Alistair's Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) background was saying – through this process one could actually see something starting to change in him.

At some point, the Japanese documentary team asked Alistair to sit next to Gerard over lunch, but Alistair replied: "No, this is not what this is about. If it happens it happens, but I'm not going to be part of a forced process." We thus respected the slowness of that kind of inner journeying, but over time something visibly changed in Gerard. By the time we returned home there was light back in his face, his skin colour changed. He talked in the group about feeling some relief from a deadening numbness that he was carrying for 30 years. And during the last group meal in Scotland, Gerard, by choice, did end up sitting next to Alistair.

During a follow-up interview at home he and his wife responded as follows to questions about the meaning of what happened in the Highlands, and about forgiveness:

> Q: Gerard, could you describe what the trip to Scotland has meant to your life?
> G: It was a type of relief that I could actually sit with people, especially people from a UVF background… that I could sit quite comfortably with him [Alistair] and respect him as being an ordinary individual. I could understand how they became involved and why these things happened. It happened on both sides obviously. Okay, there's nothing you can do about the past; it's happened – even though we still live with the

consequences. I was very impressed with Alistair's story and him being so totally truthful, and honest, and not holding anything back, which was good for me. He was aware that what he was saying could hurt me but I think he must have known in the back of his head that if he held anything back it wouldn't heal me in anyway. So he did me good by being truthful and honest.

Q: How would you tell your two brothers about the Scotland trip?
G: I don't think I would know how to explain it to them. I possibly would say that it was terrible that they had to be murdered but hopefully through their murders, that something good can come out of it for everybody else.

Q: Kathleen, how would you explain what has happened to Gerard to his two brothers?
K: Well, Gerard loved his two brothers. And to forgive the people that murdered the two boys must be very hard for Gerard. But I think he came a long way. Gerard has come a long way with this forgiveness. And I hope the two brothers forgive us, for forgiving the people that done it. And I'm sure they will. John and Thomas will forgive us. Because we worried a lot; we've been through a lot with their murder. Now it's time to let them two be in peace.

Q: Gerard, do you think you have forgiven the people who murdered your brothers?
G: I suppose I would say 'yes I do'. It's hard to say that. As I said, from the start, I didn't really feel… I felt numb and I still do feel that bit of numbness, but I've a better understanding. It was just unfortunate that … if it hadn't have been them two, it would've have been two other people. You just have to accept it, and try and get on with life and forgive people. That whole Scottish experience just brought it home to me, made it very clear that we can forgive… I'll not say forget but try to forget. I can never forget John and

> Thomas. But I just have to put it out of my head that they're not here. They're in heaven. And the people that done it just didn't know any better at the time.
>
> Q: Kathleen how do you feel now?
> K: Relieved that this is another part of our lives that we can move on with. Because to me, Scotland done something for Gerard that I couldn't do because I didn't know what to do. Relieved that Gerard has let go of part of the hurt and the awful feelings that he has went through life with. And, please God, we will move on, and be peaceful.

The Japanese team also asked Alistair, "Would you say you're sorry when you get the chance to meet with Gerard?' and he said "only if it is appropriate, but I would be willing to say 'I'm really sorry for what happened to your brothers'." This illustrates a complexity regarding the sincerity, proper process and timing of both private and public apologies that Govier and Verwoerd (2002a, 2002d) highlighted in their discussion of the 'promise and pitfalls' of apologies and in their cautious defence of public apologies.

In March 2009 the group met again and in a moving session looked together at the documentary produced for Japanese television, entitled "Beyond hatred – the journey of reconciliation from the Troubles in NI." The two Japanese translators were also present and they gave feedback and shared the audience reports from the multiple times that the documentary had been shown. We received a translated copy of this written feedback, including encouraging statements such as these:

> *Female / 39 / Freelance / Tokyo*
>
> The documentary made me consider violence in general. I realized nothing could be solved by violence. Their physical journey might be only a little light in the dark but it is a fantastic challenge. I know it's not enough to solve all the problems but I also

> know nothing could be done unless they stop fighting each other. I think that we should have more time to talk in school / at home since childhood. Once it becomes a habit, it will spread to the family, friends, and society. Then it may also spread to the peace process after all. It was a rewarding documentary and greatly contributed towards non-violence.

Even though they never directly talked about forgiveness and "sorry" wasn't said explicitly, Gerard and Alistair have been working together since their return from that Scottish Highlands Journey.

The initiative for working together, publicly, came from Gerard. In early 2010 he invited Alistair onto a panel, in his local community, a strongly Republican (Catholic) part of West Belfast. As part of Gerard's initiative to bring the message that it's possible to work together with someone from the other side into the public arena within his own community, the local media was invited into that process.

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Orangeman shares platform with ex-IRA man, ex-UVF man and victim

Four different stories told at Cloona House discussion

BY CIARA QUINN

THEY say that many issues can be resolved if people just sit down and get around the table.

On a cold and grey Thursday evening last week, Cloona House opened its doors to a former republican and loyalist prisoner, an Orangeman and a community worker who lost loved ones in the conflict.

In a question and answer session, potential ways forward for the local and wider communities were discussed, as each person told their story and how the journey from conflict to reconciliation can be achieved through dialogue and discussion.

The panel included republicans, ex-prisoner and West Tyrone MP Pat Doherty, who served time for his part in the killing of two British corporals during the funeral of IRA volunteer Counahan O'Brien in 1988. Former UVF member Alistair Little, who joined the paramilitary organisation at age 18, Orange Order member John Mathers, and Director of Cloona House, Gerard McKee.

IT'S GOOD TO TALK: Barry McElduff, whose two brothers were shot dead by the UVF in Mount Vernon in 1975; Alistair Little, former UVF prisoner; John McBride, an Orangeman, and Seán Lemass, former republican prisoner speaking

8. An example of "public forgiveness"

The above overview is a brief summary of what happened within Gerard and in particular between him and Alistair during a specific Journey through Conflict process. (I am not suggesting that a "cloud" did not return to hang over Gerard, but three to four years later, as part of a longitudinal research project, he still talked very positively about this Highland experience. See Hamber, Little and Verwoerd, forthcoming.)

Sharing this on-going journey with both of them helped to restore my conviction that this kind of "public forgiveness" process is indeed possible, partly because we managed to avoid the pitfalls pointed out earlier by Alistair. This was a genuine, bottom-up, carefully facilitated, small scale process that allowed change to grow and eventually bear fruit; it wasn't a top-down process, it didn't put undue pressure on anybody (Verwoerd 2008). Furthermore, in terms of the "public"

nature of forgiveness, a number of important distinctions emerge from this example:

8.1. Making the private public

In this example an essentially private process (rooted in the conflict in and about NI) was made public in Japan through a careful and extensive process of prior discussion, selection of participants, and on-going attention to the relationships among everyone involved. As facilitators a lot of effort went into making sure that the documentary team understood the process, and stuck to our agreement. Where appropriate, we included them in the process – for example we gave them opportunities to also introduce themselves in some depth, and they were invited to join the group during meal times in Scotland. This further encouraged their sensitivity to the process and the group, and helped participants to be more relaxed in the presence of the filming team.

In terms of more tricky local publicity, the initiative was taken by a victim-survivor to organize a public meeting and to include local media. The active support and involvement of participants in the process, and respect for their agency and consent, allowed international and local media to be used, without any damage (that we are aware of) being caused in the process. In these ways a small-scale, interpersonal process could be taken into a much bigger public realm (Little and Verwoerd 2013).

One meaning of "public forgiveness" thus has something to do with making the private public by using the media in a carefully facilitated way that respects the complexity and the humility of the process.

8.2 Making the public personal

The example used here also highlights the potential of making the public personal. At the public meeting in

Gerard's community he was sitting in the front, next to Alistair, and they both shared not only something about their life experiences but also talked about their recent experience in Scotland. Both were honest about their inner journeys – their thoughts and feelings, their struggles and breakthroughs along the way. They spoke from the heart.

There were 40-50 people in the audience. For many this was the first opportunity to see a victim-survivor from their own community sitting next to someone from the "other community," who used to be part of the organization responsible for their community member's bereavement. For many it was the first time to hear someone like Alistair and someone like Gerard speak from the same platform and in the way they did. During the question and answer time and in follow-up conversations a number of people talked about how deeply moving and encouraging this panel discussion was.

This audience response points to what a South African TRC colleague, Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, describes as the need to "make public spaces intimate." (Gobodo-Madikizela 2008) In other words, it is important to find ways to bring the personal into the public realm, because this kind of (careful) exposure to individual, human experiences has the potential to touch people at a deeper level, and thus to encourage more openness and a greater willingness to try and understand. And in the process a positive ripple effect in the community and beyond is often created.

8.3 Direct and indirect forgiveness

The Highland Journey example also brings a further important distinction to the fore, namely between indirect and direct forgiveness. As stated before, in our Journey through Conflict work the focus is not specifically on forgiveness or reconciliation. The language of forgiveness (and saying sorry) was eventually used in interviews with the Japanese documentary team, but not in the face to face

interactions between, for example, Gerard and Alistair. The process thus had an indirect quality – allowing understanding and deepening human connection to grow, without putting pressure on anyone to "forgive" or "reconcile".

The need for indirectness is poetically alluded to by the Irish poet-philosopher-priest, John O'Donohue, when he talks about the need to respect the "shyness of the soul." "The soul," he says "is shy. If it sees you coming after it, it will do a runner and be gone in a crevice" (O'Donohue 1997). This challenging notion of the "shyness" of the "soul" – that innermost part of who we are as human being – has been one of the guiding principles in Journey through Conflict work, in our approach to facilitation and programme design.

O'Donohue uses further helpful metaphors in this regard when he warns against the "neon light" of modern, scientific consciousness. He likens this neon light to the "harsh and brilliant white light of a hospital operating theatre" which is "too direct and clear to befriend the shadowed world of the soul. It is not hospitable to what is reserved and hidden." He is drawn instead to the reverential quality of "candlelight" when approaching the unique "mystery and depth of the individual soul." Candlelight "is ideal light to befriend the darkness, it gently opens up caverns in the darkness and prompts the imagination into activity" (O'Donohue 1997, 109-110).

In our experience there is a reserved, "soulful" quality to interpersonal forgiveness and reconciliation. Thus there is a need for processes that respect the sensitivity, the fragility of human relationships, especially when traumatized people are involved; processes that use more candlelight than spotlight; processes that are more indirect than direct.

The above example from a particular Journey through Conflict process thus illustrates that it is indeed challenging to make this deeply personal, typically private kind of process public. Neither is it simple to make public

spaces personal or intimate. The media and public spaces typically have a glare, a "spotlight" feel to them. However, the example given here does show that this kind of "public forgiveness" is actually possible. The promise of forgiveness, in public or in private, is real – as long as we remain deeply mindful of the many pitfalls along the way.

7. Giving Up, Expecting Hope, and Moral Transformation

KATHRYN J. NORLOCK

Summary: Trudy Govier (FR) argues for "conditional unforgivability," yet avers that we should never give up on a human being. She not only says it is justifiable to take a "hopeful and respectful attitude" toward one's wrongdoers, she indicates that it is wrong not to; she says it is objectionable to adopt an attitude that any individual is "finally irredeemable" or "could never change," because such an attitude "anticipates and communicates the worst" (137). Govier's recommendation to hold a hopeful attitude seems to follow from one's knowing that an appropriate object of unforgivability is also an agent capable of moral transformation. I appeal to Blake Myers-Schultz's and Eric Schwitzgebels' account of knowledge without belief, and Schwitzgebels' account of attitudes, to argue that a victim's knowledge that a wrongdoer has the capacities of a moral agent does not entail belief in the possibility that a wrongdoer will exercise those moral capacities, nor does knowledge of a wrongdoer's moral capacities entail hopeful attitudes toward the prospects of an individual wrongdoer's moral transformation. I conclude that what victims can hope for should not be that which victims are held to as a moral minimum.

1. Introduction

I first read Trudy Govier's work on forgiveness fifteen years ago. Her article on "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable" affirmed intuitions I had hesitated to articulate, and provided needed support for work that eventually took the form of my essays for the M.A. degree, my Ph.D. dissertation, and, later, my first monograph. Over the years, I have returned to her compelling work again and again, to agree and to

disagree, to lean on her as a philosophical ally and to question or quarrel with her claims. I'm sure I speak for many of my fellow contributors when I say that her contributions have come to constitute part of the furniture of my mind. In what follows, I move quite a bit of that furniture around and suggest possible improvements to some of its joints, but my arguments should not be taken as reasons to throw it out – something I couldn't do when I rest on it so often. Instead, I aim to engage in the sort of dialectical argumentation that Trudy Govier and I both endorse, occasionally employing minimal adversariality in the course of constructively sorting out our reasons to justify our beliefs.

Trudy Govier argues for the ethical importance of believing that moral transformation is possible for every individual, even unrepentant evildoers. Attitudes that hold anything less than belief in the possibility of others' improvement are "incompatible with moral respect" for other human beings (FR, 137). Hers is a hopeful account of what every person, even one guilty of great crimes, can conceivably do to be a better moral agent. Govier argues that much hope is rational, a sentiment with which I agree (Hope, 240). Yet, when she is advancing the argument that "we should never give up on another human being" (Hope, 140), I find more is required of her readers than agreement with hope's occasional rationality. Govier's suggestion is that it is not only *justifiable* to take and express "a fundamentally hopeful and respectful attitude" toward one's wrongdoers, it is also *objectionable* to adopt an attitude that any individual is "completely and finally irredeemable" or "evil through and through and could never change," because such an attitude "anticipates and communicates the worst" (FR, 137). Govier prescribes an attitude toward even unrepentant wrongdoers that cultivates hope for their moral transformation, implying that giving up hope amounts to a failure to respect them as human moral agents.

But I question whether victims of wrong fail morally when they have no hope for the possibility that wrongdoers will change. In this essay, I clarify the details of Govier's rejection of belief that a wrongdoer *cannot* change, and distinguish the pessimistic belief she rejects from belief that a wrongdoer *will* not change, or that such a change is highly unlikely; the latter beliefs are compatible with what Govier calls "conditional unforgivability" (FR, 102). I analyze Govier's account of belief in moral transformation, and her recommendations with respect to our attitudes toward wrongdoers. At times, it seems Govier argues for a normative expectation which may not necessarily be always available to victims of great harm. "Giving up," depending on what kind of resolution it turns out to be, can be held to be compatible with normative expectations that victims believe in the capacity for moral transformation. I conclude that the complexities inherent in the ethics of expecting victims to cultivate normative attitudes in particular relationships require us to better articulate what attitudes are, and what victims can (and need not) do to cultivate them. I rely on Eric Schwitzgebel's (2013) account of dispositional attitudes to make a case for holding that belief in the logical possibility of moral transformation is consistent with dispositional attitudes of hopelessness or despair. Sometimes it is reasonable to believe in another's commitment to intransigence precisely *because* they have the moral capacities for wrong as well as right.

With Govier, I believe it is both possible and ethical to recommend attitudes, assess attitudes, and expect some to be cultivated by good people. Therefore, in what follows, I do not disagree with Govier's view so much as I develop a clearer picture of the details and ramifications of her view: first, I contextualize Govier's account of the separability of agents from acts, then outline her related view of human nature as capable of moral transformation. I discuss her view of the appropriate

attitudes that others should take toward those in need of transforming—that is, to wrongdoers. I take up her argument that we should never give up on another human being, and I suggest that, at times, Govier bases her account of hopeful attitudes on the possession of beliefs in a way that may risk reducing attitudes to their belief-contents. And I maintain that Eric Schwitzgebel's (2013) view of dispositional attitudes allows for the moral permissibility of what Govier might consider "giving up" on another human being; I find her account of conditional unforgivability to be compatible with an attitude she may seem to hold *prima facie* to be morally wrong. I conclude with my argument that hopelessness or despairing of a particular wrongdoer's moral transformation is not even *prima facie* wrong, and I attribute even more moral importance than Govier seems to grant to her own conception of conditional unforgivability, in light of its coherence with dispositional attitudes of hopelessness or giving up on the moral transformation of others.

2. Agents, acts, and moral transformation

I start at our points of agreement; I share Govier's related views that in principle, individuals are capable of moral transformation, and that it is correct to view human beings as more than, and separate from, their particular acts. What these two claims mean requires some contextualizing. In one way or another, every major contributor to the literature of forgiveness agrees we can separate acts from agents in order to discuss and appraise them. However, the separability of the linguistic concepts of acts and agents is held compatibly with a variety of views regarding the forgivability of individuals. Margaret Holmgren (2012), for example, criticizes retributive theorists who conflate authors of acts with their acts, "and then sit in judgment on the conglomerate" (93), confusing recognition-respect for persons with evaluative respect for their acts (90).

Holmgren, in contrast to retributivists, goes to the extreme of holding that internal attitude-cultivation can be absolutely separable from any facts about the wrongdoer, including whether or not he repents, 'independent of his wrongful behaviour' (67). Yet it is difficult for me to understand why, if the latter view is true, cultivation of forgiveness would be necessary. If the wrongness of acts and wrongdoers' attitudes toward those acts are among the facts that are irrelevant, then there seems nothing to forgive. Reflecting on Holmgren's analysis prompts me to conclude that the relationship of authors to their acts becomes so unhooked as to be meaningless. This does not sound like an account of forgiveness that most people would understand or accept.

Eve Garrard and David McNaughton (2003) apparently agree with me. Against Holmgren's view of the absolute separability of acts and agents, which promotes cultivating attitudes only to agents and never to acts, Garrard and McNaughton argue that "her account does not explain what it is to forgive someone for a particular offence" (2003, 8). They reject her "attitude-focused reasons for action," that is, "reasons for getting oneself into a particular psychological state, in this case the state of having a forgiving attitude" (9). They instead endorse "object-focused reasons," which "reveal the way in which the relationship that actually holds between the victim and the offender makes a forgiving response appropriate" (9). Object-focused forgiveness seems a preferable account to Holmgren's, more consistent with the reasons people tend to forgive or withhold forgiveness; that is, they forgive because they have been wronged. Victims are not incidental to evil acts; they are victims because of what has been done to them. However, Garrard and McNaughton's object-focused account swings too far in the other direction from ignoring acts altogether; their emphasis on attending to "the relationship that actually holds" turns out to be rather close-up, eyes trained on the wrong act in that relationship. The object on which to focus was presumably

the relationship, but the wrongdoing seems to be the sole salient fact about the relationship that Garrard and McNaughton consider. In other words, whereas Holmgren's attitude-focused account of forgiveness ignores acts to focus on agents, Garrard and McNaughton's object-focused approach errs in the direction of over-attentiveness to the wrongdoer's act as the most important aspect of a relationship to the exclusion of other considerations, taking a close look at one thread and losing sight of the fabric that usually makes up relationships between two or more individuals.

Govier's account of the separability of agents and acts seems to hit a more plausible middle ground between these two positions. Like Holmgren, Govier persistently calls her readers' attentions to the "person whom we forgive as a human being not reducible to those deeds and capable of something better" (FR, 110). She keeps firmly in view that those who commit atrocious deeds are properly candidates for responsive attitudes precisely because they are "human beings whose past lives have included evil," but this is not the only fact about them in the relationship that actually holds; the same wrongdoers to whom victim stand in relation are also those "whose future lives are open to new choices" (112). Govier repeats this emphatically: human beings are individual moral agents "capable of deliberation, choice, and originality" (111). Govier's priority of attention to our individuality keeps her from zeroing in on the act to the exclusion of the person. She argues for the logical relationship of agents and acts simultaneously with arguing for their thick contexts, saying, "When we forgive, we distinguish that person, the agent, from the acts, however terrible those acts might have been. There is a logical and ethical distinction between the acts and the agent who committed them" (110).

Govier therefore resists "the idea of absolute unforgivability" (FR, 120). As she understands it, absolute unforgivability is constituted by a view that no conditions

could make it the case that a person currently unforgivable could be a forgivable person in the future. She rejects arguments for fixedness of character; whatever we hold to be true of an unforgivable person capable of moral agency can alter if they commit to moral change. One could argue against this position that it is acts which are unforgivable, but Govier's position is that "we do not forgive deeds; we forgive people who have committed deeds" (109). We may talk of unforgivable acts in colloquial senses, but she persuasively argues "that description is misleading, because it is not deeds that would be forgiven or not forgiven" (109). We may read popular press accounts of someone guilty of murder described as a monster; however, if the person under discussion is a moral agent, then "there is not a compelling argument from the monstrous character of acts to the conclusion that the agent is a monster" (111). We know the past, but we do not know what the future of this person holds. We can ascertain their capacities for choice and deliberation, and when we find them, we ought to recognize that we do not know the future. We do not know all the choices even unrepentant evildoers may come to make. As Govier says in her work on hope, it is impossible to falsify the claim that there's always some basis for hope, but we can also hope for more than just the abstractly possible; "hope can be reasonable and based on arguments for the possibility or probability of distinct positive outcomes" (Hope, 242).

Govier concludes in her reasonable and argument-based way that moral agents are capable of "moral transformation," a variety of moral change based on our capacity "to repent and reform ourselves, and to change our moral character" (FR, 186n23). If one did wrong due to circumstances, one can change one's circumstances or others could take responsibility for changing the circumstances. If one did wrong due to one's decisions and choices, then one can effectively commit to different decisions and choices. "Among the many capacities and habits that human beings can cultivate is the ability to

reflect on the merits of what they are doing and work to change some of their actions and tendencies" (123). Govier's arguments for moral transformation amount to arguments for the metaphysics of personhood itself; "A person has… the present capacity to perceive, feel, think, reflect on his past actions and life, make fresh decisions and commitments, and seek to conform his *future* actions to those fresh resolves" (125).

Her account of personhood shows why Govier is "committed to the universal possibility of moral transformation," and rejects absolute unforgivability. Because of what persons *are*, one can reasonably believe that there is something persons can *do*. "There are, then, many routes to moral transformation. Central to it will be the support of other people, and a philosophical pillar of that support is a grounded conviction that for moral agents, fundamental moral change is possible" (137). Govier recommends that we can and should believe in the possibility of moral transformation. Believing this is compatible, she adds, with "conditional unforgivability," the view that current conditions hold which, if removed, would permit forgiveness (102). Since her account of forgiveness involves distinguishing an agent from his acts, one example of a conditionally unforgivable person is the unrepentant evildoer who strongly identifies *with* his wrong acts. Were he to change, to renounce his wrongdoing and express a new conviction that he ought to cultivate a different character, this would remove the conditions that make the person difficult to forgive (103).

3. Knowing, believing, and cultivating attitudes in giving up on another

These arguments for belief in the possibility of moral transformation and against belief in absolute unforgivability are compellingly established by Govier, who concludes that "[w]e should never give up on another

human being" (140). Attitudes that hold anything less than belief in the possibility of others' improvement are "incompatible with moral respect" for other human beings; adopting the attitude that some "could never change is to anticipate and communicate the worst" (137). Interestingly, Govier holds that even if her metaphysical commitments to personhood are arguable, even if one can imagine counterexamples such as, say, "sane individuals who are impossible projects for moral transformation," her commitment to moral transformation's "possibility could [still] be defended on moral grounds alone" (137).

Victims of serious wrongdoing may not expect this ethical recommendation, and may have feelings of pessimism and disbelief in others already settled; if so, it is important to note that Govier argues victims, like offenders, "are distinct moral agents responsible for their own emotions and their own lives. In the wake of wrongdoing, it is up to victims to handle their own feelings and their own lives" (65). One may have some involuntary emotions about one's suffering at the hands of a wrongdoer, but for Govier, even if some emotions and beliefs are involuntary, it is not the case that all of our emotional experiences are involuntary. I am tempted to resist her suggestion that victims bear responsibility for how they feel, except that in the preceding pages of this article I happily endorsed the arguments that wrongdoers can commit to different convictions and attitudes regarding their own characters and acts. If wrongdoers can change their characters, attitudes, and relationships, then we should be open to the argument that victims of great harm can take some steps toward deciding to adopt morally respectful attitudes. Attitudes can be both decisional and proper objects of evaluation, as Govier says: "Any decision about attitudes, policies, and actions towards perpetrators is a decision about how to regard and treat human beings and must be evaluated as such" (FR, 112).

I agree with Govier that for the above reasons, it is, at a minimum, justifiable to adopt "a fundamentally hopeful and respectful attitude" toward one's wrongdoers, and it is reasonable to recommend that victims of wrongdoing who do not have such an attitude would be morally better actors were they to cultivate such an attitude toward those who wrong them. I am persuaded that it is good to remember that even monstrous deeds can be committed by persons capable of moral change, and that we all probably ought to cultivate attitudes which recognize the capacities of our wrongdoers to be and do better. However, I cannot endorse the view that it is *objectionable* to adopt an attitude that a particular individual is "completely and finally irredeemable" or "evil through and through and could never change," and I am not convinced of the relationship between this attitude and the predictive expectation reflected in Govier's statement that the hopeless attitude "anticipates and communicates the worst" (137).

I agree with Govier's account of personhood as entailing capability for moral transformation, and I see why she argues that we can sensibly recommend victims ought to know such true metaphysical propositions about personhood. I agree that we can even argue victims are wrong to believe something we have grounds to say is false, such as the claim that a wrongdoer's moral transformation is metaphysically impossible. However, I would not go so far as to say that victims fail morally when they adopt pessimistic or hopeless attitudes about the prospects of their wrongdoer's moral change. One may have knowledge without belief, one may have correct and true beliefs which are not the basis of a particular attitude, and one may have attitudes which are predicated on attitudinal content in conflict with those true beliefs. To defend the distinction between a victim's knowledge of a proposition, a victim's belief in a proposition, and a victim's attitude toward a person, I rely on Blake Myers-Schultz's and Eric Schwitzgebel's co-authored account of

knowledge without belief (2013). I then turn to Schwitzgebel's account of dispositional attitudes "outside the belief box" (2013).

Myers-Schultz and Schwitzgebel cite Gilbert Ryle's account of 'know' and 'believe' as "dispositional verbs of quite disparate types. 'Know' is a capacity verb, and a capacity verb of that special sort that is used for signifying that the person described can bring things off, or get things right. 'Believe,' on the other hand, is a tendency verb and one which does not connote that anything is brought off or got right" (quoted in Myers-Schultz and Schwitzgebel 2013). Myers-Schultz and Schwitzgebel provide empirical evidence that respondents to thought experiments consistently distinguish between the same agent knowing P and (not) believing P. They conclude, "it is not *prima facie* obvious that all instances of knowledge are also instances of belief;" instead, "it is as though knowledge requires only having the information stored somewhere and available to be deployed to guide action, while belief requires some consistency in deploying the information (at least dispositionally or counterfactually)" (2013). Knowledge of a true proposition can be on or off. The proposition is true, or it is false. It does not appear that belief follows propositional knowledge so inevitably that one can be held responsible for failing at belief, however. If knowledge does not entail belief, then at times, the knowledge-switch will be set to 'on' while the belief falters.

Belief in the moral transformative powers of unrepentant evildoers starts to sound more like a virtue or an imperfect duty, a view with which I suspect Govier agrees, but which bears further investigation regarding the incompatibility of disbelief with moral respect for all persons. My efforts in the first half of this paper were dedicated to establishing Govier's excellent arguments for a metaphysics of personhood which support the proposition that moral transformation is possible for individual human beings with moral agency. I agree with

the veracity of her view so much that I consider it safe to say I know it to be true: If moral agents are equal to the set of just those individuals capable of moral transformation, then I know moral agents are capable. This is a statement of equivalence packed with moral import, because its content is too tempting to ignore when one is in pain. If one is morally wronged, then one's wrongdoer is, by definition, capable of moral transformation. Yet even as I know that, I am inclined to agree with Myers-Schultz and Schwitzgebel that knowledge does not entail belief, that the former may be a propositional bit of information while the latter reflects "a tendency to succeed" (Myers-Schultz 2013). To believe is to carry one's knowledge forward into situations; it is to bring it off, to get its application right in the presence of competing information. If so, then a failure to believe what I know is not a moral failure. A prescription regarding what victims ought to believe amounts to a recommendation to carry forward a practice which it is not entirely up to victims to succeed at tending to do; more importantly, it is not a moral failure in one's respect for personhood, which one can know one ought to bear, regardless of what one believes over time.

For related reasons, attitudes are difficult to contain in inner landscapes; as Schwitzgebel says, "To have an attitude is, at root, to live a certain way… It is to have, in general though probably only imperfectly, a certain profile of outward behavior and inner experience, … to embody a certain broad-ranging actual and counterfactual pattern of activity and reactivity" (2013). Attitudes are not internal representations written in a "Belief Box," Schwitzgebel says, but come with postures and patterns of behavior in the world, and he argues this account for both propositional attitudes (in the set of which he includes believing and hoping) and reactive attitudes (in the set of which he includes resenting, forgiving, and being angry). If knowledge does not entail belief, then belief does not entail appropriate attitudes, and Schwitzgebel rejects as 'misleading' the view that an attitude is "a matter

of possessing some particular internally stored representational content, a content perhaps poised to play some specific set of cognitive roles depending on the attitude type." Instead of holding that to have an attitude is to have a relationship to a belief, Schwitzgebel argues that to have an attitude is to have, "though probably only imperfectly, a certain profile of outward behavior and inner experience… to embody a certain broad-ranging actual and counterfactual pattern of activity and reactivity" (2013).

I do not imagine that Govier would disagree overmuch with this description of attitudes, as correlative and not coextensive with one's knowledge and one's beliefs, in light of Govier's brief but sensitive depiction of *conditional unforgivability*. Her view of this attitude appears to be entirely compatible with the way that Schwitzgebel characterizes attitudes:

> There are indeed enormous psychological and moral obstacles to the forgiveness of very serious wrongs. These obstacles stem both from the appalling nature of those wrongs and from the cruel suffering of the victims. When atrocities are committed, the insults to humanity and moral principles is profound and deeply disturbing. In such a context, it is difficult to gain a sense of the wrongdoer as a person, difficult to comprehend how anyone could do such things… It may be virtually impossible for 'ordinary people' to feel empathy with such offenders – even though there is in the end some basis of common humanity. We may rightly regard a perpetrator as conditionally unforgivable if that perpetrator has not acknowledged, and does not morally regret, the wrongdoing…Failure to forgive perpetrators in these circumstances expresses our conviction that those acts, and any person still identified with them, are profoundly evil. To deny sympathy and empathy to such perpetrators, to wish to disassociate ourselves from them and avoid any implication that we might

> condone those acts is an understandable human response. (FR, 117-118)

In this passage, Govier's account of conditional unforgivability is entirely consistent with Schwitzgebel's account of dispositional attitudes; patterns of activity and reactivity are understood in a context in which a particular victim responds to a particular wrongdoer.

However, it now seems that a victim with the attitude of conditional unforgivability is not doing something objectionable; holding an attitude that someone is conditionally unforgivable seems highly compatible with the reasoning of a victim of atrocity who knows that persons are capable of moral transformation, but does not, at this time, believe *this* wrongdoer capable of it. The attitude that the perpetrator of an atrocity is hopelessly committed to unrepentant disregard, and offers one no prospects for believing otherwise, no longer seems to "presume that he is nothing more – and is worth nothing more – than his wrongful deeds," even if the victim does assume that a particular unrepentant is never going to change (FR, 64). It seems unreasonable of us to expect hope from a victim of wrongdoing that a particularly unrepentant evildoer will exercise capacities for moral transformation. The knowledge that he *can* change does not entail that it is false to believe that he will never change, or to adopt an attitude that it is hopeless, that one's ongoing ways of living in the world simply cannot include the unrepentant evildoer. As Margaret Urban Walker (2006) says, hope can "die the natural death of exhaustion in the face of waning possibilities," and can even be killed (59). Walker identifies "hope's points of vulnerability," including "the real possibility (non-zero probability, less than certainty) of what is hoped for" (60), and here I take her to include not only normative expectations that humans can act as moral agents, but predictive expectations as well.

Govier's moral grounds for rejecting absolute unforgivability rest rightly on metaphysical accounts of personhood as well as normative expectations that we correctly hold people responsible for acting as we know they can and should. The practices of belief and attitude, however, are concrete and specific to particular relationships with individual wrongdoers, and one that announces his commitment to carry on unrepentantly wishing he'd finished the job of killing a victim's family gives the victim evidence of waning possibilities. The belief that all humans are capable of moral transformation, the normative expectation based on a reliable proposition, can in particular cases be held compatibly with adopting an attitude that an actual, particular wrongdoer is never going to change. I hold this is not a failure of respect for his moral agency. Instead, it is a dispositional attitude that informs the way this victim lives in the world; it may take the form of disassociating with this person, denying him sympathy, or refusing condonation of his acts, because of one's predictive expectations and not one's normative expectations. What I am attempting to describe is a form of relational hopelessness which gives up on another human being, not because one no longer believes he has capacities, but because one sees no prospects that he will exercise them in one's lifetime. What we can hope for is not that which we should be held to as a moral minimum.

4. Conclusion: Believing in, while giving up

What do we do when we give up on another human being? I mean that literally: What do we *do*? Our actions informed by adopting a despairing attitude toward the moral transformation of an individual are hard to distinguish from the actions Govier describes as justifiable in the context of conditional unforgivability. Imagine that I despair of former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney ever coming around to seeing that his conduct and priorities are

morally bad. He is not getting any younger, and in fact is closer to the average age of death than I am. He routinely continues to appear on television broadcasts and oppose everything from conservation of electricity to feeding starving people. My responses to him include avoiding his broadcasts, expressing rejection of his views, and denying him the sympathy that I give to others. Am I conditionally despairing of him, while retaining a belief in his potential for moral change? I do not believe my attitude toward him is a failure of moral respect for his personhood. I believe that I have powerful predictive expectations that he will never change because he offers me a wealth of experience and evidence. I despair of improvement in my attitude toward him, but I know that he is a capable moral agent. If I didn't know and believe this, I would not resent his continued broadcasting of his views as much as I do. Yet I pronounce myself a believer in the proposition that he will never change in the short time left to him on this earth. I adopt an attitude which ceases to look toward the future.

I do not intend the forgoing to amount to a recommendation for hopelessness with respect to the prospects of all wrongdoers' moral capacities. With Govier, I believe that a receptivity to the possibilities of living together in the future is key to peace. However, I do not believe the forward-looking attitude of hopefulness that others will exercise their moral capacities is always necessary. Optimistic beliefs and hopeful attitudes are not always necessary for moral motivation, and indeed, some philosophers argue for a healthy pessimism that looks away from predictive expectations in order to focus on other goods. One firmly endorsed view of pessimism does not look to outcomes or progress, and instead "asks us to philosophize in its absence" (Dienstag 2009, 18). My own sentiments are captured in the statement that "peacemaking is always specific" (Ruddick 1995, 139). Our attitudes toward a particular evildoer

occur alongside our attitudes toward how we are living with others and with ourselves. What we know, believe and hope may all promote our abilities to continue the perpetual struggle.

Response to My Commentators

TRUDY GOVIER

I wish to express my thanks to all those who have written here about diverse aspects of my work over some forty years and to Cate Hundleby for her organizational and editing work. Those who have generously contributed their time and talent here are busy persons whose thoughtful efforts are greatly appreciated. As a result of their energy and talent, the present volume offers considerable food for thought, with some touching and constructive reflections. Without being able to respond to every interesting interpretation and comment, I will do my best here to consider some major aspects of these essays.

Takuzo Konishi's interest in the development of informal logic since the 1970s shows a close knowledge of the work of many central figures. I greatly appreciate his interest in my work and close attention to it. A major theme of Konishi's study is that in their early phase the theory and practice of informal logic were driven by pedagogical concerns. I of course vividly recall this period and my own intense interest in the field during the 1980s. Our concern that students be able to identify, understand, and assess arguments led quickly to puzzlement and uncertainty about what the appropriate standards were, once we left the terrain of established formal logic. It seemed clear that standard formal logic did not apply plausibly to many natural language arguments; it seemed much less clear just what did apply and what could be said those arguments. Was there a theory to be had, in this area? If so, what was it? Although it is correct to state, as Konishi does, that pedagogy informed my scholarship, I state the point somewhat differently, saying that pedagogy drove at least some of the scholarship in the sense of motivating it. Working with students on natural language examples led

us to pressing questions with no obvious answers. Konishi cites my confession that I have no graduate course credits in formal logic. That, in fact, is something I regret. When I was a graduate student at the University of Waterloo in the late 1960s, there was a renowned course in formal logic offered by Jay Minas. Due to scheduling conflicts, I was unable to take that course, whose legendary status led me to regret its lack. To this day, I feel that regret.

Like Takuzo Konishi, Moira Kloster shows great care and patience exploring developments in informal logic and, in particular, my textbook, *A Practical Study of Argument*. When, in 1983, I signed a contract with Wadsworth, I did not fully grasp the implications of agreeing to write new editions when the publisher felt a need. The weight of that obligation increased over three decades. As users will know, there were six such demands. I cannot claim that each re-writing task was approached with enthusiasm. The text is a large book; in the days when one dealt with physical manuscripts, it amounted to a bulky 1000 pages. In each new edition, I adapted theoretical content in an effort to be sensitive to new interests (as, for instance, in the topics of evaluating Internet material, and considering questions surrounding visual arguments), revised and up-dated examples, and addressed criticisms from instructors, students, and reviewers. Several editions were written in rather trying circumstances. Recalling the many challenges, I especially appreciate the careful attention these editions receive from Moira Kloster. With several editions, I had valuable help from proof-readers and trouble-shooters: let me recall again, for the record, the work of Lowell Ayers, David Boutland, Colin Hirano, Carrie MacWilliams and – most of all – Risa Kawchuk.

Kloster makes the interesting suggestion that I could have included in the text more references to empirical work about reasoning and its pitfalls, benefitting from psychological studies as to which false moves are most tempting and hardest to avoid. Although I did discuss the

confirmation bias and would not want to have enlarged an already substantial text, I will not deny the force of this criticism. She makes the interesting comment that in recent years, argument is less socially acceptable than it formerly was. I cannot be certain that this is a phenomenon, but to the extent that it is, that is highly regrettable. It is, after all, through discussion and argument that we are able to reasonably respond to other persons and address differences regarding practical problems and theory. If argument is becoming less socially acceptable, may be due to the speed at which we communicate electronically. Another factor, I suspect, is an uneasy sense that when we argue we are in conflict, may offend people, and are not respectful of diversity and difference. I have disputed that presumption and urge again here that it is careful attention, not the ignoring of difference, that shows respect for the person with whom we disagree. If argument is becoming less socially acceptable than it once was, that will not be because the need for it has lessened. Hard issues of fact and theory, policy and action, persist and if we try to resolve them without serious consideration and scrutiny of arguments, the loss will be enormous.

To be sure, rhetorical strategies exist enabling us to convey contestable claims without putting forward an argument. For example, we can use language making presumptions about disputable matters (labeling actions as 'reform' or 'progressive' or 'vindictive' or 'reductive', for example). We can offer explanations of supposed facts that are not established as facts at all. We can assume agreement in the audience by careful use of terms like "us", "it is known", and so on. We can simply insert dismissive words or phrases ("nonsense" or "that's ridiculous" or "not so") with no back-up of reason or evidence. There are many such moves: I once called them 'packing strategies.'

Kloster links my work on argument and informal logic to themes in social philosophy, regarding attention to the thinking of other persons, and showing respect and

consideration for them. I appreciate this connection, which has rarely been made by others and which I may well have under-estimated myself.

Laura Pinto offers a detailed and thoughtful application of my work on trust and distrust, relating this work to the 'audit culture' in education. As she explains, in that context trust is centrally important at many levels: between teachers and parents, between teachers and students, between administrators and teachers, and at policy levels. What is at stake is professional trust, a form of social trust. Pinto emphasizes that trust should not be reduced to confidence: she interestingly and importantly observes that, unlike confidence, trust is required in contexts of uncertainty and has moral dimensions. An audit culture in education is one in which the achievements and capabilities of teachers are understood to be directly indicated by the test scores of their students. These scores, made public, are regarded as objectively showing the attainments of students and the competence of their teachers. Empirical research into educational success along these lines reveals a limited view of the nature and role of trust, argues Pinto. Obviously, I heartily agree. In an audit culture, there is a managerial conception of trust, and a distorting emphasis on test scores, with a resulting impression of certainty and control. That emphasis may give an impression of certainty and control, but any such impression is highly misleading. Undermining the trust that is needed in educational contexts, the audit culture in education has baneful effects. While measurable indicators may seem objective and rational, they produce distorting incentives and may leave out too much. Surveillance and testing can neither provide nor replace trust; and Pinto's sobering account shows how and why attempts to make them do so distort educational efforts. It is very rewarding to see my reflections on trust and distrust so persuasively applied to the context of education: I found her essay fascinating.

Exploring public forgiveness, the article by Alistair Little and Wilhelm Verwoerd raises fundamental questions about context and process in addressing political wrongs of the past. Their work powerfully illustrates the breadth and importance of concerns about private and public. Little maintains that in Northern Ireland, after the Troubles, such terms as "forgiveness" and "reconciliation" were unwelcome: they seemed overly religious, simplifying, and evocative of directed top-down processes such as those promoted in South Africa. One interpretation of Little's observations here is that what is useful and appropriate may vary considerably depending on the context. That there should be such variation is quite plausible; apart from the underlying cultural differences, we might consider the vastly larger numbers of involved people, outstanding leadership, and pressures emerging from the significant risk of large-scale civil war in the South Africa of the 1990s as compared with the situation in Northern Ireland. Another factor would include attitudes toward race and religion in these contexts. Little's story of Tutu's efforts in Northern Ireland is both fascinating and disturbing. His claim that Tutu's work in that context was overly choreographed, sensationalist, and actually dangerous will make readers want to learn more about the events described.

Little urges that for improving relations between people who have been opposed, one needs timing, a sense of place, humility in the use of language, and a sense of what human transformation can cost an individual, family, or group. If a person establishes relations with a former enemy, his friends and family members may feel betrayed and deem him disloyal. How ethically significant are such feelings? We might understand this phenomenon as a conflict of values; it raises the question as to whether loyalties based on past affiliation should trump values tied to moving forward into a shared future.

Hesitant to refer to improved relations with former enemies as 'reconciliation,' Little prefers the more neutral

word ‘change.’ And yet, rather ironically, the last few sentences of his contribution describe amicable relations and good feeling between himself and some former enemies. As Little tells the story, with their shaking hands, phoning, sending cards, and even hugging him, these people have become his friends and coexist with him in a state of warm relations. In these remarks I find every indication that these persons have *forgiven* Alistair Little for past deeds and now regard him as a person with whom they are *reconciled*.

In both South Africa and Northern Ireland, Wilhelm Verwoerd has been centrally involved in post-conflict processes, widely understood as involving forgiveness and reconciliation. In South Africa, national reconciliation was sought through top-down processes; in Northern Ireland, the work of Verwoerd, Little, and others, has been largely bottom-up. In one context “forgiveness” and “reconciliation” were much-used terms; in the other, such language has often been resisted, as Little describes. Given his work in South Africa and expressed enthusiasm for the South African TRC, one may be surprised to find Verwoerd largely in agreement with Little about the limitations of a top-down process. Through our many conversations and joint writings, I know of Verwoerd’s energetic defense of the South African TRC and his admiration for the work of Archbishop Desmond Tutu. I find it somewhat unclear how his ideas in the period 1997 – 2003 are consistent with his approval of Little’s views – although given the enormous amount of work these two have done together, that agreement should not have been entirely unexpected.

Verwoerd explores the relationship between public forgiveness and private interpersonal forgiveness. Indeed this topic emerges as a most important one and given his experiences in both South Africa and Northern Ireland, one on which he must be almost uniquely qualified to explore. As does Little, Verwoerd maintains that people can best work towards improved relations with their

former enemies through careful bottom-up processes, with no pressure and or direction from the top. When such private processes are pursued sensitively, they can be made public; if that is done with due care, the publicity will provide a link between private and public forgiveness. Accordingly, one way of envisaging a relation between private and public forgiveness is to approach the problem from the bottom up. Verwoerd offers persuasive examples of small-scale activities and encounters, sensitively publicized. The top-down approach to interpersonal relations emerges from his account rather less clearly; it would involve, somehow, making personal what starts out as public. In South Africa, some proceedings of the TRC were publicized; shown on television and described in the press, they can rightly be described as public processes. Perhaps elements of such public encounters could sensitively motivate private encounters. That would provide an example of making the public private.

In my own work on public forgiveness, I sought to explain how it could make sense to attribute beliefs and attitudes – and changes in them – to collectives. This philosophical approach to an aspect of public-private questions does not address the interpersonal challenges that would emerge from the sorts of practitioner experience available to Alistair Little and Wilhelm Verwoerd.

Kathryn Norlock and Alice MacLachlan have both caught me out on bold claims: Norlock on the unforgivable and MacLachlan on revenge. As to the unforgivable, Norlock carefully articulates my views about personhood and its implications with regard to choice and the possibility of moral transformation. I have urged that any person capable of morally significant action has the capacity to choose his or her actions. Even a person who has committed serious wrongs should not be rejected as *rotten* or a *monster* beyond all hope of moral transformation. A person who has committed heinously evil acts remains a moral agent who is not reducible to his

or her acts. My position is that such a person may be *conditionally unforgivable* if he or she has not renounced the evil acts and shown remorse. But the person should not be regarded as *unconditionally* unforgivable. I took this stance from a basis in what Norlock describes as "the metaphysics of personhood." My stance has understandably been controversial and found unattractive by several prominent commentators. Some have been all too ready to reason from the appalling nature of *acts* designated as unforgivable to the permanent and absolute unforgivability of the *agents* who have committed them. I insist on the distinction between acts and agents. Norlock does the same.

Quite rightly, Norlock scrutinizes my bold claim that it is objectionable for *anyone* to adopt the attitude that *any person is irredeemable*. She points out that this claim is not plausible when applied to a person who is the victim of an atrocity inflicted by a perpetrator whom the victim deems unlikely ever to repent in her lifetime. One can hope that the perpetrator of atrocities will repent and redeem himself. And one can hope that the victims of atrocities will understand the grounds for that hope and reflect it in themselves. Norlock argues that what we can hope for may not be what we can be held to as a moral minimum: we cannot rightly expect that hoping in such a way can be morally demanded of victims.

Granting my arguments about personhood, moral agency, and the possibility of moral transformation, Norlock seeks to resolve a paradox that emerges in the context of victims who regard their perpetrators as irredeemable. She submits that, while granting my arguments about moral personhood, it may nevertheless be the case that the victim of a serious wrong could fail to believe in the possibility of any moral transformation by the perpetrator and, in so failing, not be in any 'objectionable' moral or epistemic state. In a constructive and most interesting discussion, Norlock uses the work of Blake Myers-Schultz and Eric Schwitzgebels, seeking to

resolve the paradox. She maintains that (a) we can have knowledge without belief; (b) we can have correct and true beliefs that are not the basis of an attitude; and (c) we can have attitudes embodying a content that is in conflict with our beliefs. Attitudes involve a certain profile of outward behavior and inner experience; I find it easier to accept (b) and (c) than to accept (a), which in any event is not strictly necessary to relieve the paradox.

Norlock follows Margaret Walker in saying that hope may be killed; if it is, the victim of an atrocious wrong should not be blamed for giving up on a perpetrator. One may know and even in a sense believe, that a perpetrator, as a moral agent, is capable of choice, resolve, and change. And yet one's attitudes toward that perpetrator, as expressed in feelings and actions, could nevertheless have content out of accord with that knowledge. Such content could include hatred, fear, despair, and other emotions not expressive of any hope that the person would change. An observer might allow that the unforgivability of such a perpetrator would be conditional because someday he might be morally transformed and repent. And yet for the victim, he would seem unconditionally unforgivable. Her attitudes would not necessarily be in accord with any knowledge or beliefs regarding 'the metaphysics of personhood', regarding the agency and potential for change of all who constitute moral persons.

As does Kathryn Norlock, Alice MacLachlan concentrates on a bold claim made in my work about forgiveness and revenge. I argued that the desire for revenge is an evil desire because it is a desire for satisfaction at having caused the suffering of another person. MacLachlan rightly contests a rhetorical escalation in my account from 'satisfaction' to 'pleasure', correctly noting that it is unwarranted. Her main criticism of my account of revenge lies elsewhere: it is that I omit what she regards as a necessary condition of revenge. MacLachlan argues that in order for A to achieve revenge against B, it

is not sufficient for A to deliberately harm B as a response to B's harming A and for A to experience satisfaction as a result of his inflicting that harm. One must add the condition that B knows that *it is A who has injured him and that A has harmed B in response to the harm B did to A*. In MacLachlan's view, it is essential that this message is communicated for A's infliction of harm on B to amount to a case of revenge. It is indeed interesting that Adam Smith also held this view.

But notwithstanding this historical point, I remain uncertain about the argued extra condition. One can imagine a grim example in which A kills B in revenge for B's killing a member of A's family. B, being dead, will be in no position to know that it was A who caused his death. And if B dies quickly, he may not know at the time of death what is causing his death. I submit that in such a case A will be entirely likely to think that he has achieved revenge against B, and he will not be incorrect to do so. To say this is not, of course, is to condone or approve A's action here. It is just to state that A's killing of B can count as an act of revenge, one with which A will feel satisfied as an avenging agent, whatever 'message' B may or may not have received. With MacLachlan's final comments about moral pictures of revenge being over-simplified and blocking out wider entanglements between agents, I am of course in total agreement. In any event, MacLachlan and I generally agree that if we consider the risks of revenge, inflicting harm on someone who has wronged us is a faulty and hazardous mode of moral address.

Linda Radzik considers repair of relationships, emphasizing a perspective of respect for persons. Radzik offers a careful and thoughtful reconstruction of a relational approach to wrongdoing. I'm grateful for her sympathetic and constructive essay, which begins from my work and George Sher's criticism of relational approaches. Radzik contrasts empirical claims regarding relationships with normative ones, offering a 'reasonable consequences' interpretation that straddles the gap between them.

Sensibly, she proposes that wrongdoing always provides a reason for parties to negatively adjust their empirical relationship. It does not always provide a conclusive reason. Radzik's account correctly includes an 'other things being equal' clause. That is important: there are relationships that are damaging and so flawed that they ought not to be repaired. Radzik does not discuss relationships so flawed that they should not be repaired: she carefully notes that whether one ought to repair a particular relationship depends on whether doing so would be unreasonably imprudent or conflict with one's other obligations.

Radzik argues that relationship repair is more like disarming a threat than rebuilding a relationship that is broken. If I were to question her careful account, it would be on the grounds that both she and Sher fail to consider the phenomenon of thick moral terms. Consider in this context an example of a mother-son relationship that begins as good but then runs into difficulties. Let us assume that the son has happy memories of his childhood and the two communicate well and frequently and enjoy each other's company. Suppose that the son falls into a habit of substance abuse and as a result frequently borrows money from his mother, failing to repay it. She becomes uneasy about his welfare and hesitant about lending him money, beginning to interpret his pressing requests and other behaviour toward her as manipulative in intent. At this point there will be what Sher would regard as empirical changes in their relationship (fewer contacts, denied requests, feelings of anger, for example). The son comes to regard his mother as 'cold' and 'suspicious'; his mother finds him as 'exploitative', and 'manipulative.' Applying Radzik's account, we would say that the mother has reasons to negatively adjust her relationship with her son. One might argue that she morally ought to counteract those reasons, disarming a threat to their relationship, on the grounds that she is his mother and they have had a good relationship in the past. Alternately, one might argue for

the opposite conclusion, on the grounds that his persistent requests and growing financial needs threaten her wellbeing and capacity to meet other obligations. Sher, and implicitly Radzik in her initial agreement with him, would seem to regard such aspects as *suspicion* and *manipulation* as purely empirical. I think the categorization is disputable, given the negative connotations of these terms. Terms such as 'suspicious', 'manipulative', and 'exploitative' qualify as thick moral terms. If one agrees with that stance, there may be another way to address the issue of a descriptive-normative gap.

That question is one of many that may be raised in all the areas discussed in this book. Again, I thank the authors and the editor for their work on this volume and hope that constructive and illuminating conversations on these many issues will continue.

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