Introduction

This volume brings together a selection of work done across a period of more than thirty years. I would like to offer this introduction as a help to readers who want to follow the thread of the papers in it and to explain the thinking behind them. I hope that these pieces will then together appear as a (somewhat) coherent effort centered on a unifying cluster of ideas.

The volume is called *Deliberative Rhetoric: Arguing about Doing* because I think this title and subtitle highlight the central ideas in that cluster. To start with the subtitle, this is not just a book focusing on argumentation and on arguing in general. It is a central feature of the book that I see arguing about *doing* as a distinctive category within the larger category of argumentation. I think that contemporary argumentation theory—a collective effort that I warmly applaud, by many excellent scholars who have done pioneering work—has, despite its advances, paid too little attention to the category of practical argumentation. Underlying this neglect is a failure to pay sufficient attention to a basic distinction, namely that between epistemic and practical reasoning—or, respectively, reasoning about what is *true* and reasoning about what to *do*. Several of the chapters in the volume address this distinction, arguing for it and seeking to tease out its implications. I have felt it necessary for a long time to insist on this distinction in publications and in talks, and readers of this volume may find passages here and there that sound pretty much like echoes of other passages. For this I apologize, but the reason is that I have found it hard to get a proper hearing for it. There seems to be a strong tendency among argumentation scholars—especially those whose background is in certain branches of philosophy—to fail to recognize that this distinction is valid and important. I object, for example, to textbooks and theories of argumentation that axiomatically state that the purpose of argumentation is to determine what is true. No, I say, in practical argument the ultimate purpose is to decide on a *choice*, and, to reiterate a quote from Aristotle that I have used many times, "choice is not either true or false."

My insistence on the difference between arguing about what is true and arguing about what to do has been taken as an assertion of a dichotomy; it has been pointed out, rightly, that there are many issues where a purported exclusive disjunction between arguing about truth and arguing about choice cannot be upheld. I completely accept this objection and have tried to accommodate it, e.g., in chapter 8. But as critics of unwarranted

Deliberative Rhetoric: Arguing about Doing Christian Kock https://doi.org/10.22329/wsia.05.2017

dichotomies should know well, one also implies an unwarranted dichotomy by asuming that if two things do not constitute a dichotomy, then they must be identical. There *are* important differences that do not constitute classic dichotomies, and the difference between epistemic and practical reasoning is an example of this. The two things are importantly different in many respects despite the fact that there are intermediary forms between them and also many hard or undecidable cases.

Moving from right to left in the title of this volume, we come to the word *deliberation*. I believe that precisely because of the differences between practical and epistemic reasoning, practical reasoning must always in principle be deliberative. This means—and here we may think of the etymology of the word *deliberate* and its cognates, which derive from *libra*, a scale for weighing—that in the standard case, there will be reasons (or "arguments") both for and against anything that one considers doing—that is to say, *valid* reasons. In this I deliberately use the term *valid* in a different sense from its use in formal logic. As will soon be clear, I believe that logically "valid" reasoning is in principle not available in practical reasoning, that is, reasoning for or against a given choice. This is because in practical reasoning there will be reasons of a certain *weight* on both sides. It follows from this that in practical reasoning a weighing or balancing must take place. If one accepts that, then one has to let go of any desire to see such reasoning as a deductive process. In practical reasoning there are in principle no reasons that deductively *entail* a certain decision as their conclusion. If there were, there could not be arguments of "some" weight on both sides. Why that is so I will try to explain, and many of the chapters make similar attempts.

In the model case of deductive argumentation, mathematics, there cannot be reasons of some weight on both sides. There is, for example, a deductively valid set of reasons, including a few axioms, that simply *entail* a theorem like that of Pythagoras. (In fact there are several proofs, i.e., sets of reasons or steps, that all *force* the conclusion that Pythagoras' theorem is true.) This fact entails that there could never be an argument "of some weight," or indeed of any weight, *against* the theorem. It is true, and any denial of it, or any alleged argument for doubting it, is false.

What about empirical sciences—like, e.g., cosmology, which involves theories like that of the "Big Bang"? Will my deep distinction between epistemic and practical reasoning not collapse because in such a domain (undeniably an epistemic domain) there will also be arguments of some weight both for and against a theory? Yes, there will no doubt, but in a

different sense of the concept "weight." If some scientists believe that the universe began with a Big Bang and others believe it didn't, then they cannot both be right: both those claims cannot be true at the same time. If one of them is right, then the other is wrong. We may believe that the truth in the matter may never be conclusively found (which is what any Popperian theory of science tells us, since such a theory can never in principle be verified, only falsified). But even so, both parties in a possible debate between pro-Big-Bangers and anti-Big-Bangers are surely out on a quest for the truth. They both assume that there *is* a truth about the origin of the universe, and that it exists independently of us all, although they probably also agree that it can never be conclusively determined. All we can have in its stead, then, is probability. In *that* sense each of the parties in the dispute may have arguments of a certain weight: reasons that either add to or detract from the probability of their theory.

In practical reasoning, however, for example in political debate, things are not like that. Some people in a given society will want lower taxes and fewer public welfare programs. Others will want more welfare programs and will accept higher taxes as a means to it. There is no "truth" anywhere about what the correct level of taxation and welfare programs might be, and so there is no deductively binding (i.e., logically "valid") reasoning available to tell us which of the two disagreeing groups is right. There is not even such a thing as "cogent" or "sufficient" reasoning to this effect—if the words "cogent" or "sufficient" are to have any discernible meaning. I say this because I admit to being impatient with the use of these terms in discussions of what a "good" argument is. The accepted meanings of these words is that if a piece of reasoning has one of these qualities (which are often taken to be the same), then it deductively entails its conclusion. Then why not say that—if that is what one means? If that is *not* what one means, then I find the meanings of these words unclear, and I tend to see the use of them as an attempt to, on the one hand, reject deductivism and, on the other hand, have it too.

As for the political dispute between those who want a strong state with welfare programs and high taxation vs. those who want the opposite, their respective claims are not about what the world *is* like, but about what they want the world to *be* like. Both probably have reasons for their positions, and both might even, if they were to engage in deliberative debate, accept that there are certain reasons against their positions; but in that case they no doubt assign different *weights* to these reasons. Debater A will believe that the reason *x* speaks for his position, while the reason *y* speaks against it.

Conversely, debater B may believe that the reason *y* speaks for *his* position and the reason *x* against it. But they assign different weights to the reasons *x* and *y*—and that is where they disagree. There will be no deductive proof available to any of them, entailing the truth of his position—or even the "probability" of it. We are simply not talking about truth here, or about its more available substitute, probability; we are talking about choice or, if you will, "preference," "desire," or "will." And not only are the weights assigned to *x* and *y* different in the two debaters; also, the weights assigned by A and B to *x* and *y* may change, perhaps as a result of something that A and B say to each other—in short, as a result of rhetoric.

This shows that the "weight" of each reason should not be taken as completely analogous to the physical weight of an object (as argumentation scholars know, no analogies are complete anyway). The physical weight of an object is objectively determined by its mass and the gravitational force acting on the object. In contrast, the "weight" of reasons in practical reasoning is a metaphorical term; it may change by slow degrees or by discontinuous leaps, caused either by rhetoric, by personal experience or by some other factor. And as we saw, it may vary from one individual to the next. Moreover, to compound the complexity, this weight is in principle always relative: a reason has a certain weight (which is in fact an *un*certain weight) in *relation* to the aggregate weight of other reasons pertaining to the issue.

The fact that there are reasons on both sides of a disagreement with assigned "weights" that are variable in all these ways implies that practical reasoning is always in principle deliberation—i.e., an act of weighing on a pair of metaphorical scales. It is a process, always renewable, that in principle involves—or should involve—*all* relevant reasons pertaining to the issue.

This is a rather different image than the picture of argumentation underlying much traditional theory and pedagogy—where one typically assesses one argument at a time, and where, in the most traditional versions, each argument is assessed on a dichotomous scale as either valid (in which case the conclusion is deductively entailed) or invalid (in which case the argument is irrelevant and worthless).

Rather than this dichotomous, stop-go approach to the evaluation of argument I speak in these papers for something that could be called a "scale" model, which necessarily involves taking into account reasons on both pans of the scale. Another meaning of the term "scale" also applies, by

the way: the "weight" of a reason should rather be seen as something that can be marked on a continuous scale or gradient, rather than as something that can have only two dichotomous values. The idea of "conductive reasoning" captures this kind of process, and so does the hallowed term "deliberation."

There is further a need to recognize that in this taking-into-account there will typically be reasons on the two sides that cannot be measured by the same unit or yardstick: reasons in practical reasoning are often what I call "multidimensional" in the sense that they belong to different dimensions. Philosophers have used terms like "value pluralism" and "incommensurability" for this complicating circumstance. Thus deliberation, i.e., the metaphorical weighing of the reasons relevant to an issue, is a process with no one authoritative answer, and there is no reason to assume that arguers in a dispute will necessarily find consensus, let alone the "truth." They may continue to disagree, in an enduring state of what John Rawls has called "reasonable disagreement."

This brings us to the last keyword in the book title: "rhetorical." Rhetoric, I argue, has from its first practical implementation by the sophists and its first theoretical conception by Aristotle been a social practice designed to deal with precisely the kind of reasoning circumscribed above. Aristotle, I argue, laid down a particularly strict and clearly demarcated conceptual definition of rhetoric, namely as public discussion of issues on which we may "deliberate" (*bouleuein*). Those issues are, as he repeatedly makes clear, only the sort of things we may decide to do or undertake—not all sorts of other issues where we can do nothing one way or the other. Rhetoric, by this definition, is precisely the public discussion of what we, as a collective, will decide to do.

This implies that traditional definitions of rhetoric as dealing with "the contingent," "the probable," etc., are not strict enough—at least not by Aristotle's standards. Rhetoric is the discussion of what we will do because we want things to be in certain ways; the "contingent" and the "probable" are terms whose core meaning is that they deny absolute certainty or necessity; but they still have to do with how things are, not how we want them to be.

I do not speak for a definition of rhetoric as strict as Aristotle's (I mean his "intensional" definition, which is the one I referred to above; his "extensional" definition is looser, genre-based and more empirical). But I think his narrow definition is worth highlighting because it identifies what I

Deliberative Rhetoric: Arguing about Doing Christian Kock https://doi.org/10.22329/wsia.05.2017

consider to be the central domain of rhetorical argumentation: disagreement over proposed action. I would add, however, that in the rhetorical tradition this strict understanding has been supplemented, as with concentric circles around a core, with other domains of argument—and with other types of "speech acts" (or if you will, Wittgensteinian "language-games") that are not argumentation at all, having no strictly persuasive motive, but which are rather to seen as exemplifying the other two Ciceronian "offices" of the rhetor besides *movere*: *docere* and *delectare*. Common to all these functions are that in each of them a rhetor aims, through discourse, to have some kind of impact on his or her audience. Rhetors are out to affect people, not merely to prove propositions (which is something they cannot do anyway in rhetorical argument, since, as we have seen, no deductive *proof* is available there).

On the other hand, in order to perform all these functions, rhetoric disposes of a vast store of instruments and insights. They exist in order to help rhetors do things (or try to do them). As regards rhetorical argumentation, rhetorical arguers should openly admit that when they engage in it they are "strategic" in the sense that they want to persuade—that is, they want, if possible, to have their way.

These facts have, ever since Plato's *Gorgias*, cause a deep distrust of rhetoric and rhetors. So they are out to persuade? Persuade by any means—any whatsoever, regardless of truth and ethics? The reply to this concern is that some rhetors are indeed like that, that is, without regard for truth and ethics—but rhetoric and rhetors are not necessarily guilty of culpable disregard for the truth, or for ethics, for that matter. Rather, since rhetoric's central domain is deliberation about what we should do, it follows that there may in principle be legitimate but opposite courses of action to choose between—as for example in the choice between a neo-liberalist and a communitarian set of political values. (Or, for that matter, for a family that considers whether to spend their vacation in Spain or France.) No binding proof is available in any of these cases—but on the other hand a multitude of other means of impacting one's audience and its inclinations *are* available.

Despite the fact that in rhetoric one argues about decision, not about truth, and despite the fact that there are countless ways one can use discourse to argue for a decision, it is nevertheless an essential tenet in this book that there *is* such a thing as reasonable and responsible rhetoric, as well as its opposite: rhetoric that is unreasonable, irresponsible and socially pernicious. The foundational thinkers in the rhetorical tradition—figures

like Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Erasmus, Vico, Campbell, Kenneth Burke, Perelman—all take it for granted that on the one hand rhetoric can fulfill a constructive and necessary function in a polity; but on the other hand it can also do the opposite (and everything in between). This makes it meaningful to try to formulate what the criteria for socially constructive rhetoric are. What are rhetorical virtues, what are vices?

All of the thinkers just mentioned have—realistically—seen rhetoric as functioning on two levels: the personal and the social. A rhetor may speak strategically for his own cause, and in that there is nothing wrong *per se*; in fact it seems a plausible speculation that language arose among humans in order to perform various "strategic" functions. On the other hand one may also ask about the social functions and significance of a society's rhetorical practices.

Much of the work in this book circles around that issue. There is much to be said and much to be discussed when we ask what the criteria for socially desirable rhetoric are, precisely because rhetoric cannot be required to prove truths or be deductively valid. So what *can* we require? And if we have some idea of what sorts of rhetoric we wish to see and hear in a society, how can we encourage and nurture them, and how can we expose and discourage the less desirable kinds? What forms and venues of critical observation and commentary might have some kind of impact? What could be done in the educational system for a better argumentative dialogue on matters of shared concern, in the public sphere and among citizens? These are some of the issues that argumentation scholars, regardless of "school," should get together to address.

Some remarks to introduce the individual chapters in the book and establish a certain coherence between them might be in place. The chapters have been arranged in four parts.

Part 1, "Rhetoric and Philosophy," has three chapters that all address the relationship between these two humanistic disciplines, the oldest of all. I wish to suggest that they can learn from each other, rather than continue the mutual warfare that Plato began, and both make their distinctive contributions to a humanistic understanding of man in society.

Chapter 1, "Gorgias Reloaded. A New-Found Dialogue between Gorgias and Socrates," is not quite what the title asserts. It was originally a talk at the presentation of a new complete translation of Plato's writings into Danish. I happen to think that the criticism of rhetoric that Plato launched

Deliberative Rhetoric: Arguing about Doing Christian Kock https://doi.org/10.22329/wsia.05.2017

through Socrates in *Gorgias* has enjoyed far too much unreflecting repetition by philosophers and other thinkers in later centuries. Reflection, however, is what it should bring about, so I playfully let Gorgias talk back instead of performing the part of the willing lamb-to-the-slaughter that Socrates' interlocutors have assigned to them in some of the dialogues. I let Gorgias enjoy the benefit of having learned from conversation with Aristotle in the Elysian fields, and I also let him expose what I consider an unfair, fallacious analogy argument in Socrates' comparison of the sophist/rhetorician and the harp-player in the *Protagoras*.

Chapter 2, "Choice Is Not True or False: The Domain of Rhetorical Argumentation," is a programmatic text in which I argue that leading contemporary argumentation theorists such as Johnson, van Eemeren and Houtlosser, and Tindale —all of whom I admire for many of their ideas, but not necessarily for all of them—have, in their attempts to address rhetoric, tended to define rhetorical argumentation with reference either to (a) the rhetorical arguer's goal (to persuade effectively), or (b) the means he employs to do so. However, a central strand in the rhetorical tradition itself, led by Aristotle, and arguably the dominant view in that tradition, sees rhetorical argumentation as defined with reference to the *domain of issues* discussed. On that view, the domain of rhetorical argumentation is centered on choice of action in the civic sphere, and the distinctive nature of issues in this domain is considered crucial. I argue that argumentation theories such as those discussed in the first part of the chapter promulgate an understanding of rhetoric that is historically inadequate. I further suggest that theories adopting this understanding of rhetoric risk ignoring important distinctive features of argumentation about action.

Chapter 3, "Aristotle on Deliberation: Its Place in Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric—Then and Now," is an attempt to highlight connections between Aristotle's thinking on rhetoric and on ethics and politics. Aristotle differs from most later philosophers in distinguishing clearly between epistemic reasoning, which aims for truth, and practical reasoning, which aims for choice. How can he posit this distinction and yet not dismiss practical reasoning as truth-neglecting flattery and manipulation, as Plato did? The question I try to answer here is one that many later rhetors and rhetoricians have also had to face. The answer lies in the concepts of deliberation (*boulē, bouleusis*) and deliberate choice (*proairesis*). They link Aristotle's rhetoric, ethics, and politics together and help provide interconnected definitions of all three. Ethics is about deliberate choices made by individuals. Politics and rhetoric are about the collective choices made by the polity: politics is about making such choices that the good life of all

Deliberative Rhetoric: Arguing about Doing Christian Kock https://doi.org/10.22329/wsia.05.2017

citizens is optimally secured; rhetoric is the principal means to do this. These links have not been much discussed by scholars, probably because few studies range across all three of these Aristotelian arts; a proper discussion of them should draw on modern work in ethics, political science, and rhetoric. The key concepts in Aristotle that the paper discusses offer inspiration for modern theories of "deliberative democracy," citizenship, argumentation, debate, and the public sphere.

Part 2, "Rhetoric and Argumentation," collects five chapters where I have done what I could to make clear how a rhetorical view can contribute to argumentation theory proper. I have great respect for what the leading figures in contemporary argumentation theory have done for this discipline that is fairly new in academe but no less necessary for that, but I also think rhetoric can bring useful new insights to the shared table. And the common denominator for those might be "pluralism." In all of these chapters there is a plea that significant distinctions should be made that much of the current theory is apt to neglect or downplay.

Chapter 4, "Multiple Warrants in Practical Reasoning," is one of two papers that discuss the lasting contribution of Stephen Toulmin to argumentation theory in light of the central ideas I wish to propose. The concept of "warrant," I argue, reflects Toulmin's general insights that argumentative validity in reasoning (which is not the same as logical "validity") comes in many forms, and that reasoning in most fields cannot possess the necessity and certainty that have attracted many thinkers to the "Rationalist" paradigm. However, there is a scarcity of concepts in one part of Toulmin's theory of argument. While pedagogical applications of his model offer a fine-grained system of warrant types for epistemic propositions ("sign" warrants, "causal" warrants, etc.), they lack categories of warrants for practical claims (i.e., proposals for action). One version of Toulmin-based pedagogy has only one such category—the "motivational" warrant. Ancient rhetorical thinking can help us correct this insufficiency. The author of the rhetorical textbook allegedly used by Alexander the Great proposed a broader typology of practical warrants. His approach highlights what I call the "multidimensionality," and hence what modern moral philosophers call the "incommensurability," of warrants—the absence of a common measure allowing for a "rational" balancing of conflicting warrants. The widespread occurrence of multidimensionality in practical argument lends support to Toulmin's general anti-rationalist view of reasoning. Moreover, while multidimensionality prevents a "rational" and

Deliberative Rhetoric: Arguing about Doing Christian Kock https://doi.org/10.22329/wsia.05.2017

binding balancing, I argue that it legitimizes and in fact necessitates the use of rhetoric in practical reasoning.

Chapter 5, “Is Practical Reasoning Presumptive?” addresses attempts by the most prolific contemporary argumentation theorist, Douglas Walton, to fit practical reasoning into a theoretical mold that in my view does not sufficiently recognize its distinctive features. Walton’s model of practical reasoning as “presumptive” is, I argue, misleading. The notions of “inference” and of the “burden of proof” shifting back and forth between proponent and respondent lead to counterintuitive consequences. Because the issue in practical reasoning is a *proposal*, rather than a *proposition*, there are, in the standard case, several perfectly good reasons on both sides simultaneously, which implies that argument appraisal necessarily contains a subjective element—a fact that argumentation theory needs to conceptualize.

Chapter 6, “Multidimensionality and Non-Deductiveness in Deliberative Argumentation,” argues that the focus in contemporary argumentation theory is too rarely on practical or deliberative argumentation as such. Many modern theorists mistakenly tend to see all argumentation as one homogeneous domain. Even so, there has recently been a tendency to differentiate more, for example in the work of Walton, who has defined different types of argumentative dialogue. However, to understand deliberative argumentation better, we also need to differentiate in another way, namely on the basis of argumentative issues (one might also say “domains,” cf. above). When the issue is practical (i.e., action or choice), there will typically be multidimensionality among the reasons or warrants invoked, and this helps explain why deductive “validity” is not an option nor a meaningful evaluative criterion.

Chapter 7, “Constructive Controversy: Rhetoric as Dissensus-oriented Discourse,” similarly suggests that current theories of argumentation underestimate the difference, emphasized by Aristotle, between theoretical and practical (action-oriented) argumentation. This is exemplified with the argument theories of Toulmin, Pragma-Dialectics, Habermas, Walton, and even Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (whose fundamental views and insights I am otherwise strongly indebted to). Since antiquity, rhetoric has defined itself, not as argument designed to “win,” but as action-oriented argument. What is perhaps most noticeable in this chapter is that it specifies some of the distinctive features of action-oriented argument. One is that its warrants include value concepts in audiences, implying an element of subjectivity in argument assessment. Between disagreeing individuals, but

also inside each individual, several conflicting value dimensions are typically involved, not just the dimension of truth-falsity—and this makes sustained, reasonable dissensus inevitable.

Chapter 8, “Why Argumentation Theory Should Differentiate Types of Claim,” further explores the distinction between epistemic reasoning (about the truth of propositions) and practical reasoning (about the adoption of proposals), emphasizing the depth of the differences. I use Aristotle's views of practical reasoning, as interpreted by the philosopher Anthony Kenny, to show that practical reasoning has a complex, “'backward” structure that does not allow for the predication of “truth” for the claims advanced, nor for a strict notion of “inference.” Other features of practical reasoning such as multidimensionality and the role of subjectivity are discussed, and a spectrum of types of claim, ranging from the purely epistemic to the purely practical, is suggested.

Part 3, “Rhetoric and Democracy,” widens the scope by bringing together seven chapters that all look at how argumentation and persuasion works, or should work, in the practical world of politics, ethics, and daily affairs.

Chapter 9, “Norms of Legitimate Dissensus,” can be said to summarize much of what is said in this volume about the nature of deliberative debate and the consequent criteria for the assessment of it. I call for argumentation theory to learn from moral and political philosophy. Several thinkers in these fields help understand the occurrence of what we may call legitimate dissensus: enduring disagreement even between reasonable people arguing reasonably. It inevitably occurs over practical issues, e.g., issues of action rather than truth, because there will normally be legitimate arguments on both sides, and these tend to be incommensurable, i.e., they cannot be objectively weighed against each other. Accordingly, “inference,” logical “validity,” and “sufficiency” are inapplicable notions. Further distinctive features of pro and con arguments in practical argumentation are explored, and some corollaries are drawn regarding evaluative norms of legitimate dissensus. Examples from immigration-related public debates in Denmark are given.

Chapter 10, “Dialectical Obligations in Political Debate,” zooms in on the crucial importance in public debate of not only arguing for one’s own position, but also answering counter-arguments. Given the distinctive features of political debate, and of all practical reasoning, that have been asserted in this volume, it follows that political debaters have particularly

stringent dialectical obligations: it becomes crucial, in the interest of the audience (i.e., all us citizens), that political debaters acknowledge good arguments on the opposite side and explain why, on balance, they deem the arguments favoring their own side to be weightier.

Chapter 11, “Virtue Reversed: Principal Argumentative Vices in Political Debate,” summarizes, in a systematic overview, the principal “stultifying vices” that I have analyzed in a book whose title means “They Are Not Answering”—vices that I believe beset most public political debate in Western democracies. The conceptual hierarchy of these “vices” reflects a view of argumentative norms inspired by the “ARG” triad (“Acceptability—Relevance—Good Grounds”) as well as by the concept of “dialectical obligations,” both advanced by thinkers connected with the school of Informal Logic. The resultant typology presents, in negative, a bid for something that civic instruction might profitably teach students at all levels about deliberative democracy.

Chapter 12, “Rhetoric that Shifts Votes: A Large-Scale Exploratory Study of Persuasion in Issue-Oriented Public Debates,” was written with two colleagues in the Rhetoric program at the University of Copenhagen, Charlotte Jørgensen and Lone Rørbech. It differs from all the preceding chapters in being a strictly empirical study—with a normative twist. It summarizes a study of 37 televised debates on political issues in Denmark, conducted live before representative audiences, with polls on the issues taken in the audience before and after each debate. These debates are of interest as research data because they were authentic, not experimental, and they suggest valuable insights about persuasive effects. Various rhetorical features were observed and related to debaters' success in attracting votes. In a qualitative interpretation of the observations, we suggest that debates such as these are likely to be won by debaters whose argumentation is fair and thoughtful. The debate format may enhance such a result, for the benefit of the democratic process. It was our study of these policy debates, I believe, that first alerted me to differences between epistemic and logical reasoning on the one hand and practical reasoning, including political debate, on the other.

Chapter 13, “The Rhetorical Audience in Public Debate and the Strategies of Vote-gathering and Vote-shifting,” written with Charlotte Jørgensen, grew out of our work with the “Rhetoric that Shifts Votes” project, which generated the hypothesis that two different rhetorical strategies in issue-oriented debates will be apt to win votes from two different groups: what we call vote-gathering will be more likely to appeal to the Undecided voters, while the strategy we call vote-shifting is more

likely to win votes from the opposite side. While vote-gathering tends to be "front-widening," vote-shifting tends to be "front-narrowing." We speak for debate formats that allow vote-shifting rhetoric to unfold and suggest that it would be strategically wise for debaters, as well as more useful for audiences, if debaters would focus on winning over shiftable voters from the opposite side.

Chapter 14, "Evaluation of Public Spokespersons," was written with the late Flemming Hansen, Professor of Marketing at the Copenhagen Business School. Like the preceding chapter, it is strictly empirical, aiming to find what properties ordinary people connect with the notion of "credibility"—a longtime pet subject of empirical communication research. The study uses factor analysis, as do many previous studies of the credibility construct, but with important modifications. Our findings suggest, essentially, that people tend to correlate credibility with some of the same qualities that were found to characterize "vote-shifters" in the "Rhetoric that Shifts Votes" study. To be credible, one need not be telegenic, spectacular or provocative (these attributes correlate more with a factor we call "charisma"), but should rather demonstrate the qualities one would hope to find in a judge: intelligence, competence, civility, respect for both sides of an issue.

Chapter 15, "Argumentation Democracy 101," is a sort of beginner's guide to the normative assessment of public debate, with proposals for its improvement. It builds on the opening chapter of my book in Danish, *De svarer ikke: Fordummende uskikke i den politiske debat* ("They Are Not Answering: Stultifying Vices in Political Debate," 2011, 2nd ed. 2013). I am pleased to report that for several weeks this book, aimed at a general audience, topped the Danish list of best-selling non-fiction. The chapter based on it sketches in broad strokes and accessible language a view of what deliberative debate in democracy could be, and ideally should be.

Part 4, "Rhetoric and Practice," widens the scope further. The chapters in this part overlap with other neighbor disciplines of rhetoric such as linguistics, pedagogy, and media studies.

Chapter 16, "Non-Truth-Conditional Quantification," is the earliest of the papers in the book. When I wrote it I didn't think of myself as either a rhetorician or an argumentation scholar, but more as a pragmatic linguist. The paper parallels, and is inspired by, Oswald Ducrot's thinking on language as more argumentative than referential, and I argue that an omnipresent element in everyday communication, namely the meanings of what I call "vague" adjectives and adverbials (elements that I later learned many linguists call "scalar") can only be understood if we see those meanings as argumentative. (Looking back, I would like to have said

"rhetorical." As it happens, Ducrot himself went on to draw on terms and notions from the rhetorical tradition.) I polemically address a widespread view of how to account to for the meaning of linguistic items: the view that sees meaning as (almost) exhaustively describable in terms of "truth conditions." This stab at the "meaning-as-truth-conditions" theory anticipates my later claim that not all argument is about some proposition being true; lurking behind my stance here is a "rhetorical" theory of language to the effect that language is more fundamentally about inducing cooperation from others than about uttering true propositions.

Chapter 17, "Inception: How the Unsaid May Become Public Knowledge," opens a section featuring specific analyses of how language may function rhetorically—for better or worse. It uses H.P. Grice's concept of conversational implicature, and develops concepts based on Gricean thinking, in a rhetorical analysis of several passages in President George W. Bush's speeches prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. I propose that the passages in question, along with many others, were apt to suggest to audiences something that Bush never asserted (and ostensibly denied), namely that he believed Saddam Hussein to have been complicit in the 9/11 terrorist acts. Three types of suggestive mechanism are analyzed. They are offered as examples of rhetorical devices used in political communication that may create a kind of "public knowledge" that has neither been asserted, supported with reasons, or reflected upon. The intended relevance of this analysis for argumentation studies is that it cautions citizens in democracies about the views that political leaders will have us adopt underhandedly, without argument.

In Chapter 18, "A Good Paper Makes a Case: Teaching Academic Writing the Macro-Toulmin Way," my co-author Signe Hegelund and I contend that many of our students' problems in the writing of academic papers (including problems concerning typical rhetorical aspects like genre and task definition) may be addressed if we adapt Toulmin's argument model to explain the genre requirements regarding argumentation in academic papers, as opposed to everyday argumentation (including practical reasoning). Students, we say, should be encouraged to apply the model as an assessment criterion and, at the same time, as a heuristic tool while writing their papers. This involves a "macroscopic" or "top-down" approach to the evolving draft, not a "microscopic" analysis of individual passages. The paper suggests a number of class activities that will help students apply such a "Macro-Toulmin" view to their own work. I might add that I think this is what the "Toulmin model" is probably best at—

because it was not in the first place conceived to model practical argument (i.e., argumentation about doing). I believe it is better seen as part of Toulmin's Wittgenstein-inspired campaign for a pluralism where different scholarly and scientific "fields" have, as it were, different "language-games" with different rules for what counts as data and, in particular, as warrants. This again reflects the fact that Toulmin, at the time when he wrote *The Uses of Argument*, was mainly interested in the theory of science. It is, indeed, striking that the book contains no examples of examples of arguments about doing, only examples of epistemic arguments (who can forget "Harry is a British subject"?). For these reasons I also believe that Toulmin's theory and model are in fact insufficient and potentially misleading as a theoretical basis for a study or pedagogy of practical argument.

In Chapter 19, "Generalizing Stasis Theory for Everyday Use," I propose a modernized version of ancient thinking about *stasis* (or *status*)—a topical system for argument invention used by defendants in court trials. Essentially, I suggest that, for purposes of pedagogy, criticism, and also argumentative practice, we may extend the use of *stasis* thinking to *all* practical disagreements, not just forensic cases, since all such disagreements invoke norms, formal or informal, that are functionally similar to the legal statutes in forensic reasoning. Furthermore, I suggest that we collapse the two main components of *stasis* theory—the *status rationales* and the *status legales*. The resulting systematic overview of argumentative strategies could, I argue, help focus political and social disagreements on the points where the essential disagreements remain. This might at the same time give more powerful persuasive tools to debaters and "more light, less heat" to their audiences.

Chapter 20, "Rhetoric in Media Studies: The Voice of Constructive Criticism," seeks to apply an idea of rhetoric as a socially constructive force to media criticism. With reference to studies in news reporting and political journalism and commentary, I suggest that various current program types and framing practices do not serve democracy and deliberation as well as they might.

On these pages I have underlined some of the central issues that weave through this book. Hopefully they will become more visible with the above remarks in mind. I have briefly summarized the individual chapters in a way that is meant to clarify how they relate to the recurrent themes. While I

Deliberative Rhetoric: Arguing about Doing Christian Kock https://doi.org/10.22329/wsia.05.2017

ask for the reader's attentiveness in recognizing these themes, I also apologize for having made the going bumpier than necessary. Most of the flaws of exposition that I am aware of have to do with the fact that these papers were produced over a long stretch of time, in an attempt to progressively clarify my own thoughts. This has made me repeat certain key ideas and examples more times than would have been fitting for a monograph. And the papers in this volume are reproduced in exactly the formulation they originally had. There would have been no point in trying to revise and update them—that task would inevitably lead to complete rethinking in monograph form (which is in fact a project I am engaged in). In addition to some unnecessary repetition, there is also on the other hand a certain lack of repetition and consistency in my use of key terms. I have tried out various wordings and key terms for key ideas and have at times, for example, spoken of reasoning, argumentation, or deliberation as more or less overlapping or synonymous notions. A list of other blemishes of expository rhetoric might be put together. I ask the reader's indulgence with this in the hope that the central ideas I speak for will crystallize and earn the reader's thoughtful consideration.

Deliberative Rhetoric: Arguing about Doing Christian Kock https://doi.org/10.22329/wsia.05.2017