Aristotle differs from most later philosophers in distinguishing clearly between epistemic reasoning, which aims for truth, and practical reasoning, which does not. How can he posit this distinction and yet not dismiss practical reasoning as flattery and manipulation, as Plato did? The answer lies in the concepts of deliberation (boulē, bouleusis) and deliberate choice (proairesis). They link Aristotle’s rhetoric, ethics, and politics together and help provide definitions of all three: ethics is about deliberate choices by individuals. Politics and rhetoric are about the collective deliberate choices by the polity: politics is about making these choices well so that the good life of all citizens is optimally secured; rhetoric is the principal means to do this. These links have not been much discussed by scholars, probably because few studies range across these three Aristotelian “arts”; a proper discussion of them should draw on modern work in ethics, political science, and rhetoric. These key concepts and Aristotle’s discussions of them offer inspiration for modern theories of “deliberative democracy,” citizenship, argumentation, debate, and the public sphere.

One important difference emphasized by Aristotle which Plato had sought to downplay concerns reasoning in different realms. Aristotle differs from his master, and from many later philosophers, in seeing epistemic reasoning and practical reasoning as distinct domains. In the former, the concern is to find truth, or, failing that, the nearest we can come to it: probability. In the latter, what we are ultimately concerned with is not truth but decisions on action.

By insisting on this as an essential feature of practical reasoning, and more specifically, of that subspecies of it which he calls rhetoric, Aristotle bared a flank to a charge that has ever since been leveled against rhetoric, most forcefully by Plato: that it is truth-neglecting flattery and manipulation.

It is well known that Aristotle did not agree with this charge. It is less clearly realized that the reason why has to do with his concepts of deliberation and deliberate choice. Not only do they help furnish a reply to the charge, they also link together Aristotle’s theories of rhetoric, ethics, and politics together and help provide definitions of all three: ethics is about deliberate choices by individuals. Politics and rhetoric are about the collective deliberate choices by the polity: politics is about making these choices well so that the good life of all citizens is optimally secured; rhetoric is one of the principal means to do this.

These links have not been much discussed by scholars, probably because few scholars have had interests ranging across all the three Aristotelian “arts” just mentioned. Moreover, if we want to have the full benefit of Aristotle’s cross-disciplinary thinking in this area, it will be useful also to connect it with modern work in ethics, political science, and rhetoric. These key concepts and Aristotle’s discussions of them offer inspiration for modern theories of “deliberative democracy,” citizenship, argumentation, debate, and the public sphere.

The original terms in Aristotle usually translated as “deliberation” are boulē and bouleusis. The core meaning of boulē is usually given as “will, determination”; there is probably a genetic relation between boulē in Greek, voluntas in Latin, and modern equivalents like will in English, Wille in German, etc. The corresponding verb, bouleuein, is usually translated in Aristotle’s writings as “to deliberate”.  

This term is crucially important in several of Aristotle’s writings, primarily in the ethical works. In all of them, he specifically insists that we

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9 It is striking that the modern translation of the Rhetoric most frequently quoted, that of George Kennedy, unlike older translations like that of Freese and others, is inconsistent in its renderings of this word and its derivatives; for example, in a crucial passage where Aristotle states the function of rhetoric, using the medial first person plural of bouleuein, i.e., bouleuometha, Kennedy’s translation says that rhetoric is “concerned with the sort of things we debate” (1357a; Kennedy, p. 41; my emphasis). As will be clear below, Aristotle is insistent that what we “deliberate” upon is a clearly defined subcategory of that which we “debate”. There seems to be no reason for Kennedy’s choice here other than carelessness—but he is not alone among modern scholars in overlooking how Aristotle makes a crucial distinction and sharply demarcates the scope of rhetoric.
can only deliberate about what we can undertake ourselves. “We deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done” (Nicomachean Ethics 1112a) is one of many statements. Another is: “we do not deliberate about the affairs of the Indians nor how the circle may be squared; for the first are not in our power, the second is wholly beyond the power of action” (Eudemian Ethics 1226a). So, for example, “no one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise” (Nicomachean Ethics 1139b, with an almost identical formulation at 1140a); “since it is impossible to deliberate about things that are of necessity, practical wisdom cannot be knowledge nor art” (ibid., 1140b); “about things that could not have been, and cannot now or in the future be, other than they are, nobody who takes them to be of this nature wastes his time in deliberation” (Rhetoric 1357a).

Deliberation is the kind of reasoning that precedes deliberate choice, for which Aristotle’s term is proairesis (some translate it “purposive choice”, e.g., Kenny 1979). Proairesis literally means “taking something rather than (something else)”.

What makes these concepts so important to Aristotle’s ethical thinking is that the individual’s deliberate choices are what primarily determines that individual’s ethical worth. Rhetoric, however, is also about deliberate choice, but of a different kind, i.e., collective choices by people organized in groups like the polis.

The identity of rhetoric is closely bound up with deliberation, inasmuch as the function of rhetoric (its ergon) is “to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning” (1357a). In most references to Aristotle’s definition(s) of rhetoric it tends to be forgotten that rhetoric is thus rooted in “such matters as we deliberate upon”; instead, all the attention is given to terms like “the available means of persuasion” (1355b), “present us with alternative possibilities” (1357a), the presence of hearers, the lack of systematic rules, and other features. However, the restriction of rhetoric to dealing with “such matters as we deliberate upon,” in the understanding just stated, is a crucial element in Aristotle’s intensional definition of rhetoric; indeed most leading rhetorical thinkers since Aristotle follow him in thus defining rhetoric as argument concerned with social decision or action, “civic issues,” etc., as documented in Kock (2009).

This demarcation of rhetoric, I contend, is more to the point—historically and theoretically—than the many current demarcations that emphasize the “contingent,” the “probable,” etc., as for example in
Brockriede & Ehninger (1960), the paper that initiated the use of Toulmin’s theory in the teaching of argument:

Whereas in traditional logic arguments are specifically designed to produce universal propositions, Toulmin's second triad of backing, rebuttal, and qualifier provide, within the framework of his basic structural model, for the establishment of claims that are no more than probable. (p. 46)

To be sure, there are “broader” definitions of rhetoric which do not see rhetoric as rooted in any particular domain of issues, e.g., in Quintilian and in Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776); the latter defines rhetoric (or rather, eloquence) as “that art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end.” This is also a meaningful demarcation and aligns well with how rhetoric is defined in many academic programs (including the one this writer is affiliated with at the University of Copenhagen). So my insistence that Aristotle defines rhetoric as linked to “things on which we deliberate” is not an endorsement of this definition, which is indeed quite restrictive; rather, I point to it because it is often overlooked, and mainly because it brings out Aristotle’s insistence on the differences between epistemic and practical reasoning—to which I think we should pay more attention.

It is worth repeating that what Aristotle does is to distinguish between the domain where we ultimately discuss truth, and the domain where we ultimately discuss choice. In his view, there is a domain where there is no “truth” to find, but there are also domains where truth does exist and can either be found, or where at least the best attainable degrees of probability may serve in its stead.

So, if we follow Aristotle, it is clear that we should not theorize about argumentation as if all claims people may argue about are claims about something being true. Some claims, for example, are claims for a deliberate choice, a proairesis. And a proairesis is not a proposition expressing a belief or an opinion (doxa). The Eudemian Ethics in particular makes that clear:

Choice is not an opinion either, nor, generally, what one thinks; for the object of choice was something in one’s power and many things may be thought that are not in our power, e.g. that the diagonal is commensurable. Further, choice is not either true or false [etì ouk esti proairesís alêthês è pseudêš]. Nor yet is choice identical with our opinion about matters of practice which are in our own power, as when we think that we ought to do or not to do something. This argument applies to wish as well as to opinion. (1226a)
Once this is clear, it seems to me to terminate the old dispute between what we might call hardcore “Platonists” and other thinkers we might call hardcore “Protagoreans”: both are wrong. Hardcore Platonists are wrong in thinking that a truth exists and can be found (through dialectical/pseudo-mathematical reasoning) on any kind of issue. Hardcore “Protagoreans” (and many contemporary thinkers, including some “discourse” theorists and some “social constructivists”) are wrong in thinking that on no kinds of issue does a truth exist.

Aristotle’s distinction might also help “solve” (or dissolve) the old antagonism between (some) champions of rhetoric and philosophy, respectively: since rhetoric is (centrally, “ultimately”) not concerned with “truth,” but with (social) choice, there is no reason why philosophers should suspect rhetoric per se of subverting, or unconscionably disregarding, truth; rhetoric is not about truth. To be sure, it relies on the giving of reasons that may be true or false, or at least probable or improbable; but that for which the reasons are given is not an assertion that may be true or false. Incidentally, rhetoricians should realize that not all philosophers believe, in Platonic fashion, that every issue is about the truth of some assertion.

But why is it that choice is neither true nor false? This question may be elucidated with reference to a few distinctive features of the way we reason about deliberate choice. Not all of these features, I should add, are discussed by Aristotle; some of the insights I am going to cite are drawn from other thinkers, and some nuances I wish to add on my own.

1) Although deliberate choice of some action is based partly on epistemic beliefs (as we just saw), it is never based only on epistemic beliefs, i.e., beliefs about what is true or probable, but also on inner attitudes in the choosing individual; these attitudes, since they are located in the individual, may in that sense be termed “subjective.” Some of them are ethical and are discussed by Aristotle in the pertinent works on ethics; others are emotions, pathē, discussed primarily in the second book of the Rhetoric. It is worth recalling here that the theory of emotions set forth there sees an emotion as having two components: (a) an affective one and (b) an epistemic one (cf. Fortenbaugh 1970 and later writings). The second book of the Rhetoric defines a series of emotions (pathē) in such a manner; for example, anger is defined as follows: “Anger may be defined as (a) a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for (b) a conspicuous slight at the hand of men who have no call to slight oneself or one’s friends” (1378a).

2) These “attitudes” of both kinds, besides being individual, are graded, i.e., they come in any number of degrees. That is to say, someone’s allegiance to
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a certain ethical value may be more or less strong, by any number of degrees, compared to his or her allegiance to other values that may, in a given case, contradict it. Similarly, the emotion, e.g., anger, that motivates an individual to a certain action, may be more or less strong compared to the factors that prompt that individual to desist from the action.

3) As the previous point indicates, plural values are involved, even for an individual: each of us believes in a plurality of values that often collide, that is to say, speak for contradictory decisions on specific issues. This recognition is tantamount to the meta-ethical belief often named “value pluralism,” associated with thinkers like Isaiah Berlin.

Aristotle’s account of practical reasoning as interpreted by Anthony Kenny (1979) may help us further understand this plurality/pluralism that makes it impossible to infer the “true” answer to a question of choice. Put in simple terms: an action that promotes one value or good probably counteracts another.

Kenny explains how in all practical reasoning, as Aristotle sees it, we argue as it were backwards; that is, we start with a certain goal, value or end that we want to promote, for example, health; given that the end is good, we look for a means to bring about that end, because that means will also, in that respect, be good. Thus, if health is the end, it follows that what brings health is also good, and since exercise is something that brings health, it follows that exercise is good. So, to speak generally, we look for steps in reasoning that will transfer or preserve goodness from the end to the means.

If we compare this kind of reasoning with reasoning about propositions, we see that there we look for steps in reasoning that will preserve truth. For that purpose we need truth-preserving rules, whereas in practical reasoning we need “goodness-preserving” rules. But these two kinds of rules are quite different. Kenny points out that whereas Aristotle himself managed to formulate truth-preserving rules for propositions, he did not even try to formulate a parallel set of goodness-preserving rules for practical reasoning; nor has anyone else attempted to do so. The reason is that practical reasoning is much more complicated, and so are the goodness-preserving rules that would be required to codify it. Because practical reasoning works as it were backwards from the desired end or effect or good to an available means, whereas reasoning about propositions works forward from the truth of one proposition to the truth of another that follows, the following applies:

If a proposition is true, then it is not also false; but if a project or proposal or decision is good, that does not exclude its being also, from another point of view, bad. Hence, while truth-preserving rules will...
exclude falsehood, goodness-preserving rules will not exclude badness. (Kenny 1979, p. 146)

This explains why, for a given choice we face that asks us to either undertake a given action or desist from it, there usually is no one “true” choice. For example, we may consider undertaking a given action because we believe it will promote a certain ethical good that we wish to promote; but any action that promotes one good or value tends to counteract others. This state of affairs is brought out in figure 1—a diagrammatic rendition of certain aspects of Aristotle’s theory of the will, relying in part on Kenny.

Figure 1. The logic of practical reasoning illustrated

Circles illustrate goals
Rectangles illustrate available means
Triangles illustrate unavailable means
A bold arrow means: promotes a goal
A dotted arrow means: counteracts a goal

What we see here is, first, that we all endorse a plural set of values or ends (the circles). Certain actions might be imagined that would simply promote one or more of these goods without counteracting any; but such actions are generally unavailable. As a banal illustration of this, no state can decide to spend some of its wealth on building a beautiful opera house and yet retain the same amount of wealth to spend for other worthy purposes. Wealth that does not diminish when spent is, alas, not available. But a

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certain amount of wealth of the ordinary kind is often available, besides other means for achieving the ends we endorse. Another means available to most states is warfare; it might bring about some benefit, but it certainly has costs, e.g., in human lives, thus counteracting the common end of preserving human lives. Thus any action will have good and bad (presumptive) effects, or in different terms, advantages and drawbacks. And that just accounts for the foreseen consequences of that action. A different set of considerations might concern deontic principles that it might either embody or violate, e.g., a principle that the taking of human lives is per se wrong.

Thus it is clear that any action has any number of straight as well as dotted arrows emanating from it towards goods (values, goals) that it is seen either to promote or counteract. The facts that any individual’s set of these values/goals is (1) in principle subjective (although to a large extent shared), (2) graded, and (3) plural, together ensure that, as a standard case, no one incontrovertible choice presents itself, nor does anything that we might, even in a derived sense, call the “truth.”

The main theme in what I have said so far is what we might call the inevitable plurality and, indeed, multidimensionality of the ends, goods, or values (in Toulmin’s terms it would be “warrants”) that are potentially relevant in deliberation (and hence in its subdivisions: ethical and rhetorical reasoning). There is not just one kind of value that should be attended to, as is the case in epistemic reasoning, where that value is truth value (substitutable, if need be, with probability value).

Before moving on to how Aristotle might illuminate the interrelations between rhetoric, ethics, and politics, we may pause to comment on the question of whether Aristotle himself is a “value pluralist.” There has been much debate on this between philosophers, with, among others, Martha Nussbaum (1986) on the “pluralist” side and Charles Larmore (1996) on the “monist” side. Aristotle does not declare himself a pluralist, in fact he says that there is a supreme ethical value that dominates all others, namely philosophical contemplation (Nicomachean Ethics 1177b); but on the other hand his ethical theory does analyze several distinct ethical qualities, and his famous theory of the golden mean (to meson) can be seen as a theory where two potentially contradictory values must be balanced. For example, courage is analyzed as a mean between bravery that sets aside fear and prudence that seeks self-preservation (1115a ff.); both are ethically good if not driven to excess, so true courage is a mean between them. Another instance of Aristotle reasoning in a way that arguably is de facto pluralist
occurs at the opening of the *Politics*; there he suggests a plurality of (intrinsic) values that humans, unlike animals, are committed to:

... whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attends to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just or unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state. (1253a)

Since, as humans, we both understand what is beneficial vs. harmful, and also what is just and unjust, we can indeed be said to have at least two mutually independent goals or ends to guide us in our choice of action; and then the argument made above on the multidimensional and pluralistic nature of our practical reasonings will apply.

So there is in Aristotle, as in ancient rhetoric generally, a realization that in deliberation about choice several heterogeneous (or we might say, incommensurable) values or ends will inevitably be intertwined. That goes for reasoning in ethics as well as in rhetoric, where (as we saw above) we reason together about the collective decisions of the polity.

Christopher Lyle Johnstone is one of the first, and still one of the few, philosophers who have tried to relate the *Ethics*, the *Rhetoric* and the *Politics* to each other. He would have it that in these reasonings in the polity, ethical values are somehow supreme; “moral truths” of a communal kind, he argues, are amalgamated out of individual moral visions through the agency of rhetoric:

The deliberative functions of rhetoric identify it as the instrument whereby individual moral visions are shared, modified, and fused into the communal moral principles that regulate our shared undertakings. Out of individual knowings we create communal moral truths; rhetoric is the instrument of that creation. (1980, p. 17)

I would argue that Johnstone’s view of the workings of rhetoric in society, as expressed here, is too idealistic. Aristotle is more of a realist, some would say more of a believer in *Realpolitik*. To be sure, he has succinctly defined and comprehensively analyzed ethical reasoning; but he has not said that rhetorical reasoning is identical with ethical reasoning. On the other hand, nor has he said that ethical reasoning has no place in rhetorical reasoning. Rather, the broad picture of his thought on rhetoric, ethics and
politics is that rhetorical deliberation in the polity is, and has to be, a jumble of individuals’ self-interest, the collective self-interest of the polity, considered in terms of presumptive consequences, ethical and legal (deontic) principles, and all sorts of other considerations. It is, to use the terms employed above, pluralistic and multidimensional.

The few scholars who, after Johnstone, have attempted to correlate in a more systematic way Aristotle's theories of rhetoric, ethics, and society, have been less prone than he was to equate rhetoric with the creation of “moral truths.” One of these scholars is the political theorist Mary P. Nichols, who emphasizes how public deliberation, i.e., rhetoric, fuses private interests with considerations of the collectively advantageous as well as the just:

By recognizing the heterogeneity of common opinion and trying to incorporate that heterogeneity into a consistent whole, the rhetorician arrives at a comprehensive position that is both rooted in common opinion and able to go beyond common opinion. He is restrained by the individuals whom he addresses at the same time that he is able to educate them. … It is the existence of a public realm of discourse that makes man’s political life more than the conflict of private interests and passions, that allows cities that come into existence for the sake of mere life to become associations in which men share speech about the advantageous and the just. (1987, pp. 661-662)

Nichols cites, at this point, the same passage from the opening of the \textit{Politics} that was quoted above about logos as man’s prerogative; and she goes on to argue that the obligation of the deliberative rhetor to integrate and absorb self-interest in fact makes it a noble pursuit: “Paradoxically, deliberative rhetoric is nobler and more statesmanlike than forensic not only because it aims at a general or public end but also because it must address a greater variety of private interests and concerns” (1987, p. 663).

Public rhetoric, Nichols also observes, which allows self-interest a chance to appeal to the population at large, contains in itself a safeguard against precisely the kind of selfish manipulation that Platonic critics expect from it; that safeguard is the fact that any instance of public rhetoric is revelatory of the \textit{ethos} of the speaker from the very first word. Thus ethotic effects constitute a reason to cultivate public rhetoric rather than to suspect it:

Addressing the popular fear that the speech of a clever rhetorician might hide his ends, Aristotle calls attention to the extent that a man reveals
himself in his speech. If a rhetorician is to be persuasive, he must show that his advice is advantageous to his audience, that what he is praising is noble, or that he has justice on his side. In such cases, his premises, his conclusions, and his examples all reveal his character. (1987, p. 665)

Above and elsewhere, I have emphasized the inevitability of plural values, and, as a corollary of that, of dissensus (cf. Kock 2007). So does the political scientist Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos: “Aristotle argues that political speech should bridge the gaps between the public and private spheres, passions and reason, individual interests and the common good, equity and law” (1999, p. 742). That is to say, Aristotle shows us how to steer a middle course, find a meson as it were, between rival conceptions of the public sphere, namely those which see it, respectively, as all-out rivalry between entrenched interests, and as Habermasian communicative rationality:

Aristotle’s fusion of reason, emotion, and performance also provides us with a unique alternative to both agonistic and rational/deliberative conceptions of the public sphere ... Deliberative rhetoric is unique in that it appeals both to the listener’s private interests and the business of the community. ... Orators on either side of a debate use persuasive speech to influence their audience’s decision. ... Unlike Habermas, he rejects the claim that truly universalizable norms can be apprehended intersubjectively through rational discourse. (1999, pp. 744ff.)

Going a step further, the political theorist Bernard Yack argues that the obligation of public deliberative rhetors to integrate appeals to advantage and self-interest with communal considerations is ennobling rather than demeaning. For one thing, “it rules out explicitly self-serving arguments” (2006, p. 422). Other recent political theorists, including John Dryzek (2000, 2010), have argued along similar lines for the place of deliberation and rhetoric in democracy. That is, although we all have our own interests at heart as one strong motivating force, we still know and expect that in public rhetoric the appeal should be to the public interest.

Such a mixed, pluralist, multidimensional view of political deliberation goes against certain influential paradigms in political science and economics. Among these are the so-called “Rational Choice” theories, and similarly a close relative of these, namely the “economic theory of democracy” of Anthony Downs (1957). Regarding the forces that motivate politicians and citizens alike, Downs (like the Rational Choice theorists, among whom he may or may not be counted) holds one-track, pseudophysical theories. As to what motivates political parties this theory claims:
… political parties in a democracy formulate policy strictly as a means of gaining votes. They do not seek to gain office in order to carry out certain preconceived policies or to serve any particular interest groups; rather they formulate policies and serve interest groups in order to gain office. Thus their social function—which is to formulate and carry out policies when in power as the government—is accomplished as a by-product of their private motive—which is to attain the income, power, and prestige of being in office. (1957a, p. 137)

As to what motivates citizens (voters), Downs’s theory in its original pure form is equally categorical in its reliance on just one factor:

Because the citizens of our model democracy are rational, each of them views elections strictly as means of selecting the government most beneficial to him. Each citizen estimates the utility income from government action he expects each party would provide him if it were in power in the forthcoming election period, that is, he first estimates the utility income Party A would provide him, then the income Party B would provide, and so on. He votes for whatever party he believes would provide him with the highest utility income from government action. (1957a, p. 138)

This attitude in citizens is what Downs and like-minded theorists see as “rational”: “Whenever we speak of rational behavior, we always mean rational behavior directed primarily to selfish ends” (1957b, p. 27).

What we can safely say is that Aristotle’s thinking on rhetoric, ethics and politics presents a more complex picture than this, and one that I would argue is more realistic. He neither postulates the supremacy in public deliberation of “moral truth” nor that of crass self-interest, but explains how both these kinds of motive, and the full spectrum in between, have roles to play.

As for the role of self-interest and considerations of advantage as against ethics, Yack makes clear that, unlike what is ideally the case in forensic reasoning (namely that only justice should determine any decision, as symbolized by the blindfolded Lady Justice), deliberation on political decisions has no right to completely disregard the interest of the members of the polity in the name of blind justice. Indeed, total abnegation of self-interest on behalf of the collective would undercut a rhetor's ethos: “Impartiality and disinterestedness recommend individuals to us as judges but not as political deliberators, since deliberators are supposed to be
pondering our fate and theirs, not the disputes and interests of others” (2006, pp. 423-424).

The function of a state according to Aristotle, as the opening of the *Nicomachean Ethics* makes clear, is to secure for all its citizens the “Supreme Good,” and that is why the science of politics is the master-craft, “the most authoritative of the sciences.” This also is why Aristotle lists rhetoric, along with “domestic economic and strategy,” as “one of the most highly esteemed of the faculties” in the state (1094a): rhetoric enables the political community to perform its essential function, which also provides its definition. In the words of Bernard Yack, the function of political communities is to serve “our shared interest in establishing the conditions—laws, moral habituation, opportunities for the exercise of prudence, and the other virtues—that make it possible to lead the Aristotelian good life” (p. 424).

It may be in place to sum up the main insights that we may gain by pulling together Aristotle’s thoughts on deliberation as expressed in his ethical, political and rhetorical writings.

From the ethical works, students of rhetoric may learn that if rhetoric is concerned with such matters as we deliberate upon, then its central subject matter is not the truth or probability of propositions, but actions that we may choose to undertake. From Aristotle’s *Politics*, rhetoricians may learn that politics is the noble art of statecraft and that rhetoric should be proud to be an integral and necessary part of it.

Ethics, in turn, might learn from rhetoric and politics that rhetorical deliberation in the state is a distinctive human activity that is just as necessary and worthy as the individual’s deliberation over ethical choice, as well as being more complex.

Politics, finally, might learn from ethics about the essential nature of deliberation. From rhetoric it might learn about the specific workings and resources of this verbal *praxis*, so essential to the state’s endeavor to secure the good life for all.

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